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ABSTRACT	  AmeriCorps,	  the	  federal	  volunteer	  program	  developed	  in	  1993,	  has	  won	  increasing	  political	  and	  cultural	  support	  since	  its	  development.	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  challenged	  program	  administrators	  to	  recruit	  and	  support	  volunteers	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  a	  uniquely	  devastated	  city.	  This	  qualitative	  study	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  former	  volunteers	  examines	  the	  implications	  of	  AmeriCorps	  program	  policies	  for	  the	  recovery	  of	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans.	  Rooted	  in	  statements	  by	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  Federal	  Emergency	  Response	  Agency	  and	  local	  grassroots	  organizations,	  this	  study	  concludes	  that	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  was	  not	  effective	  in	  facilitating	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  residents,	  appropriately	  utilizing	  city	  resources	  or	  maintaining	  strong	  accountability	  to	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  disaster.	  Thus,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program,	  which	  is	  not	  intended	  specifically	  for	  disaster	  relief,	  must	  be	  redesigned	  in	  order	  to	  accountably	  contribute	  to	  recovery	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  acute	  disaster.	  	  
	  	  	  Keywords:	  AmeriCorps,	  volunteerism,	  disasters,	  Hurricane	  Katrina.
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Chapter	  1.	  INTRODUCTION	  The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  volunteerism,	  originating	  with	  early	  religious	  charity	  where	  those	  with	  wealth	  assisted	  those	  “less	  fortunate”	  (O’Connell	  1983,	  1-­‐4).	  There	  have	  been	  significant	  changes	  in	  national	  volunteerism	  since	  its	  beginning.	  Today,	  more	  people	  than	  ever	  before	  participate	  in	  volunteer	  activities—27%	  of	  the	  US	  population	  (CNCS	  2006)—hope	  to	  better	  their	  communities,	  try	  something	  new	  and	  gain	  experience.	  The	  federal	  government	  has	  encouraged	  these	  endeavors,	  beginning	  with	  the	  internationally	  focused	  Peace	  Corps	  and	  continuing	  today	  with	  the	  growing	  national	  volunteer	  program,	  AmeriCorps.	  Following	  national	  disasters	  the	  number	  of	  volunteers	  and	  the	  hours	  they	  commit	  increase—as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  September	  11th,	  2001	  and	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  study	  I	  will	  use	  the	  definition	  of	  volunteerism	  as	  work	  done	  without	  financial	  compensation	  for	  an	  institution	  or	  organization.	  This	  is	  distinct	  from	  simply	  work	  without	  pay,	  as	  it	  is	  directly	  affiliated	  with	  an	  organization	  other	  than	  the	  home,	  such	  as	  church,	  school	  or	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization.	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  and	  the	  tragic	  aftermath	  placed	  many	  government	  programs	  under	  intense	  scrutiny.	  It	  is	  my	  intention	  to	  examine	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  federal	  disaster	  response	  in	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  through	  the	  work	  of	  federally	  supported	  volunteers.	  While	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  affected	  the	  entire	  Gulf	  Coast,	  my	  study	  is	  bounded	  by	  the	  borders	  of	  Orleans	  Parish,	  Louisiana,	  where	  federal	  infrastructure	  failure	  led	  to	  devastating	  flooding.	  By	  interviewing	  former	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  who	  served	  in	  this	  area	  in	  2006	  I	  explore	  the	  implications	  of	  federal	  volunteer	  policy	  in	  the	  ongoing	  recovery	  from	  this	  disaster.	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New	  Orleans	  in	  January	  2006	  was	  still	  soggy.	  I	  traveled	  with	  a	  plane	  ticket	  from	  my	  future	  supervisor,	  and	  ate	  the	  first	  of	  many	  Meals	  Ready	  to	  Eat	  (MRE’s)	  that	  evening.	  The	  next	  day	  I	  gutted	  my	  first	  of	  over	  two	  hundred	  houses	  with	  the	  support	  of	  a	  Christian	  relief	  organization.	  I	  was	  never	  an	  AmeriCorps	  volunteer,	  though	  I	  was	  socially	  connected	  with	  many	  of	  them.	  I	  volunteered	  with	  faith-­‐based	  organizations	  for	  a	  year	  specializing	  in	  house	  gutting	  and	  volunteer	  coordination.	  Through	  this	  year	  and	  after,	  I	  struggled	  to	  understand	  the	  reasons	  for	  such	  an	  intense	  need	  for	  volunteer	  services.	  I	  discussed	  government	  neglect	  in	  hundreds	  of	  conversations	  with	  displaced	  people	  about	  FEMA,	  then-­‐President	  Bush’s	  statements,	  tax	  collection	  and	  other	  topics;	  however,	  I	  craved	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  seeming	  paradox	  of	  government-­‐sponsored	  volunteerism.	  	  I	  chose	  Orleans	  Parish	  as	  my	  study	  site	  partially	  out	  of	  convenience—I	  am	  a	  resident	  and	  attend	  school	  in	  New	  Orleans—but	  more	  significantly,	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  was	  the	  largest	  national	  disaster	  of	  this	  century	  and	  the	  most	  widely	  recognized	  failure	  of	  federal	  disaster	  response.	  The	  density	  of	  population	  in	  Orleans	  Parish	  and	  the	  exceptional	  failure	  of	  levee	  infrastructure	  concentrated	  tragedy	  in	  this	  city.	  Additionally,	  the	  mass	  evacuation	  of	  all	  residents,	  including	  community	  organizers	  and	  activists	  working	  against	  social	  inequality,	  created	  what	  Klein	  identifies	  as	  a	  “beautiful”	  blank	  slate	  for	  opportunity	  seekers	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  (2007).	  According	  to	  a	  press	  release	  from	  the	  National	  Commission	  for	  Community	  Service,	  by	  August	  2007	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  has	  hosted	  over	  a	  million	  relief	  volunteers	  (CNCS	  2007)	  often	  drawn	  by	  extensive	  media	  coverage	  of	  struggling	  survivors.	  Thus,	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006	  is	  the	  ideal	  place	  to	  study	  volunteerism	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  a	  federal	  program	  on	  a	  devastated	  city.	  	  This	  study	  is	  not	  exclusively	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  federal	  policy;	  it	  also	  provides	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  volunteers	  who	  worked	  in	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the	  Crescent	  City.	  They	  found	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  through	  online	  and	  personal	  connections	  and	  worked	  hard	  in	  difficult	  conditions.	  	  The	  time	  frame	  for	  this	  project	  is	  the	  period	  of	  disaster	  recovery,	  not	  relief.	  The	  volunteers	  I	  interviewed	  were	  not	  responding	  to	  dehydrated	  people	  on	  rooftops,	  nor	  did	  they	  have	  to	  search	  for	  bodies	  or	  care	  for	  the	  sick	  without	  electricity.	  Rather,	  they	  were	  tasked	  with	  supporting	  the	  systems	  that	  began	  to	  take	  hold	  following	  mass	  evacuation.	  Some	  were	  new,	  such	  as	  systems	  of	  utilizing	  and	  handling	  the	  mass	  influx	  of	  volunteer	  labor,	  and	  some	  were	  old,	  such	  as	  public	  education.	  Rachel	  E.	  Luft	  also	  identifies	  this	  time	  as	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  “second	  generation”	  of	  social	  movement	  groups,	  focusing	  on	  grassroots	  organizing	  for	  a	  “just	  reconstruction,”	  were	  developing	  (2009,	  504).	  As	  many	  new	  groups	  were	  emerging	  federal	  grants	  of	  low-­‐cost	  AmeriCorps	  labor	  supported	  only	  specific	  organizations.	  This	  study	  explores	  the	  implications	  of	  AmeriCorps	  policies	  for	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006—one	  year	  after	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  and	  examine	  volunteer	  recruitment	  methods,	  the	  applicable	  training	  and	  experience	  volunteers	  received,	  the	  benefits	  they	  were	  offered	  in	  exchange	  for	  their	  labor,	  the	  actual	  work	  they	  did,	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  official	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  My	  analysis	  places	  this	  information	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  displaced	  people,	  resource	  availability	  in	  the	  city	  during	  this	  time	  and	  the	  history	  of	  social	  justice	  organizing	  in	  the	  South.	  While	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  is	  not	  designed	  as	  a	  disaster	  response	  program,	  it	  consistently	  increases	  the	  number	  of	  volunteers	  sent	  to	  a	  specific	  location	  following	  an	  acute	  disaster	  (CNCS	  k).	  	  A	  statement	  issued	  by	  the	  Commission	  for	  National	  and	  Community	  Service	  states	  “The	  Corporation’s	  Board	  of	  Directors	  added	  a	  new	  strategic	  initiative	  on	  disaster	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preparedness	  and	  response…This	  action	  reflects	  the	  agency's	  growing	  expertise	  and	  increased	  commitment	  to	  help	  individuals	  and	  communities	  expand	  their	  capacity	  to	  pre-­‐	  pare	  for	  and	  respond	  to	  natural	  disasters”	  (CNCS	  2009).	  Thus,	  I	  place	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  reaction	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  in	  order	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  government	  following	  disasters.	  	  My	  data	  analysis	  is	  from	  my	  perspective	  as	  a	  post-­‐Katrina	  resident	  of	  New	  Orleans	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  local	  needs.	  Through	  my	  research	  I	  determine	  that	  AmeriCorps	  policy	  provides	  insufficient	  support—financial	  and	  otherwise—making	  it	  an	  unattractive	  employment	  option	  for	  displaced	  residents,	  and	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  services	  of	  the	  disaster-­‐struck	  city	  to	  support	  the	  needs	  of	  volunteers.	  Due	  to	  the	  low	  financial	  stipends,	  insufficient	  health	  care	  and	  selective	  publicizing,	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  were	  discouraged	  from	  participating	  in	  AmeriCorps.	  Following	  a	  disaster,	  those	  affected	  are	  in	  increased	  need	  of	  well	  paying	  jobs	  and	  health	  care	  for	  any	  injuries,	  trauma	  induced	  conditions,	  and	  mental	  health	  needs.	  AmeriCorps	  job	  postings	  were	  selective	  and	  disproportionally	  drew	  those	  who	  were	  computer	  savvy	  or	  had	  personal	  connections	  with	  select	  organizational	  leaders.	  Many	  volunteers	  were	  housed	  in	  former	  homeless	  shelters	  and	  hospitals—areas	  that	  could	  have	  been	  used	  to	  ease	  the	  homelessness	  and	  health	  care	  crisis	  of	  residents.	  They	  were	  provided	  emergency-­‐only	  health	  care	  despite	  working	  in	  dangerous	  conditions,	  forcing	  some	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  already	  over-­‐burdened	  local	  charity	  medical	  system.	  Volunteers	  faced	  an	  extreme	  amount	  of	  stress,	  which	  contributed	  to	  a	  significantly	  low	  organizational	  retention	  rate	  following	  service	  completion—and	  the	  highest	  dropout	  rate	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  has	  known.	  This	  increased	  the	  turnover	  rate	  in	  organizations	  and	  required	  more	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energy	  to	  be	  spent	  on	  training	  new	  volunteers	  than	  on	  increasing	  organizational	  capacity.	  Despite	  all	  of	  this,	  individual	  post-­‐Katrina	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  worked	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  exhaustion,	  wracked	  their	  brains	  for	  creative	  solutions	  to	  overwhelming	  problems	  and	  struggled	  to	  help	  the	  ravaged	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans.	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Chapter	  2:	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
Introduction	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  offer	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  My	  case	  study,	  the	  first	  AmeriCorps	  team	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  federally	  sponsored	  volunteers	  in	  disaster	  recovery1.	  The	  history	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  began	  in	  1964	  with	  Volunteers	  In	  Service	  To	  America	  (VISTA)—the	  first	  federally	  sponsored	  national	  volunteer	  program—which	  recruited	  mostly	  white,	  college-­‐educated	  young	  people	  to	  provide	  social	  services	  in	  southern	  black	  communities.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  Student	  Nonviolent	  Coordinating	  Committee	  (SNCC)	  was	  recruiting	  a	  demographically	  similar	  volunteer	  population	  to	  advocate	  for	  political	  change	  in	  very	  similar	  communities	  through	  their	  Freedom	  Summer	  program.	  As	  government	  priorities	  and	  political	  climates	  shifted,	  VISTA	  was	  incorporated	  into	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  AmeriCorps	  program	  and	  SNCC	  folded.	  Now,	  looking	  at	  recent	  U.S.	  history	  of	  government	  response	  to	  the	  devastation	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  it	  is	  my	  intention	  to	  place	  AmeriCorps	  within	  the	  context	  of	  disaster	  response	  and	  efforts	  of	  social	  justice	  organizations	  in	  the	  South.	  	  
	  
VISTA	  In	  his	  1961	  introduction	  to	  the	  Peace	  Corps	  program,	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  stated:	  “The	  wisdom	  of	  this	  idea	  is	  that	  someday	  we’ll	  bring	  it	  home	  to	  America”	  (Americans	  for	  a	  National	  Service	  Act,	  2007).	  Peace	  Corps	  volunteers	  do	  important	  work	  such	  as	  teach	  in	  schools,	  provide	  health	  care,	  develop	  businesses	  and	  plant	  trees;	  however,	  some	  academics	  are	  critical	  of	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  implications	  of	  the	  program.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  this	  case	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “team”	  to	  represent	  the	  annual	  group	  of	  volunteers	  in	  the	  area.	  These	  groups	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  “generations.”	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Elizabeth	  Cobbs	  Hoffman	  writes	  that	  the	  Peace	  Corps	  as	  a	  program	  holds	  U.S.	  culture	  in	  such	  high	  esteem	  that	  experience	  and	  training	  perpetuates	  U.S.	  imperialism	  and	  demonstrates	  much	  of	  the	  political	  naiveté	  of	  the	  1960s:	  “It	  threw	  young	  volunteers	  at	  the	  third	  world	  in	  the	  way	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  threw	  draftees	  at	  the	  Vietnam	  War—with	  approximately	  the	  same	  effectiveness	  at	  times	  and	  the	  same	  assumptions,	  namely	  that	  American	  will	  was	  enough	  to	  make	  the	  nation	  prevail”	  (1998,	  10).	  Volunteers	  In	  Service	  To	  America	  (VISTA)	  was	  the	  first	  federally	  funded	  national	  service	  program	  following	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  the	  internationally	  focused	  Peace	  Corps.	  The	  VISTA	  program,	  created	  by	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson	  in	  1964	  as	  part	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty,	  brought	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  Peace	  Corps	  to	  the	  national	  arena.	  Five	  hundred	  college	  students	  applied	  to	  the	  first	  year	  of	  VISTA	  and	  one	  hundred	  were	  selected	  and	  placed	  with	  the	  North	  Carolina	  Fund	  (NCF).	  They	  were	  “young	  and	  idealistic,”	  came	  from	  middle	  class	  households	  and	  women	  outnumbered	  men	  three	  to	  one	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  8	  and	  13).	  Fifteen	  out	  of	  the	  one	  hundred	  were	  African	  American	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  8).	  The	  first	  VISTA	  service	  corps	  received	  a	  $250	  stipend	  plus	  room	  and	  board	  for	  10	  weeks	  of	  service	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  185).	  Beginning	  in	  1965,	  VISTA	  workers	  were	  compensated	  $75	  per	  month	  and	  contracted	  for	  one	  year	  with	  the	  option	  to	  extend	  for	  another.	  Upon	  the	  completion	  of	  service,	  volunteers	  were	  awarded	  an	  additional	  $650	  (Wilansky	  1969,	  993).	  	  The	  NCF	  was	  established	  in	  1963	  by	  Governor	  Terry	  Sanford	  as	  an	  anti-­‐poverty	  volunteer	  program	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  177).	  	  Stanford	  chartered	  the	  new	  agency	  as	  a	  private,	  nonprofit	  corporation	  whose	  purpose	  was	  to	  "enable	  the	  poor	  to	  become	  productive,	  self-­‐reliant	  citizens,	  and	  to	  foster	  institutional,	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	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change	  designed	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  functioning,	  democratic	  society”	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  182).	  From	  1963	  to	  1968,	  the	  Fund	  drew	  the	  bulk	  of	  its	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  Ford	  Foundation	  and	  agencies	  of	  the	  federal	  government2	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  182).	  According	  to	  Korstad	  and	  Leloudis,	  the	  NCF	  foreshadowed	  the	  development	  of	  nonprofit	  social	  service	  providers	  that	  “today	  stand	  alongside	  government	  and	  business	  as	  a	  vital	  third	  sector	  in	  the	  development	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  policy”	  (1999,	  183).	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  first	  VISTA	  volunteers	  working	  with	  the	  North	  Carolina	  Fund	  assisted	  children	  in	  educational	  or	  recreational	  programs	  through	  tutoring	  in	  public	  schools	  or	  assisting	  the	  local	  Parks	  and	  Recreation	  department	  (Kolstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  186	  and	  197).	  In	  the	  process	  some	  VISTA	  volunteers	  began	  organizing	  communities	  around	  playground	  construction,	  federal	  funding	  for	  after	  school	  tutoring,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  Head	  Start	  programs	  (Kolstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  191).	  As	  the	  VISTA	  program	  expanded,	  work	  assignments	  and	  geographical	  placement	  became	  increasingly	  diverse.	  By	  1966	  the	  VISTA	  program	  expanded	  dramatically,	  supporting	  3600	  volunteers	  scattered	  across	  the	  country	  (CNCS	  i).	  Eileen	  Wilansky	  reports	  VISTA	  workers	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  serving	  in	  mental	  hospitals,	  working	  with	  migrant	  workers,	  assisting	  alcoholics	  in	  city	  slums,	  teaching	  mothers	  “hygiene	  techniques,”	  setting	  up	  community	  clinics,	  collecting	  clothing	  donations	  and	  visiting	  senior	  citizens	  (1969,	  991).	  The	  Corporation	  for	  National	  and	  Community	  Service	  (CNCS)	  reports	  that	  mid-­‐sixties	  VISTA	  volunteers	  helped	  to	  develop	  the	  first	  Head	  Start	  programs	  and	  Job	  Corps	  sites,	  started	  agricultural	  cooperatives,	  organized	  community	  groups	  and	  supported	  small	  businesses	  (CNCS	  i).	  Many	  volunteers	  were	  building	  careers	  and	  gaining	  experience	  with	  their	  volunteer	  service.	  A	  VISTA	  volunteer	  who	  aspired	  to	  be	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  Ford	  Foundation	  contributed	  $7	  million	  and	  total	  allocation	  from	  public	  funds	  totaled	  $7,042,753.	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nurse	  recalled	  that	  her	  service	  year	  was	  “the	  closest	  I	  could	  come	  to	  direct	  nursing	  experience	  without	  actually	  being	  licensed”	  (Wilansky	  1969,	  993).	  While	  many	  volunteers	  brought	  unique	  skills	  to	  their	  work,	  there	  were	  no	  educational	  requirements,	  tests	  or	  examinations,	  and	  volunteers	  were	  often	  placed	  in	  positions	  for	  which	  they	  had	  few	  qualifications	  (Wilansky	  1969,	  993).	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  early	  VISTA	  volunteers	  were	  northerners	  and	  encountered	  southern	  poverty	  and	  racism	  for	  the	  first	  time	  during	  their	  service	  year	  (Clotfelter	  1999,	  15).	  They	  were	  offered	  a	  six-­‐week	  pre-­‐service	  training	  course	  that	  did	  not	  address	  root	  causes	  of	  poverty.	  	  When	  faced	  with	  such	  suffering,	  most	  of	  the	  Volunteers	  turned,	  at	  least	  initially,	  to	  explanations	  that	  were	  both	  familiar	  and	  comforting.	  While	  they	  never	  quite	  blamed	  the	  poor	  for	  their	  plight,	  they	  did	  locate	  the	  causes	  of	  poverty	  within	  a	  cluster	  of	  social	  and	  psychological	  inadequacies.	  The	  poor,	  it	  seemed,	  ‘believed	  in	  nothing	  and	  [had]	  little	  faith	  in	  their	  own	  capacities.’	  Such	  views	  provided	  both	  emotional	  distance	  from	  hardship	  and	  assurance	  that	  the	  Volunteers	  could	  ‘fix’	  the	  people	  they	  encountered.	  ‘All	  we	  had	  to	  do	  was	  clean	  up	  this	  one	  generation,’	  a	  former	  Volunteer	  recalled	  many	  years	  later,	  ‘educate	  these	  people	  and	  lift	  them	  up,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  over	  with.	  We	  really	  believed	  that’	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  186).	  	  	  While	  this	  mindset	  was	  not	  constant	  among	  volunteers,	  the	  VISTA	  program	  did	  not	  offer	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  social	  problems.	  Individual	  community	  members	  exposed	  volunteers	  to	  the	  complex	  systems	  that	  keep	  people	  in	  poverty	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  187).	  In	  response	  many	  VISTAs	  began	  organizing	  concerned	  citizens	  to	  address	  community	  concerns.	  For	  these	  efforts	  volunteers	  faced	  institutional	  backlash.	  	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  first	  VISTA	  team	  grew	  weary	  of	  “keeping	  order	  on	  ball	  fields”	  and	  began	  organizing	  parents	  to	  build	  a	  playground	  “in	  a	  poor	  black	  neighborhood	  where	  the	  city	  refused	  to	  provide	  recreational	  services”	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  189-­‐190).	  This	  first	  group	  of	  volunteers	  was	  only	  contracted	  for	  ten	  weeks,	  which	  limited	  the	  
10	  
effectiveness	  of	  organizing	  work,	  which	  requires	  long-­‐term	  commitments;	  however,	  the	  state	  political	  structure	  that	  ran	  the	  NCF	  lashed	  out	  against	  their	  new	  efforts.	  As	  remembered	  by	  a	  former	  volunteer,	  the	  mayor	  of	  Durham	  proclaimed	  to	  volunteers	  “We,	  the	  volunteers,	  must	  remember	  that	  we	  were	  employees	  (in	  effect)	  of	  the	  City	  of	  Durham,	  and	  under	  the	  city's	  thumb.	  We	  are	  here	  to	  serve	  as	  requested,	  not	  to	  change	  the	  requests.	  In	  short,	  we	  are	  here	  to	  be	  un-­‐creative,	  and	  not	  to	  fight	  poverty,	  but	  to	  play	  the	  city's	  conservative	  ball	  game”	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  189-­‐190).	  Ultimately	  the	  North	  Carolina	  Fund—which	  hosted	  the	  first	  VISTA	  group	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1964—	  terminated	  the	  volunteer	  program	  citing	  “the	  tension	  between	  service	  and	  activism”	  (Clotfelter	  1999,	  15).	  	   Daniel	  Blumenthal,	  a	  VISTA	  volunteer	  in	  1969-­‐1970,	  recalled	  similar	  tension.	  He	  writes	  that	  many	  of	  his	  fellow	  VISTA	  volunteers	  spent	  their	  days	  driving	  people	  to	  the	  welfare	  office	  or	  distributing	  used	  clothing	  (2002,	  26).	  “Those	  jobs	  constitute	  service,	  to	  be	  sure,	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  done,	  but	  in	  the	  long	  run	  they	  don’t	  change	  anything”	  (Blumenthal	  2002,	  26).	  Conflicted	  between	  service	  provision	  and	  wanting	  to	  change	  systems	  that	  make	  such	  services	  necessary,	  many	  volunteers	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  frustration	  and	  failed	  to	  complete	  their	  contracted	  time	  with	  VISTA	  (Blumenthal	  2002,	  26).	  In	  New	  Orleans	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  VISTA	  volunteers	  were	  placed	  with	  local	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Social	  Welfare	  Planning	  Council	  (SWPC)	  and	  Total	  Community	  Action	  (TAC),	  where	  much	  of	  the	  initial	  tension	  from	  the	  first	  VISTA	  summer	  continued.	  In	  1965	  twenty	  white	  VISTAs	  were	  sent	  to	  New	  Orleans.	  Kent	  Germany	  describes	  them	  as	  aggressive	  activists	  and	  organizers	  (2007,	  88).	  The	  SWPC	  brought	  them	  on	  to	  “play	  effective	  roles	  in	  community	  affairs”	  and	  to	  “raise	  residents’	  self	  esteems”	  (Germany	  2007,	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88).	  VISTA	  workers	  immediately	  began	  attempting	  to	  organize	  poor	  black	  communities	  for	  social	  and	  political	  change.	  The	  SWPC	  lashed	  out	  in	  response,	  explaining,	  “VISTA	  meant	  three	  social	  workers	  at	  no	  cost”—	  emphasizing	  the	  expectation	  that	  VISTAs	  would	  provide	  social	  services,	  not	  political	  agitation	  (Germany	  2007,	  88).	  VISTAs	  were	  denied	  numerous	  requests	  to	  move	  into	  neighborhoods	  they	  were	  working	  in,	  to	  hold	  meetings	  in	  public	  places,	  to	  post	  potentially	  controversial	  fliers	  and	  to	  organize	  against	  agencies	  of	  the	  government	  (Germany	  2007,	  88	  and	  91).	  Two	  volunteers,	  Peter	  Friedberg	  and	  Gary	  Sledge,	  attempted	  to	  organize	  the	  Central	  City	  neighborhood	  against	  police	  brutality;	  as	  a	  result	  they	  were	  targeted	  by	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Police	  Department	  and	  the	  FBI,	  accused	  of	  being	  communist	  sympathizers	  and	  transferred	  by	  VISTA	  away	  from	  the	  city	  (Germany	  2007,	  91-­‐92).	  New	  Orleans	  VISTAs	  were	  so	  disgusted	  with	  the	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  them	  that	  only	  four	  out	  of	  the	  original	  twenty	  completed	  their	  full	  term	  of	  service	  (Germany	  2007,	  88).	  	  Nationally,	  VISTA	  volunteers	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s	  came	  into	  conflict	  with	  local	  political	  leaders	  in	  communities	  where	  they	  worked	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  190).	  Some	  recruits	  openly	  questioned	  Jim	  Crow	  laws,	  and	  some	  allied	  with	  civil	  rights	  resistance.	  In	  response,	  President	  Nixon	  placed	  restrictions	  on	  all	  VISTA	  participants,	  confining	  their	  activities	  to	  politically	  neutral	  service	  provision	  (Clotfelter	  1999,	  10).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  new	  regulations,	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  VISTA	  volunteers	  grew	  so	  frustrated	  with	  the	  restrictions	  on	  their	  work	  that	  they	  chose	  not	  to	  compete	  their	  service	  year	  (Blumenthal	  2002,	  26).	  	  Simultaneous	  with	  the	  first	  VISTA	  program,	  the	  Student	  Nonviolent	  Coordinating	  Committee	  (SNCC)	  was	  recruiting	  volunteers	  to	  fight	  poverty	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  Freedom	  Summer	  was	  designed	  to	  expose	  the	  nation	  to	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  poverty	  though	  the	  stories	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of	  privileged	  volunteers.	  It	  was	  intentionally	  politically	  radical	  and	  expected	  participants	  to	  actively	  organize	  black	  communities.	  Demographically	  similar	  groups	  of	  volunteers	  were	  drawn	  to	  both	  projects;	  however,	  they	  ultimately	  had	  very	  different	  experiences	  and	  impacts.	  
	  
SNCC	   The	  Freedom	  Summer	  was	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  Student	  Nonviolent	  Coordinating	  Committee	  (SNCC)	  and	  ran	  from	  June	  to	  August	  1964—concurrently	  with	  the	  first	  VISTA	  program3.	  SNCC,	  originally	  founded	  by	  students	  involved	  with	  lunch	  counter	  sit-­‐ins,	  has	  won	  a	  secure	  place	  among	  the	  “Big	  Five”	  civil	  rights	  organizations	  (Polletta	  2002,	  88).	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  Freedom	  Summer	  project	  was	  to	  draw	  national	  attention	  to	  the	  violence	  and	  segregation	  in	  Mississippi,	  thus	  forcing	  federal	  intervention	  (McAdam	  1988,	  39).	  SNCC	  recruited	  students	  from	  top	  colleges	  and	  universities	  in	  the	  country	  to	  participate	  in	  Freedom	  Summer.	  “The	  Volunteers”	  were	  650	  young	  people,	  mostly	  Northerners,	  mostly	  white,	  and	  mostly	  students	  or	  “nonprofessionals”	  (Sutherland	  1965,	  4).	  They	  were	  not	  burdened	  with	  families,	  marriage,	  debt	  or	  career	  worries,	  which	  would	  have	  hampered	  their	  significant	  mobility	  (McAdam	  1988,	  44).	  	  Volunteers	  were	  housed	  with	  host	  families	  or	  in	  large	  collective	  Freedom	  Houses	  and	  were	  offered	  no	  financial	  compensation	  for	  their	  work.	  According	  to	  McAdam,	  the	  financial	  requirements	  meant	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  volunteers	  were	  upper	  and	  middle	  class	  (1988,	  41).	  Less	  than	  10%	  of	  the	  volunteers	  were	  black	  despite	  some	  money	  being	  set	  aside	  for	  fellowships	  and	  41%	  of	  applicants	  were	  women—surprising	  considering	  they	  were	  agreeing	  to	  potentially	  dangerous	  situations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  Freedom	  Summer	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Mississippi	  Summer	  Project.	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which	  tend	  to	  be	  male	  dominated	  (McAdam	  1988,	  41	  and	  43).	  The	  average	  SNCC	  volunteer	  age	  was	  23.2	  (McAdam	  1988,	  41).	  Similar	  to	  VISTA	  participants,	  Freedom	  Summer	  volunteers	  interacted	  intimately	  with	  southern	  racism	  and	  poverty,	  realities	  many	  of	  them	  had	  never	  previously	  experienced	  (McAdam	  1988,	  41).	  	  Freedom	  Summer	  programs	  included	  registering	  black	  voters	  and	  running	  Freedom	  Schools	  in	  rural	  Mississippi.	  SNCC	  believed	  that	  voting	  was	  crucial	  to	  gaining	  power	  and	  challenging	  political	  systems	  that	  did	  not	  look	  out	  for	  black	  interests	  (Polletta	  2002,	  70).	  Volunteers	  canvassed	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  trying	  to	  convince	  black	  citizens	  to	  register	  to	  vote—despite	  constant	  threats	  of	  violence	  (McAdam	  1988,	  80-­‐81).	  Ultimately	  17,000	  Mississippi	  blacks	  traveled	  to	  the	  courthouse	  to	  attempt	  to	  register,	  and	  only	  1,600	  applications	  were	  accepted	  (McAdam	  1988,	  81)—a	  clear	  testimony	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  volunteers	  and	  to	  the	  prejudice	  of	  the	  state	  registrar.	  SNCC	  also	  realized	  that	  it	  was	  more	  than	  political	  restriction	  oppressing	  the	  black	  population.	  Freedom	  Schools,	  which	  were	  designed	  to	  “counter	  the	  obvious	  inequities	  and	  insidious	  political	  messages”	  inherent	  in	  the	  public	  educational	  systems,	  were	  a	  successful	  component	  of	  the	  Freedom	  Summer	  project	  (McAdam	  1988,	  83-­‐84).	  Activities	  included	  leadership	  development	  and	  academic	  learning	  about	  black	  history	  and	  other	  topics	  (McAdam	  1988,	  84).	  SNCC	  anticipated	  approximately	  1,000	  students	  and	  over	  3,000	  showed	  up	  despite	  “the	  lack	  of	  facilities,	  fears	  of	  black	  parents	  and	  considerable	  violence	  directed	  at	  the	  school”	  (McAdam	  1988,	  84).	  Despite	  this	  success	  there	  were	  many	  setbacks—both	  McAdam	  and	  Polletta	  report	  numerous	  instances	  of	  conflict	  and	  violence.	  Freedom	  Summer	  volunteers	  and	  SNCC	  staff	  were	  frequently	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  and	  faced	  daily	  life	  threatening	  violence.	  State	  institutions,	  the	  local	  police,	  state	  sheriffs	  and	  the	  FBI	  directly	  perpetuated	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  violence.	  These	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institutions	  also	  sanctioned	  the	  violence	  of	  white	  vigilantes	  who	  independently	  took	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  punish	  participants	  in	  the	  project	  (McAdam	  1988,	  96-­‐101).	  SNCC’s	  vision	  and	  insightfulness	  made	  both	  Freedom	  Schools	  and	  voter	  registration	  efforts	  highly	  successful,	  based	  on	  the	  positive	  impacts	  these	  programs	  had	  on	  low-­‐income	  black	  communities.	  	  White	  volunteers	  were	  consistently	  under	  black	  leadership,	  which	  was	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  project’s	  anti-­‐racist	  agenda.	  Highly	  educated,	  white,	  middle	  class	  youth	  were	  not	  accustomed	  to	  taking	  direction	  from	  people	  of	  color,	  which	  agitated	  already	  existing	  tensions	  (Polletta	  2002,	  105).	  SNCC	  culture	  and	  staff	  interactions	  were	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  black	  church	  culture,	  while	  white	  activists	  were	  shaped	  by	  secular	  raced,	  classed	  and	  gendered	  ideas	  which	  they	  brought	  into	  the	  organizing	  sphere	  (Polletta	  2002,	  61).	  White	  volunteers	  sometimes	  flaunted	  their	  class	  and	  educational	  privileges,	  were	  ignorant	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  southern	  race	  relations	  and	  intimidated	  residents	  with	  their	  formal	  political	  skills	  (Polletta	  year,	  105).	  Eventually	  some	  whites—defined	  by	  Polletta	  as	  “freedom	  highs”	  (2002,	  88)—got	  uncomfortable	  with	  their	  lack	  of	  power	  in	  the	  movement,	  especially	  during	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  participatory	  democracy	  to	  a	  more	  intentional	  top-­‐down	  leadership	  structure	  (Polletta	  2002,	  90).	  Whites	  abandoning	  expectations	  of	  leadership	  was	  fundamental	  to	  the	  movement	  according	  to	  Ella	  Baker,	  one	  of	  SNCC’s	  founders,	  who	  stated,	  “Deferring	  to	  residents	  in	  decision-­‐making	  was	  a	  way	  to	  prove	  organizers’	  trustworthiness	  and	  to	  show	  that	  they	  had	  no	  desire	  to	  press	  residents	  into	  service	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  personal	  agendas”	  (Polletta	  2002,	  69).	  SNCC	  staff	  members	  were	  committed	  and	  patient	  enough	  to	  address	  conflict	  and	  volunteers’	  racism	  successfully—over	  80	  mostly	  white	  volunteers	  remained	  in	  Mississippi	  after	  the	  program	  was	  officially	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over	  to	  continue	  the	  work.	  This	  massive	  influx	  of	  newly	  hired	  staff	  members	  caused	  conflict	  and	  organizational	  weakness	  at	  SNCC	  following	  the	  Freedom	  Summer	  (Polletta	  2002,	  88).	  Conflict	  centered	  on	  the	  role	  of	  whites,	  decision	  making	  practices	  and	  SNCC’s	  position	  in	  larger	  social	  movements	  (Polletta	  2002,	  88-­‐89;	  Meyer,	  Whittier	  and	  Robnett	  2002,	  274-­‐276).	  	   This	  principle	  of	  accountability	  by	  leadership	  remains	  a	  cornerstone	  in	  social	  justice	  work.	  According	  to	  Paul	  Kivel,	  “To	  make	  effective	  decisions	  about	  your	  own	  work	  we	  need	  to	  be	  accountable	  to	  those	  groups	  [at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  economic	  pyramid]	  and	  take	  direction	  from	  their	  actions	  and	  issues”	  (2007,	  146).	  Additionally,	  Paul	  Kivel	  states	  that	  examining	  supervision	  structures	  in	  organizations	  is	  fundamental	  to	  understanding	  whose	  interests	  are	  being	  prioritized.	  He	  expands	  to	  give	  examples	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  those	  with	  privilege	  (race,	  gender	  or	  class)	  being	  supervised	  by	  those	  experiencing	  oppression	  (Kivel	  2007,	  146).	  The	  Freedom	  Summer	  politically	  radicalized	  volunteers.	  Many	  referred	  to	  the	  Freedom	  Summer	  as	  a	  “watershed”	  moment	  that	  completely	  changed	  the	  course	  of	  their	  lives	  (McAdam	  1988,	  12).	  McAdam	  cites	  one	  Freedom	  Summer	  volunteer	  reflecting	  on	  his	  service	  as	  saying	  “I	  went	  from	  being	  a	  liberal	  Peace	  Corps-­‐type	  Democrat	  to	  a	  raging,	  maniacal	  lefty”	  (1988,	  127).	  Another,	  discussing	  his	  former	  political	  ignorance	  states,	  “Politics?	  What	  the	  hell	  was	  that?	  I	  didn’t	  know	  for	  nothing	  about	  politics…I	  was	  going	  to	  spend	  my	  summer	  ‘helping	  Negros’…sort	  of	  a	  domestic	  Peace	  Corps	  member”	  (McAdam	  1988,	  47).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  August	  1964,	  volunteers’	  politics	  had	  changed—they	  joined	  and	  often	  led	  radical	  organizations	  upon	  returning	  to	  school	  or	  home.	  McAdam	  discusses	  significant	  influences	  Freedom	  Summer	  volunteers	  had	  on	  the	  Free	  Speech	  Movement,	  the	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Antiwar	  Movement	  and	  Women’s	  Liberation	  Movement,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  continued	  involvement	  with	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  (1988,	  161-­‐198).	  As	  shown	  by	  the	  above	  quotes,	  Freedom	  Summer	  volunteers	  explicitly	  distinguished	  themselves	  from	  government-­‐supported	  volunteers.	  They	  emphasized	  that	  prior	  to	  their	  service	  they	  were	  politically	  neutral	  or	  liberal,	  similar	  to	  those	  involved	  with	  Peace	  Corps.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  participation	  in	  Freedom	  Summer,	  they	  were	  transformed	  into	  politically	  radical	  activists.	  	  	  Following	  the	  Freedom	  Summer,	  SNCC	  shifted	  ideologically	  away	  from	  the	  interracial	  beloved	  community	  vision	  to	  one	  of	  “collective	  identity”	  and	  demanded	  that	  whites	  work	  in	  their	  own	  communities	  to	  challenge	  racism	  and	  white	  supremacy	  (Meyer,	  Whitter	  and	  Robnett	  2002,	  269	  and	  275).	  SNCC	  and	  later,	  the	  Black	  Panther	  Party’s	  (BPP)	  statements	  reflected	  the	  widespread	  demands	  by	  black	  radicals	  for	  work	  by	  white	  allies—black	  leaders	  would	  define	  the	  terms,	  strategy	  and	  organization	  of	  their	  own	  liberation	  and	  white	  activists	  must	  organize	  their	  own	  communities	  against	  racism	  (Barber	  2006,	  225).	  These	  demands	  were	  difficult	  for	  many	  white	  activists	  to	  follow.	  They	  were	  pushed	  into	  an	  unfamiliar	  leadership	  structure	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  do	  uncharismatic	  organizing	  work	  with	  their	  own	  families	  and	  friends.	  This	  caused	  significant	  numbers	  of	  whites	  to	  sever	  their	  ties	  with	  SNCC.	  As	  one	  former	  Freedom	  Summer	  volunteer	  explained	  “The	  leadership	  changed	  and	  it	  became	  much	  less	  of	  an	  open	  organization…	  I	  didn’t	  like	  the	  leadership	  and	  its	  new	  direction”	  (Meyer,	  Whitter	  and	  Robnett	  2002,	  280).	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Political	  Shifts	  
From	  Movements	  to	  Markets	  	  The	  political	  climate	  that	  birthed	  both	  SNCC	  and	  VISTA	  was	  significantly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  The	  1960s	  saw	  a	  climate	  of	  successful	  Third	  World	  uprisings	  around	  the	  world	  that	  encouraged	  some	  youth	  to	  join	  up	  with	  radical	  groups	  (Green	  and	  Siegel	  2002).	  Intense	  political	  controversy	  spurred	  revolutionary	  thought	  and	  action	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  abroad.	  “The	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  now	  at	  high	  tide,	  was	  challenging	  the	  nation	  to	  fulfill	  its	  promise	  of	  equality	  and	  opportunity.	  Not	  since	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  Reconstruction	  had	  so	  many	  citizens	  demanded	  so	  clearly	  the	  full	  implementation	  of	  equal	  rights	  before	  the	  law”	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  180).	  According	  to	  John	  H.	  Strange,	  “One	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  pieces	  of	  domestic	  legislation	  of	  that	  period	  was	  the	  Economic	  Opportunity	  Act	  of	  1964	  which	  established	  Community	  Action	  Programs,	  funded	  by	  the	  federal	  government,	  yet	  operated	  for	  the	  most	  part	  by	  private,	  nonprofit	  agencies	  exempt	  from	  direct	  political	  review	  or	  control	  at	  the	  local	  or	  state	  level”	  (Strange	  1972,	  655).	  This	  was	  the	  first	  snowflake	  in	  an	  impending	  blizzard	  of	  public-­‐private	  alliances.	  The	  government	  increasingly	  partnered	  with	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit	  agencies	  to	  address	  social	  problems.	  	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  rose	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  advocating	  market-­‐based	  solutions	  to	  social	  problems	  (Gotham	  and	  Greenberg	  2008,	  1039).	  This	  increasingly	  popular	  three-­‐pronged—government,	  for-­‐profit	  and	  non-­‐profit—responsibility	  for	  social	  problems	  was	  adapted	  to	  an	  individual	  level	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Petras	  details	  a	  significant	  political	  shift	  during	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  away	  from	  state	  responsibility	  for	  the	  country’s	  pervasive	  social	  problems,	  towards	  an	  individual	  do-­‐gooder	  responsibility.	  The	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era	  of	  “big	  government”	  shifted	  to	  “big	  citizenship”	  (1997,	  1587).	  Political	  encouragement	  of	  corporations,	  non-­‐profits	  and	  individual	  citizens	  to	  claim	  responsibility	  for	  pervasive	  social	  problems	  has	  increased	  dramatically	  since	  the	  1960s.	  This	  increase	  in	  reliance	  on	  non-­‐governmental	  entities	  has	  been	  coupled	  with	  decreased	  spending	  on	  welfare	  and	  other	  anti-­‐poverty	  initiatives	  from	  the	  federal	  level	  (Ahn	  2007,	  63).	  As	  the	  state	  disinvests	  from	  supporting	  poor	  families,	  it	  places	  increased	  responsibility	  on	  well-­‐meaning	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐profit	  entities	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  slack.	  This	  shifts	  the	  financial	  burden	  away	  from	  federal	  and	  state	  budgets	  and	  places	  the	  responsibility	  of	  comprehensive	  services	  for	  those	  living	  in	  poverty	  on	  a	  multitude	  of	  organizations	  that	  citizens	  now	  have	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  support.	  	  	   Americans	  have	  always	  done	  work	  without	  pay.	  Families	  have	  cared	  for	  children,	  neighbors	  have	  helped	  each	  other	  with	  construction	  projects,	  and	  congregants	  played	  the	  piano	  in	  their	  church.	  “Americans	  have	  worked	  in	  their	  communities	  since	  the	  nation’s	  founding.	  Businesses,	  churches,	  and	  schools	  all	  actively	  help	  organize	  their	  members’	  efforts”	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  1996,	  29).4	  The	  rate	  of	  volunteering	  in	  the	  US	  has	  increased	  steadily	  since	  the	  1970s,	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  32%	  since	  1989	  (CNCS	  2006,	  2).	  Teenagers,	  ages	  sixteen	  to	  nineteen	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  this	  change,	  with	  their	  rates	  of	  volunteerism	  more	  than	  doubling	  since	  1989.	  Volunteering	  with	  educational	  or	  youth	  organizations	  and	  participating	  in	  community	  service	  has	  dramatically	  increased,	  counteracting	  the	  decline	  in	  volunteer	  hours	  for	  religious	  institutions,	  political	  causes,	  civic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  While	  religious	  institutions	  are	  often	  most	  recognized	  for	  their	  charitable	  or	  missionary	  work,	  many	  have	  a	  history	  of	  organizing	  members	  to	  advocate	  for	  social	  change	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  services.	  “From	  religious	  pacifists	  to	  Quaker	  abolitionists	  to	  Catholic	  settlement	  workers,	  much	  of	  America’s	  activist	  history	  has	  had	  deep	  roots	  in	  the	  church”	  (McAdam	  1988,	  48).	  While	  faith-­‐based	  activism	  continues	  today,	  a	  change	  in	  political	  climate	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  dependence	  on	  foundation	  funding	  has	  affected	  this	  component	  of	  religious	  work	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  other	  institutions.	  The	  majority	  of	  faith-­‐based	  work	  in	  the	  U.S.	  represents	  a	  Christian	  responsibility	  to	  charity.	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organizations,	  health	  care	  needs	  and	  art	  and	  cultural	  causes	  (CNCS	  2006,	  3).	  Thus,	  as	  more	  and	  more	  people	  volunteer,	  their	  efforts	  are	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  education/youth	  outreach	  and	  direct	  service	  to	  communities.	  There	  was	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  volunteerism	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Katrina,	  specifically	  in	  2006	  and	  2007.	  According	  to	  CNCS,	  searches	  of	  Serve.gov	  increased	  535%	  after	  Katrina	  (CNCS	  e).	  Significant	  numbers	  of	  Americans	  were	  turning	  to	  this	  federally	  sponsored,	  online	  resource	  for	  recommendations	  on	  how	  to	  assist	  victims.	  	   Foundations	  developed	  in	  the	  early	  1900s	  to	  establish	  a	  bureaucracy	  to	  help	  the	  wealthy	  handle	  voluminous	  charitable	  requests	  (Roelofs	  2003,	  7).	  John	  D.	  Rockefeller	  established	  The	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	  in	  1913	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  creating	  a	  central	  financial	  parent	  for	  all	  other	  charitable	  organizations	  and	  showing	  to	  socialists	  that	  capitalism	  can	  promote	  public	  good	  (Roelofs	  2003,	  7).	  Early	  foundations	  also	  served	  their	  founders	  as	  tax	  shelters.	  When	  Edsel	  Ford	  died	  in	  1947	  his	  family’s	  foundation—The	  Ford	  Foundation—was	  allocated	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  wealth	  (Roelofs	  2003,	  8).	  “Some	  $300	  million	  in	  inheritance	  taxes	  shrunk	  to	  a	  few	  million	  and	  it	  was	  arranged	  for	  the	  foundation	  to	  pick	  up	  even	  this	  modest	  tab”	  (Brinton	  1958,	  41).	  This	  allowed	  the	  Ford	  family	  to	  retain	  control	  of	  their	  ancestor’s	  money,	  while	  avoiding	  significant	  taxes.	  According	  to	  Roelofs,	  “Tax	  evasion	  and	  public	  relations	  have	  motivated	  most	  foundations	  (along	  with	  indeterminable	  quantities	  of	  guilt	  and	  benevolence)”	  (2003,	  8).	  Taxes	  that	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  levied	  on	  considerable	  wealth	  remain	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  private	  foundations.	  	  “Foundations	  are	  made	  partly	  with	  dollars	  which,	  were	  it	  not	  for	  charitable	  deductions	  allowed	  by	  tax	  laws,	  would	  have	  become	  public	  funds	  to	  be	  allocated	  through	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the	  governmental	  process	  under	  the	  controlling	  power	  of	  the	  electorate	  as	  a	  whole”	  (Ahn	  2007,	  65).	  	  Certainly	  many	  decision	  makers	  within	  foundations	  have	  good	  intentions	  and	  truly	  wish	  to	  assist	  those	  with	  less	  access	  to	  wealth.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  difference	  between	  providing	  necessities	  for	  people—as	  charities	  such	  as	  soup	  kitchens	  do—and	  providing	  people	  with	  the	  means	  to	  procure	  them	  on	  their	  own.	  The	  Walsh	  Commission	  in	  1915	  investigated	  foundations	  and	  took	  testimony	  on	  foundations’	  operations.	  Witnesses	  were	  critical	  of	  foundation	  heads	  stating,	  “if	  Rockefeller	  and	  Carnegie	  wanted	  to	  improve	  human	  welfare,	  they	  might	  pay	  their	  workers	  more”	  (Roelofs	  2003,	  9).	  Wealthy	  foundations	  are	  responsible	  for	  a	  funding	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  the	  charitable	  work	  that	  is	  done	  in	  this	  country	  and	  abroad	  (INCITE!	  2007,	  4).	  Simultaneously,	  foundations,	  particularly	  Ford,	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  often	  steering	  it	  into	  more	  conservative	  directions	  (INCITE!	  2007,	  5;	  Arnove	  1980,	  4).	  This	  was	  accomplished	  by	  only	  funding	  specific	  projects	  within	  radical	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Congress	  of	  Racial	  Equality	  chapter	  in	  Harlem.	  Significant	  amounts	  of	  money	  were	  allocated	  to	  a	  small	  business	  and	  industry	  development	  project	  while	  none	  was	  provided	  for	  the	  organization’s	  desire	  to	  create	  an	  all-­‐black	  school	  board	  to	  control	  local	  public	  schools	  (Allen	  1969,	  126).	  Thus,	  foundations	  simultaneously	  provide	  tax	  shelter	  for	  wealthy	  benefactors,	  fund	  charities	  which	  provide	  much	  needed	  social	  services	  but	  do	  very	  little	  to	  address	  underlying	  inequalities	  which	  create	  the	  need,	  and	  support	  only	  specific	  projects	  within	  controversial	  organizations.	  Foundation	  funding	  sustains	  the	  approximately	  1.9	  million	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  operating	  within	  the	  United	  States	  today	  (IRS	  2008).	  Many	  of	  these	  organizations	  have	  been	  recipients	  of	  AmeriCorps	  grants	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and/or	  volunteers.	  By	  providing	  extremely	  low	  cost	  labor	  to	  select	  institutions,	  the	  federal	  government	  not	  only	  publicly	  encourages	  the	  organization’s	  work	  and	  mission	  but	  also	  provides	  concrete	  resources	  to	  strengthen	  it.	  	  	   President	  Obama	  began	  the	  call	  for	  increased	  volunteerism	  in	  his	  inaugural	  address	  and	  backed	  it	  by	  signing	  the	  Edward	  M.	  Kennedy	  Serve	  America	  Act	  in	  April	  2009	  which	  increased	  funding	  for	  AmeriCorps	  and	  other	  programs	  supporting	  domestic	  volunteers.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  legislation,	  AmeriCorps	  participation	  has	  increased	  from	  75,000	  to	  250,000	  volunteers	  annually	  (The	  White	  House	  2010).	  These	  actions	  are	  rooted	  in	  a	  strong	  historical	  precedent—the	  federal	  government	  has	  created	  increasingly	  large	  national	  volunteer	  programs	  since	  the	  New	  Deal	  (Light	  2002,	  47).	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  developed	  the	  Peace	  Corps	  soon	  after	  his	  election	  in	  1960,	  followed	  closely	  by	  Johnson’s	  VISTA	  in	  1964	  which	  continued	  until	  Clinton	  incorporated	  it	  into	  AmeriCorps—today’s	  largest	  service	  program	  in	  the	  U.S.—in	  1993	  (Clotfelter	  1999,	  6).	  Except	  for	  Gerald	  Ford,	  every	  president	  since	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  has	  encouraged	  volunteerism	  rhetorically	  and	  often	  programmatically	  (Light	  2002,	  45).	  According	  to	  Light,	  Nixon	  bolstered	  volunteerism	  more	  than	  any	  other	  president	  in	  our	  history	  by	  establishing	  a	  Cabinet	  Committee	  on	  Voluntary	  Action,	  an	  Office	  of	  Voluntary	  Action	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development,	  and	  The	  National	  Center	  for	  Voluntary	  Action	  (2002,	  47).	  Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  Ronald	  Reagan	  both	  encouraged	  volunteerism,	  though	  they	  did	  little	  to	  establish	  new	  programs	  (Light	  2002,	  46).	  George	  H.	  Bush	  launched	  his	  Points	  of	  Light	  program	  in	  1989	  to	  call	  all	  individual	  Americans	  and	  institutions	  including	  corporations,	  schools	  and	  places	  of	  worship	  to	  claim	  society’s	  problems	  as	  their	  own	  and	  to	  help	  solve	  them	  (Greenya	  2006,	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580).	  Individual	  responsibility	  is	  a	  very	  old	  concept	  in	  US	  culture;	  however,	  political	  programs	  expanded	  this	  notion	  to	  task	  citizens	  with	  solving	  prevailing	  social	  problems.	  The	  Reagan	  and	  Bush	  administrations	  and	  the	  Republican	  Congress	  of	  the	  1990s	  called	  for	  the	  non-­‐profit	  sector	  to	  take	  over	  from	  government	  more	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  dealing	  with	  social	  problems	  (Coltfelter	  1999,	  9).	  Clinton	  created	  two	  significant	  programs	  which	  decreased	  government	  responsibility	  for	  social	  problems—his	  AmeriCorps	  program	  provides	  a	  stipend	  to	  well-­‐meaning	  volunteers	  to	  assist	  those	  less	  fortunate	  and	  the	  Personal	  Responsibility	  and	  Work	  Opportunity	  Reconciliation	  Act	  in	  1996	  decreased	  government	  support	  for	  welfare	  programs.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  pieces	  of	  this	  welfare	  reform	  bill	  was	  increased	  expectations	  for	  individuals	  to	  support	  themselves	  by	  working	  or	  by	  seeking	  help	  from	  places	  other	  than	  the	  government—which	  was	  enforced	  with	  a	  strict	  five-­‐year	  time	  limit	  for	  welfare	  benefits	  (Hays	  2003,	  16).	  While	  this	  reform	  act	  decreased	  the	  welfare	  rolls	  dramatically—from	  12.2	  million	  recipients	  in	  1996	  to	  5.3	  million	  in	  2001,	  the	  number	  of	  people	  living	  in	  poverty	  only	  decreased	  by	  approximately	  11%5	  (Hays	  2003,	  17	  and	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau	  2006).	  According	  to	  Hays,	  many	  families	  who	  have	  left	  welfare	  are	  “…turning	  to	  locally	  funded	  services,	  food	  banks,	  churches,	  and	  other	  charities	  for	  aid.	  Many	  of	  those	  charities	  are	  already	  overburdened.	  In	  some	  locales,	  homeless	  shelters	  and	  housing	  assistance	  programs	  are	  closing	  their	  doors	  to	  new	  customers,	  food	  banks	  are	  running	  out	  of	  food,	  and	  other	  charities	  are	  being	  forced	  to	  tighten	  their	  eligibility	  requirements”	  (2003,	  227).	  Thus,	  as	  welfare	  funding	  decreases,	  charities	  and	  other	  non-­‐profits	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  adequately	  fill	  the	  gap	  by	  providing	  services	  to	  families	  living	  in	  poverty.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  research	  is	  based	  on	  data	  before	  the	  2008	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  number	  of	  people	  living	  in	  poverty	  in	  the	  US	  in	  1996	  was	  36,529,000	  while	  in	  2001	  it	  was	  32,907,000.	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economic	  downturn	  that	  is	  causing	  even	  greater	  numbers	  of	  families	  to	  depend	  on	  social	  services	  and	  charitable	  giving.	  	  	  Political	  encouragement	  of	  individual	  volunteerism	  has	  increased	  to	  place	  the	  burden	  of	  filling	  this	  gap	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  well-­‐meaning	  individual	  citizens.	  Whether	  it	  is	  through	  an	  afternoon	  of	  volunteering,	  a	  financial	  donation	  or	  a	  year	  of	  AmeriCorps	  service,	  there	  are	  taxation	  and	  benefit	  incentives	  for	  individuals	  who	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  help	  in	  whatever	  way	  they	  deem	  fit.	  In	  his	  2002	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address	  then-­‐President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  issued	  the	  challenge:	  “My	  call	  tonight	  is	  for	  every	  American	  to	  commit	  at	  least	  two	  years,	  4,000	  hours	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  lifetime,	  to	  the	  service	  of	  your	  neighbors	  and	  your	  nation.”	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  recent	  call	  for	  individuals	  to	  volunteer	  with	  organizations	  follows	  the	  tradition	  established	  by	  Nixon,	  Reagan	  and	  his	  father	  (Light	  2002,	  47).	  In	  2003,	  the	  second	  President	  Bush	  created	  USA	  Freedom	  Corps	  and	  increased	  funding	  of	  Peace	  Corps	  and	  AmeriCorps.	  The	  federally	  maintained	  USA	  Freedom	  Corps	  Volunteer	  Network,	  Serve.gov,	  is	  the	  largest	  online	  searchable	  database	  for	  volunteer	  opportunities.	  It	  includes	  collaboration	  among	  government	  agencies,	  for-­‐profit	  companies,	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  and	  private	  foundations	  (Bridgeland,	  Goldsmith	  and	  Lenkowsky	  2002,	  21).	  Organizations	  listed	  on	  this	  website	  are	  not	  clearly	  identified	  as	  government,	  for-­‐profit	  or	  non-­‐profit.	  This	  fits	  into	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  framework	  by	  eliminating	  distinctions	  between	  these	  three	  types	  of	  institutions	  and	  possibly	  funneling	  volunteers	  to	  projects	  that	  benefit	  corporations.	  This	  network	  only	  displays	  government	  approved	  volunteer	  opportunities,	  effectively	  directing	  potential	  volunteers	  who	  turn	  to	  the	  Internet	  for	  information	  away	  from	  projects	  and	  organizations	  that	  challenge	  political	  policies.	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Service	  Provision	  	  Increased	  political	  encouragement	  of	  volunteerism	  has	  been	  coupled	  with	  a	  cultural	  shift	  for	  18	  to	  24	  year	  olds,	  away	  from	  political	  action	  and	  toward	  service	  provision	  (Walker	  2000,	  648).	  “Service	  has	  been	  positioned	  as	  a	  morally	  superior	  alternative,	  a	  belief	  reinforced	  through	  rhetoric	  and	  practice	  by	  parts	  of	  the	  community	  service	  movement”	  (Walker	  2000,	  647).	  As	  the	  Black	  Power	  movement	  of	  the	  1960s	  focused	  on	  transformative	  change,	  the	  21st	  century	  service	  provision	  emphasis	  focuses	  on	  survival	  within	  the	  system.	  Acquiring	  services	  becomes	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  (Petras	  2000,	  1589).	  Petras	  asserts	  that	  volunteerism	  distracts	  the	  concerned	  citizen	  away	  from	  holding	  the	  state	  and	  government	  agencies	  accountable	  for	  the	  conditions	  low	  income	  families	  face	  (2000,	  1589).	  Volunteerism	  holds	  the	  privileged	  individual	  accountable	  for	  social	  inequality,	  assuming	  that	  individuals	  are	  better	  suited	  to	  solve	  mass	  social	  inequality	  than	  increased	  government	  investment.	  Similarly,	  service	  provision	  depoliticizes	  social	  problems	  absolving	  national	  and	  state	  agencies	  of	  structural	  responsibility	  (Petras	  2000,	  1587).	  Walker	  states,	  “If	  students	  only	  think	  of	  civic	  engagement	  as	  individual,	  results	  driven	  activity,	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  challenging	  institutions	  in	  power.	  Feeding	  the	  hungry	  does	  nothing	  to	  disrupt	  or	  rethink	  poverty	  or	  injustice.	  Tutoring	  inner-­‐city	  kids	  does	  nothing	  to	  secure	  more	  resources	  for	  schools	  or	  ensure	  that	  teachers	  are	  held	  accountable”	  (2000,	  647).	  According	  to	  Petras,	  policy	  change	  is	  necessary	  to	  reduce	  the	  need	  for	  services	  which	  institutional	  injustice	  and	  disinvestment	  induces	  (2000,	  1589).	  Political	  and	  cultural	  encouragement	  to	  assist	  the	  poor	  is	  based	  on	  serving	  individual,	  short-­‐term	  needs—a	  meal,	  a	  bed	  for	  the	  night,	  homework	  help,	  a	  shower,	  even	  a	  counseling	  session.	  Well-­‐meaning	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individuals	  are	  not	  given	  incentives	  to	  fight	  for	  policy	  changes	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  food	  justice,	  housing	  availability,	  educational	  inequalities	  or	  health	  care.6	  	  There	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  as	  the	  government	  pulls	  away	  from	  direct	  funding	  and	  support	  of	  social	  services,	  that	  it	  effectively	  fills	  the	  gap	  by	  providing	  incentives—often	  financial—to	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  who	  wish	  to	  provide	  services.	  There	  are	  two	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  state	  directly	  providing	  services—say	  food	  stamp	  allocation—and	  government	  support	  of	  non-­‐profits—for	  example	  offering	  an	  AmeriCorps	  volunteer	  to	  a	  soup	  kitchen.	  The	  first	  is	  one	  of	  decision-­‐making	  authority.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  federal	  programs	  are	  subject	  to	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  at	  least	  some	  degree	  of	  voter	  approval	  (Ahn	  2007,	  65).	  Faith-­‐based	  and	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  are	  accountable	  to	  their	  select	  leadership—not	  the	  national	  electoral	  base.	  The	  second	  issue	  is	  that	  volunteerism	  and	  charity	  does	  not	  consistently	  prioritize	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  people	  in	  their	  communities.	  Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  identify	  a	  drawback	  to	  relying	  on	  volunteerism	  to	  accommodate	  for	  decreased	  federal	  investment:	  “One-­‐third	  of	  the	  volunteering	  done	  by	  those	  90	  million	  Americans	  consists	  of	  serving	  on	  committees,	  baby-­‐sitting,	  singing	  in	  the	  church	  choir,	  or	  other	  activities	  that	  are	  beneficial	  but	  hardly	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  welfare	  state”	  (1996,	  29).	  Similarly,	  in	  discussing	  volunteer	  efforts	  coordinated	  by	  faith-­‐based	  institutions,	  Waldman	  indicates	  “while	  all	  this	  charitable	  activity	  is	  valuable,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  help	  for	  the	  poor—or	  with	  solving	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	  review	  of	  Serve.gov	  turns	  up	  many	  opportunities	  that	  would	  fall	  into	  the	  former	  list	  and	  almost	  none	  that	  fall	  in	  the	  latter.	  For	  example,	  searching	  the	  term	  “Food	  Justice”	  generates	  opportunity	  titles	  such	  as:	  “Food	  Pantry	  Bagger	  Needed,”	  “Assist	  with	  Food	  Distribution”	  and	  “Grant	  Writers	  Wanted.”	  There	  were	  no	  search	  results	  from	  the	  term	  “racial	  justice”	  and	  “housing”	  generates	  options	  to	  visit	  with	  seniors	  and	  build	  for	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity.	  I	  do	  not	  meant	  to	  imply	  that	  these	  are	  bad	  opportunities	  or	  should	  not	  be	  pursued.	  Rather,	  I	  am	  attempting	  to	  highlight	  the	  emphasis	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  placed	  on	  service	  provision	  as	  the	  superior	  use	  of	  volunteers,	  which	  is	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  political	  emphasis	  SNCC	  and	  other	  civil	  rights	  groups	  placed	  on	  their	  volunteer	  programming.	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problems.	  Most	  religious	  charity	  and	  volunteerism	  is	  directed	  inward—toward	  the	  congregation,	  the	  building,	  the	  Sunday	  school,	  the	  organ—rather	  than	  outward	  toward	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole”	  (2002,	  33).	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  church	  and	  state	  tension	  when	  agendas	  for	  social	  service	  provision	  are	  shifted	  from	  government	  authority	  to	  religious	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  The	  second	  difference,	  identified	  by	  Clotfelter,	  is	  that	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  volunteers	  are	  amateurs—defined	  as	  those	  who	  are	  not	  trained	  for	  the	  work	  they	  are	  doing	  or	  are	  in	  employment	  positions	  above	  their	  qualification	  level	  (1999,	  2).	  “Despite	  the	  undeniable	  trend	  over	  time	  toward	  greater	  professionalization	  of	  so	  many	  activities,	  including	  those	  of	  government	  and	  nonprofit	  organizations,	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  effort	  that	  advances	  social	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  continues	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  persons	  such	  as	  those	  described	  above,	  who	  either	  do	  not	  receive	  a	  paycheck	  or	  receive	  a	  modest	  paycheck	  for	  doing	  work	  for	  which	  they	  were	  not	  professionally	  trained”	  (Coltfelter	  1999,	  2).	  The	  early	  VISTA	  program	  sponsored	  amateurs	  to	  provide	  health	  care,	  education	  and	  other	  services	  to	  very	  low-­‐income	  communities.	  The	  volunteers	  who	  are	  expected	  to	  help	  fill	  the	  gaps	  in	  the	  welfare	  state	  often	  have	  no	  background	  in	  the	  work	  with	  which	  they	  are	  tasked.	  Even	  today,	  of	  the	  three	  AmeriCorps	  programs—National	  Civilian	  Conservation	  Corps	  (NCCC),	  VISTA	  and	  State/National—only	  one	  (VISTA)	  actively	  recruits	  participants	  with	  higher	  education	  or	  work	  experience.	  NCCC	  and	  State/National	  qualification	  summaries	  identify	  citizenship	  status	  and	  age	  as	  the	  only	  limitations	  to	  participant	  eligibility	  (CNCS	  a).	  According	  to	  Walters,	  “Crime,	  drug	  abuse,	  family	  breakdown,	  and	  other	  social	  crises	  are	  so	  complicated	  that	  traditional	  institutions	  such	  as	  churches	  and	  voluntary	  associations	  cannot	  possibly	  address	  them.	  Only	  policy	  specialists	  trained	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  
27	  
social	  services—therapeutic-­‐state	  elites—are	  up	  to	  the	  task”	  (1996,	  44).	  Thus,	  social	  workers,	  health	  care	  providers,	  counselors,	  teachers	  and	  others	  who	  find	  themselves	  unemployed	  due	  to	  government	  budget	  cuts	  may	  be	  replaced	  with	  individuals	  who	  may	  be	  aspiring	  to	  those	  positions	  yet	  have	  not	  been	  trained	  or	  certified.	  In	  contrast,	  social	  movement	  scholars	  insist	  that	  community	  leadership	  and	  control	  is	  necessary	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  affecting	  a	  population7.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  neither	  position	  advocates	  for	  unprofessional,	  non-­‐local	  volunteers	  to	  address	  social	  problems.	  	  	  	  Training	  and	  support	  is	  especially	  valuable	  when	  working	  in	  disaster	  areas,	  where	  it	  is	  important	  for	  volunteers	  to	  know	  how	  to	  handle	  traumatic	  situations.	  According	  to	  Laura	  van	  Dernoot	  Lipsky,	  a	  researcher	  of	  secondary	  trauma,	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  that	  those	  who	  are	  assisting	  in	  the	  recovery	  have	  access	  to	  support	  and	  mental	  health	  services.	  She	  explains:	  “We	  frequently	  see	  trauma	  exposure	  response	  manifest	  in	  our	  work	  in	  two	  ways:	  lack	  of	  accountability	  and	  unethical	  behavior”	  (2009,	  25).	  Secondary	  trauma	  affects	  workers	  who	  then	  “unknowingly	  abuse	  their	  power	  in	  their	  client	  interactions,	  or	  develop	  policies	  that	  are	  not	  mindful	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  values	  of	  the	  organization,	  or	  competing	  with	  other	  organizations	  instead	  of	  collaborating”	  (van	  Dernoot	  Lipsky	  2009,	  27).	  	  
AmeriCorps	  President	  Clinton	  created	  AmeriCorps	  in	  1993,	  incorporating	  the	  continuing	  VISTA	  program	  and	  the	  National	  Civilian	  Community	  Corps	  (NCCC)	  that	  had	  been	  created	  in	  1992	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Nancy	  A.	  Matthews	  explains	  that	  survivors	  of	  gendered	  violence	  must	  take	  leadership	  positions	  in	  ending	  these	  acts	  (Matthews	  1994).	  Bursik	  and	  Grasmick	  document	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  community	  control	  of	  crime	  prevention	  programs	  (1993).	  SNCC,	  similar	  to	  other	  anti-­‐racist	  organizations,	  saw	  black	  leadership	  as	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  their	  political	  and	  social	  agendas	  (as	  discussed	  on	  page	  4).	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as	  a	  way	  to	  explore	  usage	  of	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  military	  resources	  in	  a	  national	  context	  (CNCS	  i).	  Today,	  AmeriCorps	  programs	  include	  VISTA	  as	  well	  as	  State/National	  and	  NCCC.	  The	  VISTA	  branch	  of	  AmeriCorps	  remains	  rooted	  in	  its	  original	  mission	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  federal	  war	  on	  poverty.	  VISTA	  is	  unique	  as	  it	  is	  not	  exclusively	  focused	  on	  service	  provision	  but	  rather	  on	  capacity	  building	  of	  anti-­‐poverty	  organizations	  though	  building	  infrastructure	  and	  community	  partnerships,	  and	  by	  securing	  resources	  and	  trainings	  (CNCS	  2008).	  NCCC	  is	  a	  highly	  mobile,	  full-­‐time,	  residential	  volunteer	  program	  for	  men	  and	  women	  age	  18–24.	  Members	  are	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  five	  NCCC	  campuses	  and	  travel	  regionally	  to	  complete	  service	  work	  hosted	  by	  local	  organizations	  lasting	  no	  more	  than	  eight	  weeks	  in	  one	  area	  (CNCS	  d).	  The	  majority	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  are	  distributed	  between	  State	  and	  National	  programs8.	  AmeriCorps	  State	  works	  with	  the	  Governor-­‐appointed	  State	  Service	  Commission	  that	  allocates	  volunteers	  to	  numerous	  non-­‐profits	  and	  faith-­‐based	  organizations	  (CNCS	  e).	  AmeriCorps	  National	  places	  volunteers	  in	  federally	  approved	  organizations.	  Both	  State	  and	  National	  AmeriCorps	  programs,	  hosting	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  AmeriCorps	  participants,	  focus	  on	  direct	  service	  provision	  with	  tasks	  such	  as	  tutoring	  and	  mentoring	  youth,	  assisting	  crime	  victims,	  building	  homes,	  and	  restoring	  parks	  (CNCS	  g).	  The	  first	  class	  of	  20,000	  AmeriCorps	  members	  in	  1994	  served	  in	  1,000	  different	  communities	  across	  the	  country	  (CNCS	  i).	  	  In	  April	  2009	  President	  Obama	  tripled	  the	  size	  of	  AmeriCorps,	  following	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  his	  predecessors,	  many	  of	  whom	  have	  channeled	  federal	  funds	  to	  bolster	  AmeriCorps	  and	  other	  volunteer	  programs.	  In	  2006,	  $542.9	  million	  supported	  75,000	  members	  working	  nationally	  (Eisner	  2005).	  In	  2006	  VISTA	  was	  allocated	  $96.4	  million,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Of	  the	  75,000	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  2007,	  67,350	  served	  with	  AmeriCorps	  State	  or	  National	  programs.	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State/National	  $275	  million	  and	  NCCC	  $25.5	  million	  (CNCS	  h).9	  The	  total	  cost	  to	  the	  Corporation	  per	  AmeriCorps	  member	  averages	  $18,000	  including	  administrative	  costs	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  1996,	  32).	  The	  financial	  incentive	  of	  encouraging	  volunteerism	  to	  address	  social	  problems	  for	  which	  the	  state	  would	  otherwise	  be	  responsible	  made	  AmeriCorps	  increasingly	  attractive	  to	  Republicans	  who	  initially	  opposed	  the	  program.	  Former	  Michigan	  Governor	  George	  Romney,	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  AmeriCorps,	  framed	  the	  program	  in	  a	  1995	  statement	  as	  having	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  an	  ever	  growing	  “army	  of	  unpaid	  volunteers”	  to	  address	  civic	  problems,	  which	  dramatically	  increased	  Republican	  support	  (Wofford	  2002,	  17).	  	  In	  Louisiana,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  2008-­‐2009	  program	  year	  hosted	  1023	  State	  volunteers,	  807	  National	  and	  81	  VISTA.	  This	  is	  a	  sharp	  increase	  from	  pre-­‐Katrina	  years:	  2003-­‐2004	  (172	  members	  total)	  and	  2004-­‐2005	  (370	  members	  total)	  (CNCS	  f).	  Many	  NCCC	  teams	  also	  worked	  in	  the	  state;	  however,	  their	  base	  that	  served	  Louisiana	  was	  in	  Mississippi.	  AmeriCorps	  provides	  significant	  benefits,	  such	  as	  the	  education	  award	  and	  job	  training,	  to	  college-­‐bound	  volunteers	  in	  their	  20s—in	  1995,	  79%	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  between	  18	  and	  29	  years	  old	  (Tschirhart	  1998,	  35).	  Low-­‐income	  citizens	  make	  up	  about	  a	  quarter	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  1996,	  34).	  Simon	  concludes	  that	  volunteers	  generally	  have	  economic	  privilege	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  work	  for	  the	  small	  stipends	  and	  educational	  awards	  offered	  (2002,	  671).	  According	  to	  Tschirhart,	  AmeriCorps	  also	  draws	  younger	  citizens	  due	  to	  the	  tuition	  credits	  applicable	  towards	  higher	  education,	  opportunities	  to	  explore	  jobs/career	  paths,	  the	  development	  of	  interpersonal	  skills	  and	  professional	  experience	  (1998).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  disparity	  between	  the	  total	  amount	  and	  that	  allocated	  to	  the	  three	  listed	  programs	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  funding	  of	  other	  service	  programs	  not	  included	  in	  this	  study	  including	  Senior	  Corps	  and	  Citizen	  Corps.	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Since	  the	  early	  VISTA	  program,	  AmeriCorps	  has	  provided	  participants	  with	  a	  small	  living	  stipend.	  In	  1997	  benefits	  to	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  expanded	  to	  include	  the	  Education	  Awards	  Program	  that	  provides	  volunteers	  with	  student	  loan	  allowance	  upon	  the	  completion	  of	  their	  service	  with	  a	  maximum	  value	  of	  $4,725	  before	  taxes	  (CNCS	  f).	  “The	  standard	  AmeriCorps	  living	  allowance	  is	  $7,945—about	  $160	  a	  week—of	  which	  $6,700	  comes	  from	  the	  federal	  government.	  Those	  members	  with	  no	  health	  insurance	  also	  get	  a	  health	  plan	  valued	  at	  $1,200.	  So	  direct	  compensation	  is	  just	  more	  than	  $9,000.	  If	  they	  finish	  a	  year	  of	  service,	  they	  get	  a	  $4,725	  scholarship”	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  1996,	  30).	  AmeriCorps	  NCCC	  members	  receive	  a	  living	  allowance	  of	  approximately	  $100	  every	  week,	  housing,	  meals	  and	  limited	  medical	  benefits	  and	  a	  Segal	  AmeriCorps	  Education	  Award	  upon	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  program	  (CNCS	  d).	  	  	  It	  is	  recognized	  that	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  benefit	  more	  than	  financially	  in	  exchange	  for	  service.	  AmeriCorps’	  participant	  benefits	  range	  from	  growth	  in	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  character	  development	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  job	  skills	  and	  preparation	  for	  future	  careers	  (Perry,	  et	  al.	  1999,	  236-­‐239).	  Neumann,	  et	  al.	  identifies	  “a	  charitable	  contribution	  value	  due	  to	  performing	  public	  service”	  as	  a	  tangible	  benefit	  to	  volunteers	  (1995,	  11).	  The	  benefits	  to	  volunteers	  have	  been	  studied	  and	  documented;	  however,	  there	  is	  no	  substantial	  academic	  literature	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  AmeriCorps	  on	  host	  organizations	  or	  communities	  in	  which	  volunteers	  are	  placed10.	  	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  are	  placed	  with	  thousands	  of	  host	  organizations	  across	  the	  country,	  both	  faith-­‐based	  and	  non-­‐profit.	  Host	  organizations	  that	  receive	  AmeriCorps	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  Examples	  of	  the	  hundreds	  of	  studies	  highlighting	  the	  positive	  impact	  volunteer	  experiences	  have	  on	  individual	  lives	  include:	  Grese,	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Musick,	  Herzog	  and	  House	  1999;	  Piliavin	  and	  Siegl	  2007;	  Willigen	  2000;	  and	  Wilson	  and	  Musick	  1999.	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volunteers	  are	  required	  to	  match	  federal	  funds	  by	  raising	  15%	  of	  each	  volunteer’s	  living	  allowance	  and	  other	  support	  costs	  (CNCS	  f).	  Even	  with	  this	  financial	  contribution	  requirement,	  AmeriCorps	  labor	  is	  significantly	  below	  market	  value.	  They	  are	  notably	  cheaper	  than	  full-­‐time	  staff	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow.	  1996,	  33).	  Organizations	  do	  contribute	  to	  the	  volunteer’s	  stipend	  in	  a	  “cost-­‐sharing”	  system	  that	  requires	  between	  $9,500	  and	  $11,000	  for	  each	  State/National	  or	  VISTA	  volunteer	  to	  be	  contributed	  to	  the	  Corporation	  for	  National	  and	  Community	  Service11	  (CNCS	  j).	  	  The	  original	  intentions	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  claimed	  to	  support	  community	  empowerment	  and	  to	  legitimize	  government	  interaction	  with	  non-­‐profit	  and	  faith	  based	  organizations.	  The	  program	  was	  supposed	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  federal	  government,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  volunteers,	  could	  support	  the	  work	  these	  organizations	  were	  doing	  and	  encourage	  partnerships	  with	  for-­‐profit	  companies.	  The	  ultimate	  result,	  with	  volunteers	  being	  placed	  in	  government	  offices,	  is	  that	  it	  perpetuated	  the	  bureaucracy	  that	  negatively	  affected	  low-­‐income	  communities	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  began	  with…a	  keen	  recognition	  of	  the	  danger	  to	  community	  posed	  by	  big	  government…	  The	  president	  claimed	  that	  AmeriCorps	  would	  prove	  that	  government	  could	  act	  as	  a	  partner	  with	  citizens,	  using	  its	  resources	  to	  leverage	  additional	  contributions	  from	  the	  private	  sector.	  It	  quickly	  became	  apparent	  that	  in	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program,	  government	  overshadowed	  its	  “partners.”	  More	  than	  one-­‐fourth	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  placed	  in	  federal,	  state	  or	  local	  government	  agencies—where	  they	  would	  reinforce	  the	  bureaucratic	  state,	  not	  rebuild	  the	  voluntary	  sector…The	  revival	  of	  citizenship	  requires	  a	  transfer	  of	  power	  from	  government	  to	  families,	  voluntary	  associations,	  and	  communities.	  (Walters	  1996).	  	  	  According	  to	  Walters	  AmeriCorps	  ultimately	  provided	  inexpensive	  labor	  to	  local,	  state	  and	  federal	  government	  agencies	  and	  was	  used	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  government	  efforts	  by	  attempting	  to	  pacify	  dissent	  by	  proving	  that	  big	  government	  created	  positive	  programs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Hosting	  NCCC	  volunteers	  does	  not	  involve	  organizational	  cost	  sharing.	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(1996).	  The	  placement	  of	  AmeriCorps	  workers	  in	  government	  agencies	  also	  served	  to	  save	  significant	  amounts	  of	  money—volunteers	  did	  the	  work	  of	  full-­‐time	  employees	  who	  otherwise	  would	  have	  required	  full	  salaries.	  Faith-­‐based	  organizations	  are	  recipients	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  The	  program	  is	  able	  to	  toe	  the	  line	  between	  church	  and	  state	  by	  exclusively	  supporting	  the	  individual	  volunteer,	  not	  the	  organization	  as	  a	  whole.	  Religious	  organizations	  are	  able	  to	  receive	  federal	  support	  through	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  while	  maintaining	  their	  spiritual	  missions.	  	  “Consider	  the	  case	  of	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  faith-­‐based	  volunteer	  groups.	  The	  founder,	  Millard	  Fuller,	  was	  wary	  of	  any	  involvement	  with	  AmeriCorps	  precisely	  because	  he	  feared	  a	  government	  program	  would	  distort	  the	  religious	  nature	  of	  his	  effort.	  But	  on	  the	  urging	  of	  his	  board,	  Habitat	  brought	  in	  some	  AmeriCorps	  members”	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  1996,	  31).	  This	  proved	  to	  be	  successful	  as	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  used	  to	  manage	  large	  numbers	  of	  short-­‐term	  volunteers	  and	  build	  50	  houses.	  “Habitat’s	  experience	  is	  instructive…because	  it	  is	  a	  faith-­‐based	  organization	  that	  did	  not	  have	  to	  alter	  its	  spiritual	  mission	  to	  make	  use	  of	  AmeriCorps	  members.	  This	  has	  been	  the	  experience	  of	  all	  the	  religious	  groups	  from	  the	  nuns	  of	  the	  Notre	  Dame	  de	  Namur	  mission	  to	  the	  Greater	  Dallas	  Community	  Churches—that	  have	  brought	  on	  AmeriCorps	  members”	  (Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  1996,	  33).	  	  Indeed,	  AmeriCorps	  host	  organizations	  in	  the	  greater	  New	  Orleans	  area	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  include	  faith-­‐based	  initiatives	  (Catholic	  Charities,	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity,	  Mary	  Queen	  of	  Vietnam,	  Trinity	  Christian	  Community);	  non-­‐profits	  (JumpStart,	  Literacy	  Alliance,	  Rebuilding	  Together,	  Operation	  REACH,	  Green	  Light	  New	  Orleans);	  government	  programs	  (Recovery	  School	  District,	  Federal	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency,	  Louisiana	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Division	  of	  Administration,	  TeachNOLA)	  and	  institutions	  of	  higher	  education	  (CNCS	  c).	  Absent	  from	  this	  list	  are	  grassroots	  and	  social	  change	  organizations.	  The	  dominant	  organizations	  advocating	  for	  a	  just	  reconstruction	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  are	  identified	  by	  Rachel	  E.	  Luft	  as:	  ACORN,	  Common	  Ground,	  People’s	  Hurricane	  Relief	  Fund,	  People’s	  Organizing	  Committee,	  New	  Orleans	  Women’s	  Health	  Clinic	  +	  Women’s	  Health	  and	  Justice	  Initiative,	  Safe	  Streets	  Strong	  Communities,	  and	  the	  New	  Orleans	  Worker	  Center	  for	  Racial	  Justice	  (2009,	  504).	  None	  of	  these	  organizations	  hosted	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  According	  to	  Walters,	  federal	  support,	  including	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers,	  can	  be	  a	  mixed	  blessing.	  “Robust	  community	  groups	  that	  enjoy	  genuine	  grass-­‐roots	  support	  do	  not	  need	  to	  seek	  federal	  grants.	  And	  the	  organizations	  that	  do	  seek	  out	  government	  support	  are	  generally	  those	  with	  their	  own	  in-­‐house	  bureaucracies,	  accustomed	  to	  receiving	  federal	  social-­‐welfare	  grants	  and	  contracts…Public	  financing	  of	  AmeriCorps	  often	  led	  organizations	  to	  substitute	  the	  ‘blessing’	  of	  a	  government	  grant	  for	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  fanning	  and	  sustaining	  local	  support”	  (Walters	  1996).	  Coltfelter	  identifies	  AmeriCorps	  as	  a	  public	  service	  program	  that	  utilizes	  amateur	  labor	  to	  do	  increasingly	  complex	  jobs,	  in	  many	  cases	  involving	  duties	  formerly	  done	  by	  paid	  staff.	  As	  they	  take	  on	  this	  work	  the	  organizations	  become	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  them	  (1999,	  2).	  This	  dependence	  could	  place	  an	  organization	  on	  tenuous	  footing,	  as	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  are	  only	  contracted	  for	  one	  year	  and	  positions	  must	  be	  applied	  for	  annually.	  Ultimately,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  federal	  decision	  makers	  to	  allocate	  volunteers	  to	  organizations.	  	  In	  1995	  President	  Clinton,	  under	  congressional	  pressure,	  challenged	  his	  advisors	  to	  take	  AmeriCorps	  off	  the	  political	  battlefield.	  Wofford,	  then	  the	  CEO	  for	  the	  Corporation	  for	  National	  Service	  (CNCS),	  writes	  that	  he	  himself	  had	  to	  de-­‐politicize	  all	  his	  actions	  and	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further	  make	  political	  work	  off-­‐limits	  to	  national	  service	  participants	  (2002,	  15).	  This	  is	  partially	  due	  to	  a	  bipartisan	  government	  that	  would	  resist	  supporting	  a	  federally	  funded	  program	  that	  changed	  the	  political	  leanings	  of	  voting	  citizens	  (Wofford	  2002,	  17).	  Since	  then,	  the	  Corporation	  for	  National	  and	  Community	  Service—the	  entity	  which	  directs	  AmeriCorps—has	  made	  clear	  its	  intention	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  nonpartisan,	  politically	  neutral	  manner	  (Simon,	  2002,	  670).	  For	  example,	  Wofford,	  Waldman	  and	  Bandow	  cite	  an	  AmeriCorps	  official	  explaining	  that,	  “We	  funded	  a	  grant	  to	  ACORN	  Housing	  Corp.,	  which	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  an	  advocacy	  agenda.	  When	  we	  found	  out	  that	  ACORN	  had	  crossed	  the	  line	  into	  political	  advocacy,	  we	  pulled	  the	  plug”	  (1996,	  35).	  	  To	  maintain	  a	  politically	  neutral	  stance,	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  are	  prohibited	  from	  engaging	  in	  any	  potentially	  political	  activities.	  In	  explaining	  why	  AmeriCorps	  members	  were	  barred	  from	  attending	  the	  Stand	  for	  Children	  rally	  in	  Washington	  D.C.,	  the	  CNCS	  general	  counsel	  wrote:	  “National	  service	  has	  to	  be	  nonpartisan.	  What’s	  more,	  it	  should	  be	  about	  bringing	  communities	  together	  by	  getting	  things	  done.	  Strikes,	  demonstrations	  and	  political	  activities	  can	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  They	  polarize	  and	  divide”	  (Drogosz	  2004,	  18).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  strikes	  and	  demonstrations	  often	  resist	  actions	  by	  government	  and	  corporate	  institutions.	  In	  a	  commissioned	  study	  Simon	  concluded	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  has	  a	  politically	  neutral	  impact	  on	  its	  diverse	  membership	  (2002).	  “The	  enabling	  legislation	  for	  AmeriCorps	  draws	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  service	  and	  activism.	  For	  example,	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  can	  work	  to	  winterize	  the	  homes	  of	  the	  poor,	  but	  they	  would	  violate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  contract	  by	  joining	  with	  labor	  unions	  or	  other	  partisan	  political	  organizations	  to	  demand	  the	  enforcement	  of	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housing	  codes”	  (Korstad	  and	  Leloudis	  1999,	  196).	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  regulations	  follow	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  the	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  early	  VISTA	  participants.	  	  
Disasters	  
	   The	  previous	  sections	  have	  offered	  a	  history	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  as	  a	  whole;	  however,	  my	  study	  is	  exceptional	  in	  that	  it	  examines	  AmeriCorps	  policy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  biggest	  national	  disaster	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  AmeriCorps	  was	  not	  designed	  as	  a	  disaster	  response	  program	  but	  was	  used	  as	  such,	  with	  rapidly	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  volunteers	  traveling	  to	  the	  Gulf	  Coast	  following	  the	  hurricanes	  of	  2005	  and	  direct	  recruitment	  to	  help	  “storm	  victims”	  (CNCS	  b).	  This	  section	  provides	  background	  on	  disasters,	  their	  social	  impacts	  and	  historical	  government	  responses.	  The	  differences	  between	  technological	  disasters,	  a	  20th	  century	  development,	  and	  natural	  disasters	  are	  based	  on	  perceptions	  of	  control.	  Natural	  disasters	  result	  from	  the	  forces	  of	  something	  perceived	  to	  be	  uncontrollable	  by	  all	  parties.	  Technological	  disasters	  result	  from	  the	  loss	  of	  control	  of	  something	  perceived	  to	  be	  controllable	  (Gill	  and	  Picou	  1998).	  While	  the	  actual	  storm,	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  was	  natural,	  the	  subsequent	  disaster	  in	  New	  Orleans	  was	  technical—the	  levees,	  systems	  designed	  to	  control	  water,	  gave	  way.	  Natural	  disasters	  fit	  into	  a	  constant	  sequence	  of	  events	  and	  the	  “ordinary”	  course	  of	  nature.	  “Most	  technological	  disasters	  involve	  contamination	  of	  the	  environment	  that	  challenges	  individuals’	  fundamental	  expectations	  regarding	  their	  relationship	  with	  nature”	  (Gill	  and	  Picou	  1998,	  796).	  Natural	  disasters	  have	  relatively	  clear	  and	  understandable	  effects	  allowing	  for	  a	  collective	  understanding	  of	  what	  happened	  because	  of	  historical	  and	  cultural	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definitions	  of	  nature	  and	  relationships.	  The	  results	  of	  technological	  disasters	  are	  often	  unknown	  and	  not	  clearly	  visible	  which	  promotes	  individual	  definitions	  of	  event	  a	  single	  event	  (Gill	  and	  Picou	  1998).	  The	  result	  of	  this	  is	  that	  communities	  struggle	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus,	  which	  inhibits	  strong	  coalition	  building.	  The	  devastation	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  while	  catalyzed	  by	  a	  weather	  system,	  was	  a	  technological	  disaster	  as	  the	  damage	  was	  caused	  by	  infrastructure	  failure.	  This	  infrastructure	  failure	  created	  a	  unique	  disaster	  area	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  Nearly	  everyone	  was	  evacuated	  from	  the	  city,	  either	  of	  their	  own	  accord	  or	  through	  government	  channels.	  Approximately	  80%	  of	  Orleans	  Parish	  flooded,	  including	  homes,	  government	  buildings,	  hospitals,	  places	  of	  worship	  and	  many	  other	  necessary	  buildings.	  The	  decimation	  of	  vital	  pieces	  of	  the	  city’s	  built	  environment	  led	  to	  scarcity	  in	  housing,	  health	  care	  and	  mental	  health	  care.	  Housing	  was	  a	  significant	  concern	  with	  over	  two	  hundred	  thousand	  homes	  and	  apartments	  in	  New	  Orleans	  damaged	  by	  Katrina	  (Kromm	  2006,	  9).	  Over	  twenty	  one	  thousand	  FEMA	  trailers,	  intended	  for	  use	  as	  temporary	  living	  quarters	  for	  residents	  whose	  homes	  flooded,	  were	  requested.	  By	  February	  2006	  only	  three	  thousand	  had	  been	  delivered	  (Kromm	  2006,	  9).	  Health	  care	  was	  another	  concern.	  Prior	  to	  the	  hurricanes	  in	  2005	  there	  were	  twenty-­‐two	  working	  hospitals	  in	  Louisiana,	  while	  in	  February	  2006	  there	  were	  only	  seven	  (Kromm	  2006,	  13).	  Additionally,	  the	  majority	  of	  care	  for	  uninsured	  patients—66%	  of	  all	  New	  Orleans	  uninsured	  residents—was	  conducted	  by	  Charity	  Hospital,	  which	  was	  closed	  days	  after	  Katrina	  and	  has	  yet	  to	  re-­‐open	  (Kromm	  2006,	  13).	  Mental	  health	  care	  resources	  decreased	  along	  with	  the	  decline	  in	  working	  hospitals.	  	  Communities	  struggling	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  events	  often	  find	  themselves	  creating	  what	  Gill	  and	  Picou	  term	  a	  “corrosive	  community”—characterized	  by	  fear,	  anger,	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apprehension,	  confusion,	  conflict,	  and	  stress	  (1998).	  Insecurity	  prolonged	  by	  uncertainty	  leads	  to	  chronic,	  ongoing	  community	  stress.	  Indications	  of	  community	  stress	  are:	  disruption	  in	  social	  interaction,	  normlessness	  and	  role	  disruption.	  This	  leads	  to	  stress,	  mistrust,	  paranoia,	  loss	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  alienation	  (Gill	  and	  Picou	  1998).	  The	  more	  stressful	  the	  event,	  the	  more	  likely	  the	  affected	  individual	  will	  experience	  scary,	  distressing	  thoughts	  and	  feelings.	  This	  in	  turn	  results	  in	  a	  high	  incidence	  of	  avoidance	  behaviors.	  People	  whom	  social	  scientists	  have	  termed	  “vulnerable”	  feel	  these	  effects	  disproportionately.12	  Additionally,	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  was	  an	  exceptional	  case	  as	  the	  recovery	  process	  was	  found	  to	  increase	  levels	  of	  trauma	  with	  time,	  rather	  than	  decrease	  which	  is	  typical	  of	  other	  disaster	  situations.	  Ronald	  Kessler	  found	  that	  “contrary	  to	  results	  in	  other	  disaster	  studies,	  where	  post-­‐disaster	  mental	  disorder	  typically	  decreases	  with	  time,	  prevalence	  increased	  significantly	  in	  PTSD,	  serious	  mental	  illness,	  suicidal	  ideation	  and	  suicide	  plans”13	  (Kessler	  et	  al.	  2008).	  People	  displaced	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  often	  did	  not	  receive	  appropriate	  mental	  health	  care.	  	   According	  to	  Susan	  Cutter,	  social	  vulnerability	  to	  disasters—individual	  and	  community	  susceptibility	  to	  suffering	  the	  most	  losses—is	  partially	  a	  product	  of	  social	  inequalities14	  (Cutter,	  Boruff	  and	  Shirley	  2003,	  243).	  There	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  within	  the	  social	  science	  community	  on	  some	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  that	  influence	  social	  vulnerability.	  “These	  include:	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  resources	  (including	  information,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “social	  vulnerability”	  for	  literary	  consistency;	  however,	  it	  can	  be	  misleading	  and	  inappropriate	  as	  it	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  communities	  and	  groups	  of	  people	  who	  historically	  have	  displayed	  strength,	  resiliency	  and	  self-­‐sufficiency	  in	  the	  face	  of	  devastating	  events.	  13	  Rates	  of	  change	  from	  the	  study	  conducted	  5-­‐8	  months	  after	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  to	  second	  study	  1	  year	  after:	  PTSD	  increased	  from	  14.9	  to	  20.9%,	  serious	  mental	  illness	  increased	  from	  10.9	  to	  14.0%,	  suicidal	  ideation	  increased	  from	  2.8	  to	  6.4%	  and	  suicide	  plans	  increased	  from	  1.0	  to	  2.5%	  (Kessler,	  et	  al.	  2008).	  14	  Other	  contributing	  factors	  include	  the	  surrounding	  natural	  environment	  and	  infrastructure,	  which	  often	  can	  also	  be	  linked	  to	  social	  inequality.	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knowledge,	  and	  technology);	  limited	  access	  to	  political	  power	  and	  representation;	  social	  capital,	  including	  social	  networks	  and	  connections;	  beliefs	  and	  customs;	  building	  stock	  and	  age;	  frail	  and	  physically	  limited	  individuals;	  and	  type	  and	  density	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  lifelines”	  (Cutter,	  Boruff	  and	  Shirley	  2003,	  244).	  The	  authors	  specifically	  highlight	  the	  characteristics	  that	  make	  individuals	  and	  communities	  especially	  vulnerable.	  These	  include:	  high-­‐density	  living	  (as	  in	  urban	  areas),	  unstable	  employment,	  low	  levels	  of	  education,	  large	  numbers	  of	  dependents	  per	  family,	  low	  socio-­‐economic	  status,	  and	  dependence	  on	  social	  services.	  Additionally,	  communities	  with	  disproportionate	  numbers	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  female,	  non-­‐white	  and/or	  non-­‐Anglo,	  youth,	  elderly,	  and	  people	  with	  disabilities	  are	  considered	  at	  risk.	  Prior	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  the	  population	  of	  New	  Orleans	  disproportionately	  represented	  these	  identities15.	  While	  the	  proximity	  to	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico,	  the	  loss	  of	  protective	  wetlands	  and	  catastrophic	  infrastructure	  failure	  caused	  a	  significant	  disaster,	  social	  inequalities	  which	  were	  present	  before	  the	  storm	  exacerbated	  the	  disaster’s	  effect	  on	  those	  identified	  by	  social	  scientists	  as	  the	  “most	  vulnerable”—low-­‐income	  people,	  people	  of	  color,	  youth,	  elderly,	  women	  and	  people	  with	  disabilities.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  further,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  that	  the	  needs	  of	  these	  groups	  take	  center	  stage	  in	  the	  prioritization	  of	  relief	  and	  recovery	  efforts,	  as	  they	  suffered	  the	  most	  damages.	  	   In	  examining	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  evacuated	  New	  Orleanians,	  local	  human	  rights	  attorney	  William	  Quigley	  applies	  the	  United	  Nations	  Guiding	  Principles	  on	  Internal	  Displacement	  (2008,	  112).	  An	  examination	  of	  this	  document	  finds	  Part	  1	  of	  Principle	  28	  in	  this	  document	  states:	  Competent	  authorities	  have	  the	  primary	  duty	  and	  responsibility	  to	  establish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau	  2000	  data	  showed	  Orleans	  Parish	  with	  69.3%	  people	  of	  color,	  20.6%	  under	  eighteen	  years	  of	  age,	  12.3%	  over	  the	  age	  of	  sixty-­‐five,	  and	  22.9%	  of	  households	  below	  the	  poverty	  level.	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conditions,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  the	  means,	  which	  allow	  internally	  displaced	  persons	  to	  return	  voluntarily,	  in	  safety	  and	  with	  dignity,	  homes	  or	  places	  of	  habitual	  residence,	  or	  to	  resettle	  voluntarily	  in	  part	  of	  the	  country.	  Such	  authorities	  shall	  endeavor	  to	  facilitate	  reintegration	  of	  returned	  or	  resettled	  internally	  displaced	  persons	  (UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  1998,	  14).	  	  In	  examining	  my	  data,	  I	  utilize	  the	  Guiding	  Principles	  to	  frame	  my	  analysis	  of	  AmeriCorps	  policies	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  In	  the	  history	  of	  disaster	  recovery	  in	  the	  US	  and	  abroad,	  human	  rights	  prioritization	  has	  not	  been	  successfully	  carried	  out.	  Michael	  P.	  Powers	  writes	  about	  the	  recovery	  of	  major,	  acute	  disasters—specifically	  the	  leadership	  and	  accountability	  structures	  in	  relief	  efforts.	  Following	  the	  Chicago	  Fire	  in	  1871,	  the	  recovery	  task	  force,	  comprised	  of	  the	  city’s	  commercial	  elite,	  focused	  on	  the	  need	  for	  cheap	  labor	  and	  emphasized	  the	  employment	  opportunities	  in	  the	  rebuilding	  process.	  Ultimately	  this	  benefited	  non-­‐local	  laborers	  but	  “failed	  to	  help	  those	  affected	  by	  the	  fire,	  especially	  members	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  working	  classes”	  (2006,	  14-­‐15).	  A	  similar	  leadership	  structure	  was	  utilized	  in	  handling	  the	  rebuilding	  following	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Earthquake	  in	  1906,	  where	  elite	  businessmen	  tied	  the	  well	  being	  of	  the	  city’s	  residents	  to	  the	  status	  of	  commercial	  business.	  This	  recovery	  effort	  ensured	  that	  “those	  most	  in	  need	  received	  relatively	  little	  aid”	  (2006,	  16-­‐17).	  In	  1927	  heavy	  rainfall	  caused	  the	  swollen	  waters	  of	  the	  Mississippi	  river	  to	  breech	  levees	  in	  144	  places	  along	  its	  banks.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  the	  federal	  government	  contracted	  the	  Red	  Cross	  to	  direct	  relief	  efforts—a	  “Colored	  Advisory	  Commission”	  discovered	  exorbitant	  amounts	  of	  corruption	  and	  misuse	  of	  relief	  supplies	  and	  funds	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  people	  of	  color	  who	  survived	  the	  floods	  (Powers	  2006,	  19).	  These	  discoveries	  were	  later	  censored	  and	  rewritten	  by	  the	  government	  to	  suppress	  accusations	  (Barry	  1997,	  382-­‐383).	  According	  to	  Powers,	  “the	  actions	  taken	  in	  the	  relief	  effort	  specifically,	  and	  often	  illegally,	  reinforced	  the	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subjugation	  of	  black	  laborers”	  (2006,	  19).	  Powers	  concludes	  that	  if	  those	  with	  “fewer	  means”	  are	  excluded	  from	  relief	  distribution	  decision	  making	  they	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  “to	  be	  wronged	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  specific	  policies	  or	  in	  their	  execution”	  (2006,	  25).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  those	  who	  are	  accountable	  to	  vulnerable	  communities	  must	  be	  included	  in	  the	  leadership	  of	  recovery.	  In	  the	  vacuum	  of	  mass	  evacuation	  following	  some	  disasters,	  governments	  and	  corporations	  are	  able	  to	  respond	  in	  ways	  that	  otherwise	  would	  face	  massive	  local	  resistance.	  As	  Klein	  explains,	  the	  shock	  of	  acute	  disaster	  situations	  renders	  communities	  survival-­‐focused	  and	  thus	  less	  able	  to	  organize	  collective	  protest	  against	  harmful	  government	  and	  corporate	  actions	  (2007).	  Gotham	  and	  Greenberg	  use	  the	  term	  “laboratories”	  to	  refer	  to	  government	  and	  industry	  views	  of	  post-­‐disaster	  areas	  and	  “experiment”	  to	  identify	  their	  actions	  (2008).	  Disasters	  are	  framed	  by	  capitalists	  as	  opportunities,	  which	  allow	  for	  quick	  adoption	  of	  neoliberal	  strategies	  which	  otherwise	  would	  have	  come	  up	  against	  significant	  local	  resistance.	  “Moments	  of	  crisis	  have	  presented	  the	  best	  opportunities	  to	  experiment	  with	  these	  contradictory	  and	  often	  unpopular	  forms	  of	  governance	  and	  to	  do	  so	  with	  less	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  challenge”	  (Klein	  2007,	  1042).	  “Like	  the	  terrorized	  prisoner	  who	  gives	  up	  the	  names	  of	  comrades	  and	  renounces	  his	  faith,	  shocked	  societies	  often	  give	  up	  things	  they	  would	  otherwise	  fiercely	  protect”	  (Klein	  2007,	  20).	  This	  makes	  local	  leadership	  that	  much	  more	  important	  as	  communities	  in	  shock	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  face	  challenges	  in	  resisting	  projects	  not	  in	  their	  interest.	  Social	  movements	  have	  always	  responded	  to	  disasters—the	  ongoing	  disasters	  of	  poverty,	  racism,	  inequality	  and	  violence	  (Luft	  2009,	  506-­‐507).	  It	  is	  important	  in	  discussing	  post-­‐disaster	  organizing	  and	  relief	  work	  to	  recognize	  the	  organizations	  that	  have	  been	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mobilized	  for	  decades	  to	  eliminate	  the	  systems	  that	  initially	  caused	  these	  inequalities.	  These	  organizations	  and	  their	  leaders	  have	  experience	  and	  expertise	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  communities.	  The	  importance	  of	  ability	  to	  return	  home	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  statements	  and	  actions	  of	  grassroots	  community	  organizations,	  led	  by	  and	  accountable	  to	  displaced,	  low-­‐income,	  New	  Orleans	  residents.	  From	  evacuation	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  these	  organizations	  have	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  residents’	  right	  to	  return	  to	  their	  hometown.	  While	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  every	  disaster,	  in	  this	  situation	  individual	  residents	  and	  organizations	  emphasized	  the	  right	  of	  return	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  return	  home	  as	  a	  pressing	  need16.	  
	  
Conclusion	  From	  1964	  to	  today,	  national	  service	  programs	  have	  evolved	  into	  support	  for	  sectors	  distinct	  from	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement.	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  have	  been	  limited	  in	  their	  work	  by	  restrictions	  on	  their	  political	  efforts	  and	  are	  channeled	  into	  specific	  organizations,	  which	  reflect	  the	  United	  State’s	  neo-­‐liberal	  evolution.	  Volunteers,	  including	  AmeriCorps,	  are	  tasked	  with	  accommodating	  the	  increasing	  demand	  for	  social	  services—which	  often	  exceeds	  their	  levels	  of	  training.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Examples	  of	  statements	  and	  events	  which	  emphasize	  this	  need	  include:	  The	  People’s	  Hurricane	  Relief	  Fund	  and	  Oversight	  Commission’s	  statement	  on	  November	  2005	  “We	  Have	  the	  Right	  to	  Return	  to	  Healthy	  &	  Safe	  Neighborhoods”;	  in	  November,	  2007	  former	  public	  housing	  residents	  occupied	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  Housing	  Authority	  of	  New	  Orleans	  demanding	  their	  right	  to	  return	  to	  their	  apartments;	  “This	  is	  My	  Home”	  a	  documentary	  by	  the	  Advancement	  Project	  chronicles	  displaced	  public	  housing	  residents’	  struggles	  to	  return	  to	  New	  Orleans;	  The	  Survivor’s	  Village	  published	  a	  “National	  Call	  to	  Action”	  in	  August	  2006	  to	  garner	  grassroots	  support	  for	  displaced	  people	  retuning	  to	  New	  Orleans;	  and	  numerous	  protests	  and	  demonstrations	  insisting	  that	  public	  housing	  units	  be	  opened	  to	  former	  residents.	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The	  vast	  majority	  of	  literature	  on	  volunteerism	  is	  on	  the	  benefits	  service	  provides	  to	  volunteers	  or	  actions	  organizations	  can	  take	  to	  increase	  volunteer	  interest.17	  Such	  research	  assumes	  that	  volunteers	  both	  benefit	  personally,	  and	  do	  almost	  entirely	  good	  work	  for	  host	  organizations	  and	  neighborhoods.	  A	  significant	  number	  of	  the	  small	  minority	  of	  authors	  who	  take	  a	  more	  critical	  view	  of	  volunteerism	  as	  a	  modern	  phenomenon	  have	  been	  cited	  in	  this	  document.	  I	  assume	  that	  volunteerism	  is	  neither	  completely	  beneficial	  or	  harmless.	  Rather,	  I	  place	  my	  research	  on	  federally	  supported	  volunteerism	  within	  a	  historical	  view	  of	  the	  work	  done	  by	  organizations	  advocating	  for	  social	  change.	  Primary	  research	  for	  this	  project	  takes	  place	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  a	  financially	  struggling,	  black	  majority	  city,	  geographically	  positioned	  next	  to	  massive	  natural	  resource	  industry	  with	  a	  long	  history	  of	  social	  justice	  organizing	  that	  continued	  through	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  I	  consider	  the	  large	  group	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  sent	  to	  assist	  in	  Katrina	  recovery	  to	  be	  a	  component	  of	  the	  federal	  disaster	  response.	  When	  former	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  created	  the	  USA	  Freedom	  Corps	  Council	  following	  September	  11,	  2001,	  he	  linked	  the	  missions	  of	  AmeriCorps,	  Peace	  Corps	  and	  the	  newly	  created	  Citizens	  Corps	  (created	  for	  national	  emergencies,	  under	  FEMA’s	  jurisdiction)	  (Wofford	  2002,	  17).	  This	  study	  of	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  evolution	  of	  AmeriCorps	  to	  its	  place	  in	  the	  Katrina	  recovery	  provides	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	  government	  incentives	  for	  individualistic,	  politically	  “neutral”	  volunteerism.	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  increased	  the	  demands	  on	  many	  federal	  programs.	  It	  is	  my	  intention	  to	  analyze	  the	  implications	  of	  AmeriCorps	  policies	  on	  the	  recovery	  of	  New	  Orleans’s.	  I	  will	  place	  volunteer	  efforts	  and	  their	  benefits	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Of	  the	  hundreds	  of	  studies	  on	  volunteer	  motivation	  examples	  include:	  Yeung	  2004;	  Liao-­‐Troth	  and	  Dunn	  1999;	  Hibbert,	  Piacentini	  and	  Al	  Dajani	  2003;	  Anderson	  and	  Shaw	  1999;	  Schondel,	  Shields	  and	  Orel	  1992;	  and	  Caan	  and	  Goldberg-­‐Glen	  1991.	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restrictions	  in	  the	  context	  available	  resources	  and	  accountability	  to	  populations	  identified	  as	  “socially	  vulnerable.”	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Chapter	  3.	  METHODS	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  questions.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  examine	  methods	  of	  recruitment	  into	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006,	  the	  preparation	  volunteers	  received	  prior	  to	  arrival,	  the	  benefits	  they	  received	  in	  compensation	  for	  their	  labor,	  the	  work	  they	  did,	  their	  relationship	  to	  official	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  and	  regulations	  and	  ultimately	  their	  implications	  for	  New	  Orleans	  and	  its	  residents.	  To	  help	  address	  these	  questions	  I	  conducted	  ten	  in-­‐person	  and	  eight	  phone	  interviews	  with	  former	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  This	  research	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  IRB	  Committee	  and	  deemed	  compliant	  with	  both	  University	  and	  federal	  guidelines	  [Appendix	  A].	  I	  chose	  to	  interview	  volunteers	  directly	  rather	  than	  AmeriCorps	  supervisors	  or	  administrators	  because	  former	  volunteers	  can	  best	  inform	  me	  about	  the	  work	  that	  was	  actually	  being	  conducted,	  their	  experiences	  of	  leadership	  structures	  in	  organizations	  and	  the	  affect	  AmeriCorps	  benefits	  had	  on	  their	  livelihood.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  my	  study	  participants	  had	  to	  be	  full-­‐time	  volunteers	  through	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  Orleans	  Parish,	  LA	  beginning	  their	  service	  in	  2006.	  There	  were	  no	  criteria	  around	  completing	  their	  contract	  of	  service,	  though	  only	  one	  of	  my	  informants	  discussed	  early	  contract	  termination.	  I	  am	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  relationships	  volunteers	  built	  with	  organizations	  and	  thus	  filtered	  my	  sample	  to	  include	  only	  volunteers	  with	  the	  AmeriCorps	  State/National	  and	  VISTA	  programs	  because	  these	  programs	  place	  volunteers	  in	  one	  work	  position	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  service—typically	  ten	  to	  twelve	  months.	  For	  this	  reason	  I	  attempted	  to	  exclude	  participants	  in	  the	  AmeriCorps	  NCCC	  program—which	  is	  highly	  mobile	  and	  team	  based	  with	  work	  projects	  generally	  lasting	  6	  weeks.	  I	  explained	  in	  my	  recruitment	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correspondence	  that	  I	  was	  only	  looking	  for	  State/National	  and	  VISTA	  volunteers.	  I	  received	  communications	  from	  2	  former	  NCCC	  members	  and	  1	  independent	  volunteer	  (non-­‐AmeriCorps	  affiliated)	  who	  expressed	  surprise	  that	  I	  was	  not	  including	  them	  in	  my	  research,	  emphasizing	  the	  significant	  amount	  of	  volunteer	  work	  they	  did.	  One	  wrote	  in	  an	  email	  to	  me:	   I	  don't	  understand	  why	  you	  would	  exclude	  NCCC.	  I	  served	  for	  11	  weeks	  at	  the	  church	  of	  F-­‐-­‐	  and	  D-­‐-­‐	  helping	  establish	  what	  was	  the	  fledgling	  [Collaborating	  Volunteers]	  as	  a	  team	  leader	  of	  short-­‐term	  volunteers	  for	  gutting	  and	  removing.	  The	  longest	  period	  of	  time	  for	  any	  project	  away	  from	  base	  is	  8	  weeks,	  we	  were	  granted	  permission	  to	  extend	  our	  project	  an	  extra	  3	  weeks.	  	  Myself,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  team	  also	  setup,	  ran,	  and	  managed	  the	  systems	  and	  projects	  during	  that	  time.	  2	  of	  my	  teammates	  came	  back	  and	  continued	  to	  work	  for	  the	  organization.	  Another	  went	  on	  to	  become	  staff	  at	  City	  Year	  of	  New	  York	  City.	  Let	  me	  know	  if	  you	  change	  your	  mind...	  	  Despite	  my	  attempts	  to	  limit	  my	  sample	  to	  State/National	  and	  VISTA	  volunteers,	  2	  NCCC	  volunteers	  slipped	  past	  my	  screening	  process	  and	  I	  only	  discovered	  their	  sectional	  affiliation	  with	  AmeriCorps	  once	  the	  interview	  process	  had	  begun.	  In	  both	  cases	  I	  decided	  to	  complete	  the	  interview	  process	  and	  focus	  my	  questions	  on	  their	  time	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  Thus,	  my	  sample	  includes	  twelve	  AmeriCorps	  State/National	  volunteers,	  four	  VISTA	  volunteers	  and	  two	  NCCC.	  Race	  and	  gender	  were	  not	  criteria	  in	  determining	  my	  sample;	  respondents	  included	  fourteen	  whites,	  four	  people	  of	  color,	  twelve	  women	  and	  six	  men.	  	  Unfortunately,	  my	  numerous	  requests	  made	  to	  the	  state	  and	  national	  AmeriCorps	  offices	  for	  information	  on	  demographics	  of	  AmeriCorps	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  or	  even	  in	  Louisiana	  in	  2006,	  were	  returned	  with	  statements	  insisting	  that	  information	  is	  not	  comprehensively	  available.	  Therefore,	  my	  only	  way	  of	  determining	  if	  my	  sample	  accurately	  represents	  the	  demographics	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  at	  that	  time	  is	  through	  the	  observational	  statements	  of	  my	  informants.	  Three	  people	  mentioned	  that	  there	  were	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approximately	  200	  AmeriCorps	  in	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006	  and	  1	  interviewee	  stated	  that	  there	  were	  800.	  One	  black	  woman	  explained	  that	  she	  was	  the	  only	  person	  of	  color	  in	  her	  VISTA	  group	  of	  thirteen18.	  Two	  informants	  who	  attended	  AmeriCorps	  pre-­‐service	  orientation	  in	  other	  states	  said	  their	  orientation	  was	  much	  more	  racially	  diverse	  than	  the	  group	  of	  AmeriCorps	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  Four	  people	  generalized	  the	  group	  as	  mostly	  white	  and	  mostly	  non-­‐local.	  One	  informant	  who	  came	  to	  New	  Orleans	  for	  his	  AmeriCorps	  position	  explained	  that	  he	  did	  not	  meet	  anyone	  from	  New	  Orleans	  who	  was	  doing	  AmeriCorps	  despite	  a	  wide	  social	  circle	  of	  AmeriCorps	  affiliations.	  Three	  white	  women	  reported	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  expressing	  surprise	  to	  discover	  that	  they	  were	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  and	  from	  Louisiana,	  implying	  that	  most	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  they	  met	  previously	  had	  been	  from	  other	  states.	  	  My	  outreach	  to	  potential	  participants	  included	  talking	  to	  people	  with	  whom	  I	  had	  pre-­‐existing	  relationships	  with,	  in-­‐person	  recruitment	  (for	  example	  I	  met	  one	  informant	  at	  a	  friend’s	  party	  when	  she	  asked	  me	  about	  my	  thesis	  topic),	  email	  outreach	  and	  snowball	  sampling.	  I	  initially	  contacted	  the	  national	  and	  state	  AmeriCorps	  offices	  to	  send	  out	  an	  email	  to	  eligible	  former	  volunteers	  to	  recruit	  them	  for	  my	  study.	  The	  national	  office	  referred	  me	  to	  the	  state	  office	  of	  Corporation	  for	  National	  and	  Community	  Service	  office	  in	  Baton	  Rouge.	  The	  Louisiana	  State	  Program	  Director	  explained	  to	  me	  over	  the	  phone	  that	  they	  did	  not	  keep	  updated	  contact	  information	  for	  former	  volunteers.	  When	  I	  suggested	  that	  email	  addresses	  might	  have	  remained	  the	  same	  she	  explained	  that	  there	  was	  no	  comprehensive,	  annual	  list	  of	  volunteers	  and	  she	  was	  unwilling	  to	  sort	  through	  files	  to	  identify	  potential	  subjects.	  She	  suggested	  that	  I	  contact	  Rebuilding	  Together	  because	  they	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  There	  is	  also	  a	  black	  man	  in	  my	  VISTA	  group,	  but	  he	  started	  his	  service	  year	  after	  she	  had	  finished	  hers.	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currently	  have	  many	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  on	  staff19.	  I	  attempted	  to	  contact	  the	  second	  person	  in	  this	  office	  and	  was	  referred	  back	  to	  the	  first.	  I	  decided	  to	  turn	  to	  organizations	  and	  my	  own	  personal	  contacts	  to	  do	  my	  outreach.	  I	  emailed	  approximately	  fifty	  local	  organizations	  that	  hosted	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  2008	  (CNCS	  c).	  I	  also	  included	  some	  organizations	  which	  I	  knew	  from	  experience	  had	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  2006.	  I	  also	  sent	  a	  recruitment	  email	  [Appendix	  B]	  to	  approximately	  thirty	  of	  my	  personal	  contacts	  who	  had	  some	  connection	  with	  AmeriCorps.	  This	  outreach	  resulted	  in	  significant	  interest.	  My	  subjects	  contacted	  me	  by	  email	  and	  phone	  calls—the	  majority	  of	  them	  had	  heard	  about	  my	  study	  from	  their	  former	  host	  organization.	  One	  of	  my	  subjects	  is	  a	  close	  personal	  friend	  of	  mine,	  another	  I	  met	  while	  discussing	  my	  research	  at	  a	  party,	  and	  three	  others	  were	  referred	  to	  me	  by	  their	  friends.	  Following	  every	  interview	  I	  asked	  the	  subject	  if	  they	  knew	  of	  anyone	  else	  who	  might	  be	  interested	  in	  participating.	  The	  majority	  of	  them	  did	  and	  took	  the	  initiative	  to	  pass	  on	  my	  contact	  information	  to	  their	  peers.	  This	  generated	  a	  second	  significant	  wave	  of	  interest—people	  referred	  to	  me	  by	  people	  whom	  I	  already	  interviewed.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  potential	  informants	  contacted	  me	  either	  via	  phone	  or	  email	  and	  one	  replied	  via	  text	  (“I’m	  down	  for	  the	  interview”).	  I	  then	  ensured	  they	  had	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  recruitment	  email	  and	  they	  fit	  within	  the	  criteria	  of	  my	  study.	  Informants	  then	  selected	  a	  time	  and	  place	  (if	  in	  person)	  or	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  phone	  number	  for	  a	  phone	  interview.	  Most	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  early	  evening	  (though	  start	  times	  ranged	  from	  8am	  to	  10pm)	  and	  those	  in	  person	  varied	  in	  location,	  typically	  the	  informant’s	  home	  or	  a	  coffee	  shop.	  All	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  consent	  form,	  including	  contact	  information	  for	  myself	  and	  my	  committee	  chair	  prior	  to	  beginning	  the	  interview.	  Additionally,	  they	  signed	  (or	  gave	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Upon	  doing	  so	  I	  discovered	  that	  Rebuilding	  Together	  was	  just	  a	  zygote	  of	  an	  organization	  in	  2006	  and	  didn’t	  actually	  have	  any	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  until	  2007.	  	  
48	  
verbal	  agreement	  over	  the	  phone	  to)	  the	  consent	  form	  [Appendix	  C]	  and	  I	  read	  them	  the	  participant	  introduction	  [Appendix	  D].	  For	  individuals	  I	  knew	  personally	  I	  included	  a	  statement	  that	  none	  of	  the	  information	  they	  shared	  with	  me	  during	  the	  interview	  would	  be	  disclosed	  in	  social	  settings.	  I	  then	  requested	  permission	  to	  tape	  record	  the	  interview	  and	  explained	  that	  the	  recording	  would	  be	  played	  back	  and	  transcribed	  by	  me	  personally	  and	  then	  the	  audio	  copy	  would	  be	  destroyed.	  I	  also	  offered	  participants	  copies	  of	  their	  transcription	  which	  seven	  people	  requested.	  All	  participants	  agreed	  to	  be	  recorded.	  Prior	  to	  my	  first	  interview	  question	  I	  allowed	  participants	  to	  ask	  any	  questions	  they	  might	  have	  of	  me.	  These	  were	  generally	  simple	  and	  revolved	  around	  confidentiality,	  my	  research	  questions	  and	  my	  department	  of	  study.	  	  Interviews	  lasted	  approximately	  one	  hour	  though	  one	  was	  forty	  minutes	  and	  another	  was	  three	  and	  a	  half	  hours.	  Occasionally	  the	  recording	  quality	  of	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  coffee	  shops	  or	  over	  less-­‐than-­‐perfect	  phone	  reception	  were	  difficult	  to	  understand.	  Through	  the	  interview	  and	  data	  analysis	  process	  I	  found	  myself	  identifying	  with	  and	  having	  emotional	  responses	  to	  some	  participant	  responses.	  In	  order	  to	  better	  recognize	  my	  own	  biases,	  I	  took	  the	  time	  to	  interview	  myself	  and	  respond	  truthfully	  to	  each	  question	  I	  asked	  others.	  Through	  this	  process	  I	  developed	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  the	  ways	  my	  personal	  experiences	  influence	  my	  research.	  By	  having	  a	  detailed	  statement	  of	  my	  thoughts	  and	  experiences	  I	  could	  better	  distinguish	  these	  from	  my	  data.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  I	  approached	  this	  research	  unbiased,	  as	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  this	  is	  possible.	  We,	  as	  researchers,	  do	  not	  make	  discoveries	  but	  rather	  interpret	  the	  world	  around	  us	  through	  specific	  lenses	  or	  paradigms.	  “Researchers	  cannot	  be	  ‘positive’	  about	  our	  claims	  of	  knowledge	  when	  studying	  the	  behavior	  and	  actions	  of	  humans”	  (Crestwell	  2009,	  7).	  I	  support	  the	  critique	  of	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positivism	  in	  research,	  challenging	  the	  traditional	  notion	  of	  absolute	  truth	  of	  knowledge.	  	  The	  process	  of	  interviewing	  myself	  allowed	  me	  to	  clarify	  my	  own	  position	  on	  political	  radicalism	  and	  anti-­‐racist	  commitment,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  clarify	  my	  own	  relationship	  to	  my	  sample	  set.	  Within	  two	  weeks	  of	  completing	  an	  interview	  I	  transcribed	  the	  recording	  and	  deleted	  the	  audio	  copy	  from	  my	  digital	  voice	  recorder.	  When	  requested,	  the	  transcript	  was	  sent	  via	  email	  to	  the	  participant.	  One	  person	  replied	  with	  simple	  corrections	  (the	  spelling	  of	  a	  friend’s	  name	  and	  the	  author	  of	  a	  book	  mentioned).	  I	  saved	  the	  transcripts	  in	  a	  folder	  on	  my	  computer	  and	  external	  hard	  drive	  and	  printed	  a	  hard	  copy,	  which	  I	  filed	  and	  hid	  in	  my	  home.	  I	  initially	  transcribed	  interviews	  verbatim	  and	  then	  edited	  out	  names	  of	  people	  mentioned	  (for	  example,	  Emily	  would	  became	  E-­‐-­‐-­‐).	  I	  then	  inductively	  coded	  all	  eighteen	  interviews	  using	  the	  scientific	  software	  ATLAS.ti.	  Unfortunately,	  upon	  completing	  my	  coding	  my	  computer	  crashed	  and	  I	  lost	  these	  coded	  documents.	  Four	  days	  later	  my	  house	  was	  robbed	  and	  my	  external	  hard	  drive	  was	  stolen	  with	  all	  of	  my	  back-­‐up	  copies.	  While	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely,	  there	  is	  a	  small	  chance	  my	  interviews	  were	  discovered	  and	  read	  by	  hacking	  my	  external	  hard	  drive.	  Following	  this	  incident	  I	  re-­‐coded	  the	  interviews	  by	  hand	  on	  the	  printouts	  of	  transcripts.	  I	  retained	  a	  list	  of	  my	  inductively	  developed	  codes	  and	  the	  second	  time	  coding	  was	  generally	  deductive,	  working	  off	  this	  list.	  	  From	  these	  codes	  I	  developed	  five	  themes,	  which	  constitute	  the	  bulk	  of	  my	  data	  analysis.	   	  	  
Description	  of	  Sample	  I	  interviewed	  18	  informants	  who	  were	  filtered	  by	  their	  ability	  to	  receive	  notice	  of	  my	  study	  and	  desire	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  project.	  All	  informants	  were	  between	  the	  ages	  of	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22	  and	  29	  during	  their	  service	  year	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  an	  NCCC	  participant	  who	  turned	  19.	  Most	  of	  my	  informants	  (twelve	  out	  of	  eighteen)	  were	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  22	  and	  24	  during	  their	  AmeriCorps	  participation.	  	  Ten	  interviews	  were	  done	  in	  person	  because	  these	  participants	  still	  lived	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  Eight	  were	  conducted	  over	  the	  phone	  with	  people	  who	  lived	  all	  over	  the	  continental	  United	  States.	  Of	  the	  ten	  informants	  who	  were	  interviewed	  in	  person,	  only	  two	  of	  them	  had	  not	  lived	  in	  Louisiana	  before	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  and	  these	  two	  secured	  local	  employment	  directly	  through	  their	  AmeriCorps	  experience.	  Everyone	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  Louisiana	  pre-­‐Katrina	  was	  interviewed	  in	  person.	  It	  was	  difficult	  for	  me	  to	  definitely	  define	  “local”	  and	  “non-­‐local”	  as	  New	  Orleans	  has	  been	  a	  hub	  for	  travelers	  and	  a	  host	  for	  new	  residents	  long	  before	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  I	  interviewed	  four	  people	  who	  were	  raised	  in	  New	  Orleans	  and	  six	  people	  who	  lived	  in	  New	  Orleans	  immediately	  before	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  The	  remaining	  twelve	  of	  my	  group	  had	  not	  resided	  in	  New	  Orleans	  prior	  to	  their	  work	  with	  AmeriCorps.	  I	  interviewed	  two	  black	  women,	  one	  black	  man,	  one	  white	  Latino	  man,	  ten	  non-­‐Hispanic	  white	  women	  and	  four	  non-­‐Hispanic	  white	  men;	  in	  other	  words,	  four	  people	  of	  color,	  fourteen	  whites,	  twelve	  women	  and	  six	  men.	  The	  majority	  came	  from	  financially	  comfortable	  backgrounds—all	  of	  them	  reported	  living	  in	  homes	  owned	  by	  their	  parents	  at	  some	  point	  in	  their	  lives,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  one	  white	  woman	  whose	  parents	  were	  both	  pastors	  and	  lived	  in	  a	  home	  provided	  in	  their	  parsonage.	  Three	  people	  reported	  ever	  remembering	  anticipation	  for	  paychecks	  in	  their	  family	  and	  only	  one	  person,	  a	  black	  woman,	  reported	  experiencing	  homelessness.	  A	  surprising	  number	  of	  subjects’	  parents	  had	  received	  higher	  education	  degrees—only	  two	  interviewees	  came	  from	  families	  where	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neither	  parent	  had	  completed	  a	  degree	  above	  high	  school.	  Of	  the	  36	  parents	  of	  my	  informants	  there	  are	  three	  Ph.	  Ds,	  two	  law	  degrees,	  two	  M.Ds,	  12	  masters	  degrees,	  8	  bachelors,	  and	  2	  associates,	  leaving	  only	  7	  parents	  who	  did	  not	  complete	  a	  degree	  above	  high	  school.	  I	  interviewed	  four	  VISTA	  participants—all	  of	  whom	  were	  hosted	  by	  a	  wealthy,	  white-­‐majority	  local	  university	  and	  placed	  in	  other	  organizations,	  twelve	  AmeriCorps	  State/National	  volunteers	  and	  two	  NCCC.	  	  They	  worked	  for	  eight	  different	  organizations	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  job	  responsibilities	  from	  pricing	  artwork	  to	  scraping	  mold	  off	  two-­‐by-­‐fours	  in	  flooded	  houses.	  Their	  host	  organizations	  played	  huge	  roles	  in	  shaping	  their	  experience.	  In	  order	  for	  my	  informants	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  I	  have	  changed	  the	  names	  of	  the	  organizations	  they	  worked	  for.20	  Table	  1	  lists	  the	  organizations	  represented	  by	  my	  study	  participants,	  a	  short	  description	  and	  the	  number	  of	  interviewees.	  Had	  random	  sampling	  occurred	  the	  number	  of	  organizations	  would	  be	  higher	  as	  there	  were	  many	  who	  hosted	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  after	  the	  storm	  and	  there	  would	  be	  fewer	  informants	  from	  each	  organization.	  Snowball	  sampling	  requests	  often	  lead	  my	  subjects	  to	  recommend	  their	  former	  co-­‐workers,	  resulting	  in	  overlap	  of	  some	  organizations.	  











interviewed	  United	  Residents	   -­‐-­‐	   A	  national	  housing	  service	  non-­‐profit	   2	  Words	  Not	  Guns	   WNG	   A	  national	  mediation	  and	  peacemaking	  non-­‐profit	   2	  (worked	  with	  TiES)	  Together	  in	  Equal	  Stakes	   TiES	   A	  post-­‐Katrina	  volunteer	  relief	  organization	   0	  (contracted	  with	  WGN)*	  Expanding	  Horizons	   -­‐-­‐	   A	  local,	  grassroots	  art	  gallery	   1	  (VISTA)	  Christian	  Congregational	  Giving	  Alliance	   CCGA	   A	  large,	  international	  faith	  based	  anti-­‐poverty	  organization	   4	  (1	  VISTA)	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  Rebuilds	   GNO	  Rebuilds	   A	  local	  network	  developed	  post-­‐Katrina	   4	  (1	  VISTA)	  Collaborating	  Volunteers	   -­‐-­‐	   A	  national	  volunteer	  program	   2	  (2	  NCCC)	  Saint	  Vincent	  Community	  Outreach	  Association	   SVCOA	   A	  local	  Christian	  organization	  supporting	  churches	   2	  
Fun	  to	  Read	  New	  Orleans	   FRNO	   A	  non-­‐profit	  literacy	  tutoring	  program	  working	  in	  public	  schools	   1	  (VISTA)	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Organizations	  represented	  by	  interviewees.	  All	  participants	  were	  State/National	  AmeriCorps	  members	  unless	  otherwise	  noted.	  *Two	  volunteers	  were	  technically	  contracted	  with	  WGN	  but	  reported	  doing	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  work	  with	  TiES.	  	  	  While	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  divide	  a	  group	  of	  18	  volunteers,	  my	  division	  of	  subjects	  is	  based	  on	  their	  work	  assignments	  and	  job	  responsibilities.	  This	  is	  because	  my	  primary	  research	  question	  examines	  the	  work	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  did	  in	  the	  city	  and	  the	  impact	  their	  participation	  in	  this	  federal	  program	  had	  on	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  city	  as	  a	  whole.	  I	  grouped	  volunteers	  who	  reported	  doing	  similar	  work	  together	  as	  their	  responses	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were	  parallel.	  For	  example,	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  with	  CCGA	  and	  Collaborating	  Volunteers	  spent	  most	  of	  their	  days	  doing	  physical	  labor	  in	  residential	  areas	  and	  leading	  teams	  of	  short-­‐term	  volunteer	  groups	  in	  the	  effort.	  The	  differences	  in	  work	  and	  housing	  situations	  were	  minimal	  thus	  allowing	  for	  the	  combining	  of	  organizations	  within	  one	  sample	  group,	  which	  I	  call	  “The	  Gutters.”	  In	  one	  case	  an	  entire	  organization—GNO	  Rebuilds—is	  separated	  due	  to	  the	  unique	  nature	  of	  the	  work	  and	  the	  relatively	  large	  number	  of	  project	  participants	  (four)	  from	  that	  organization.	  	  
	  
The	  Gutters	  My	  first	  group	  of	  five	  volunteers	  focused	  primarily	  on	  physical	  labor	  during	  their	  service	  hours.	  They	  worked	  for	  CCGA	  and	  Collaborating	  Volunteers.	  They	  primarily	  gutted	  flooded	  houses	  as	  the	  leaders	  of	  rotating	  short-­‐term	  volunteer	  teams	  that	  traveled	  to	  the	  city	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  Their	  work	  also	  included	  mold	  remediation	  following	  the	  gutting,	  inspecting	  houses	  as	  possible	  work	  sites	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  leading	  rebuilding	  efforts	  such	  as	  painting.	  These	  organizations	  had	  clear	  leadership	  structures	  and	  all	  volunteers	  reported	  exhaustion	  and	  workdays	  over	  ten	  hours.	  This	  group	  includes	  my	  two	  NCCC	  subjects.	  All	  five	  volunteers	  in	  this	  group	  were	  provided	  room	  and	  board	  by	  their	  organization.	  	  
Agenda	  Setters	  This	  group	  of	  four	  is	  composed	  of	  two	  volunteers	  who	  worked	  for	  SVCOA	  and	  two	  who	  were	  with	  United	  Residents.	  They	  reported	  limited	  amounts	  of	  direction	  from	  their	  supervisors	  and	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  leeway	  in	  developing	  job	  descriptions	  for	  themselves.	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Members	  of	  this	  group	  often	  struggled	  to	  meet	  their	  weekly	  hourly	  requirements.	  They	  self-­‐started	  most	  projects	  and	  often	  worked	  closely	  with	  other	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  their	  organization.	  Similar	  to	  The	  Gutters,	  members	  of	  this	  group	  also	  managed	  short-­‐term	  volunteer	  groups.	  The	  two	  volunteers	  with	  SVCOA	  lived	  with	  two	  other	  AmeriCorps	  in	  a	  flooded	  church.	  Volunteers	  with	  United	  Residents	  lived	  independently21.	  
	  
GNO	  Rebuilds	  This	  group	  is	  comprised	  of	  the	  three	  State/National	  volunteers	  who	  worked	  for	  the	  above	  organization.	  They	  all	  reported	  significant	  conflict	  with	  their	  supervisor.	  Their	  work	  centered	  around	  general	  information	  provision.	  This	  included	  public	  meetings	  with	  informational	  speakers,	  a	  website	  and	  a	  monthly	  newsletter.	  No	  one	  in	  this	  group	  was	  provided	  housing	  by	  their	  organization	  or	  AmeriCorps.22	  	  
Political	  Activists	  This	  small	  group	  of	  two	  is	  exceptional	  in	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  their	  work	  was	  technically	  forbidden	  by	  AmeriCorps	  rules,	  yet	  they	  faced	  no	  repercussions.	  Both	  individuals	  worked	  through	  Words	  Not	  Guns	  but	  ultimately	  spent	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  efforts	  supporting	  anti-­‐racist	  political	  organizing	  in	  the	  large,	  volunteer	  relief	  organization,	  Together	  in	  Equal	  Stakes	  (TiES).	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  explicitly	  forbid	  all	  types	  of	  political	  work	  during	  funded	  hours23.	  They	  had	  been	  doing	  this	  work	  for	  at	  least	  6	  months	  prior	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  volunteers	  living	  independently	  were	  paying	  market-­‐rate	  rent	  and	  were	  allocated	  no	  additional	  stipend.	  22	  In	  one	  theme,	  Work,	  there	  are	  four	  members	  of	  this	  group	  because	  the	  VISTA	  participant	  assigned	  to	  this	  organization	  is	  included.	  23	  Interestingly,	  VISTA	  and	  NCCC	  workers	  are	  “on	  call”	  or	  working	  24-­‐7	  for	  the	  entire	  duration	  of	  their	  contract	  with	  AmeriCorps.	  They	  cannot	  have	  another	  job,	  attend	  school	  or	  exercise	  their	  political	  or	  religious	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getting	  an	  AmeriCorps	  stipend	  and	  lived	  temporarily	  in	  volunteer	  housing.	  They	  both	  moved	  to	  live	  independently	  before	  the	  end	  of	  their	  service	  term.	  	  	  	  	  	  
VISTA	   The	  remaining	  four	  individuals	  were	  VISTAs	  and	  sourced	  out	  to	  four	  different	  organizations.	  They	  were	  provided	  housing	  by	  the	  local	  university	  sponsoring	  their	  program.	  One	  black	  woman	  moved	  to	  New	  Orleans	  for	  her	  position	  with	  Expanding	  Horizons.	  Her	  work	  assignments	  focused	  on	  supporting	  the	  return	  and	  work	  of	  evacuated	  artists.	  A	  local	  white	  woman	  was	  offered	  an	  AmeriCorps	  position	  with	  FRNO	  following	  a	  semester	  of	  service	  learning	  with	  the	  organization.	  She	  focused	  on	  coordinating	  volunteers,	  reading	  with	  children	  in	  public	  schools	  and	  transitioning	  the	  organization	  to	  a	  new	  site.	  A	  non-­‐local	  white	  woman	  transferred	  from	  a	  VISTA	  position	  in	  Alabama	  to	  direct	  an	  English	  as	  a	  Second	  Language	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans	  through	  CCGA.	  A	  local	  black	  man	  joined	  this	  university	  VISTA	  program	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  other	  VISTAs’	  service	  years.	  He	  worked	  with	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  to	  coordinate	  meetings	  and,	  ultimately,	  ensure	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  freedom	  as	  it	  is	  prohibited	  in	  the	  AmeriCorps	  contract	  [See	  Appendix	  E].	  Therefore,	  these	  volunteers	  have	  no	  time	  when	  political	  work	  is	  allowable,	  a	  point	  I	  will	  return	  to	  later.	  In	  this	  case	  these	  two	  political	  activists	  were	  State/National—the	  contract	  for	  which	  is	  based	  on	  number	  of	  hours	  worked.	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Chapter	  4.	  DATA—THEMES	  	  
Five	  themes	  emerged	  as	  I	  coded	  my	  data.	  These	  themes	  reflect	  my	  research	  goal	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  a	  post-­‐disaster	  context.	  I	  focused	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  volunteers	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  based	  on	  their	  reflections	  on	  their	  service	  year.	  I	  choose	  not	  to	  examine	  individual	  consciousness	  or	  opinions,	  though	  this	  would	  merit	  further	  research	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  impact	  disaster	  relief	  had	  on	  the	  life	  trajectory	  of	  volunteers.	  My	  first	  theme	  discusses	  the	  people	  AmeriCorps	  sponsored	  to	  come	  to	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006	  and	  how	  they	  were	  reached.	  The	  second	  theme	  examines	  volunteer	  experience	  and	  training	  in	  preparation	  to	  work	  in	  a	  city	  in	  a	  state	  of	  disaster.	  In	  the	  third	  theme	  I	  examine	  their	  living	  conditions,	  focusing	  on	  housing	  and	  health	  care,	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  arrangements	  for	  the	  city	  and	  returning	  residents.	  My	  fourth	  and	  largest	  theme	  focuses	  on	  what	  work	  these	  volunteers	  did	  and	  which	  organizations	  “employed”	  them.	  I	  then	  examine	  the	  role	  the	  national	  AmeriCorps	  program	  played	  in	  shaping	  this	  work.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  Data	  Analysis,	  I	  frame	  their	  efforts	  in	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans.	  
	  
Theme	  1.	  Getting	  involved	  with	  AmeriCorps:	  “It	  just	  kind	  of	  fell	  into	  my	  lap.”	  In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  who	  gets	  involved	  with	  AmeriCorps,	  this	  section	  provides	  background	  information	  on	  volunteers	  in	  each	  previously	  identified	  sample	  group.	  While	  there	  are	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  AmeriCorps	  recruitment	  efforts,	  there	  are	  some	  common	  threads.	  For	  instance,	  five	  people	  who	  already	  knew	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  explicitly	  mention	  finding	  their	  specific	  AmeriCorps	  position	  using	  online	  resources.	  Four	  people	  were	  offered	  jobs	  through	  personal	  connections	  and	  a	  fifth	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	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graduate	  school	  research	  project.	  	  Nearly	  everyone,	  seventeen	  out	  of	  eighteen	  participants,	  included	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  to	  their	  decision	  to	  come	  to	  New	  Orleans	  and/or	  apply	  for	  AmeriCorps.	  The	  exception	  was	  one	  volunteer	  who	  applied	  to	  AmeriCorps	  before	  August	  2005.	  The	  majority	  of	  job	  postings	  and	  interviewing	  was	  conducted	  by	  individual	  organizations	  that	  had	  been	  granted	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  and	  had	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  their	  volunteers.	  
	  
Gutters	  The	  three	  (white,	  two	  female,	  one	  male)	  volunteers	  who	  did	  physical	  work	  with	  CCGA	  were	  specifically	  motivated	  to	  volunteer	  by	  the	  devastation	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina—and	  AmeriCorps	  seemed	  like	  the	  best	  opportunity.	  As	  two	  people	  put	  it,	  they	  “wanted	  to	  help	  in	  any	  way	  possible.”	  Two	  of	  them	  were	  not	  living	  in	  New	  Orleans	  prior	  to	  their	  AmeriCorps	  term	  and	  primarily	  used	  the	  Internet	  to	  search	  for	  volunteer	  opportunities.	  One	  person	  was	  a	  Loyola	  University	  student	  and	  he	  saw	  a	  flier	  on	  campus	  advertising	  a	  position	  with	  SVCOA,	  for	  which	  he	  applied	  and	  into	  which	  he	  was	  accepted.	  He	  later	  transferred	  to	  CCGA	  because	  they	  provided	  free	  housing	  while	  SVCOA	  did	  not.	  All	  had	  bachelor’s	  degrees	  and	  began	  their	  AmeriCorps	  term	  directly	  after	  graduation.	  The	  two	  NCCC	  members	  of	  this	  group	  worked	  with	  Collaborating	  Volunteers	  for	  12	  weeks.	  Both	  of	  them	  knew	  people	  who	  were	  AmeriCorps	  alumni	  (a	  friend	  and	  a	  brother)	  who	  spoke	  highly	  of	  the	  program.	  One	  woman	  did	  not	  mention	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  in	  describing	  her	  motivations	  to	  apply;	  rather	  she	  was	  searching	  for	  employment	  following	  college	  graduation.	  The	  other	  woman	  was	  the	  only	  person	  in	  my	  sample	  who	  applied	  to	  AmeriCorps	  before	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  hit.	  She	  explained	  her	  reaction	  watching	  the	  news	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coverage:	  “Just	  this	  realization	  that	  this	  huge	  catastrophe	  had	  just	  happened	  and	  I	  was	  excited	  and	  I	  was	  glad	  that	  what	  I	  was	  going	  to	  do	  that	  year	  was	  going	  to	  help	  those	  who	  had	  gone	  through	  that.”	  	  
Agenda	  setters	  	  The	  two	  women	  (one	  black	  and	  one	  white)	  I	  interviewed	  who	  worked	  for	  United	  Residents	  lived	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  they	  were	  hired	  to	  work	  in,	  before	  Katrina—one	  was	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  this	  neighborhood	  and	  another	  in	  Slidell,	  LA.	  They	  both	  returned	  after	  evacuation	  and	  were	  not	  happy	  with	  their	  employment	  because	  it	  was	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  recovery—one	  was	  a	  waitress	  and	  one	  was	  working	  in	  a	  computer	  lab	  at	  a	  local	  public	  university.	  They	  both	  had	  bachelor’s	  degrees	  and	  the	  black	  woman	  had	  just	  completed	  her	  masters	  in	  Urban	  Planning—she	  wanted	  to	  “get	  plugged	  into	  the	  recovery	  process.”	  She	  was	  offered	  the	  job	  following	  an	  interview	  she	  did	  for	  a	  school	  assignment	  with	  the	  organization’s	  director.	  The	  white	  volunteer,	  who	  found	  the	  position	  on	  Idealist.org	  described	  AmeriCorps	  as	  her	  only	  employment	  option	  that	  she	  deemed	  “legitimately”	  paid	  for	  her	  experience	  and	  education;	  however,	  she	  had	  some	  reservations.	  “I	  really	  didn’t	  want	  to	  take	  it;	  I	  knew	  I	  couldn’t	  live	  on	  ten	  thousand	  dollars…The	  people	  I	  was	  working	  for	  could	  not	  tell	  me	  what	  I	  was	  going	  to	  be	  doing	  when	  I	  applied.	  So	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  why	  I	  took	  the	  job.”	  They	  both	  reported	  liking	  the	  idea	  of	  working	  in	  their	  own	  neighborhood.	  	  	  	  Both	  of	  my	  interviewees	  (white,	  one	  male,	  one	  female)	  who	  worked	  for	  SVCOA	  were	  raised	  in	  Baton	  Rouge	  and	  were	  looking	  for	  employment	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  their	  graduation	  from	  Louisiana	  State	  University.	  They,	  along	  with	  two	  other	  close	  friends	  of	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theirs,	  were	  offered	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  through	  a	  personal	  connection.	  All	  four	  of	  them	  (including	  two	  I	  interviewed)	  had	  a	  friend	  who	  was	  a	  pastor	  and	  was	  granted	  four	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  to	  help	  support	  the	  recovery	  of	  eight	  Christian	  churches.	  They	  were	  drawn	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  working	  together	  and	  helping	  to	  support	  New	  Orleans	  recovery.	  They	  all	  came	  from	  similar	  faith	  backgrounds,	  and	  were	  connected	  with	  Christian	  or	  Catholic	  churches	  in	  Baton	  Rouge.	  	  
GNO	  Rebuilds	  I	  interviewed	  four	  people	  who	  worked	  for	  this	  organization,	  though	  I	  include	  only	  the	  three	  State/National	  volunteers	  in	  this	  group,	  and	  assign	  the	  fourth,	  an	  AmeriCorps	  VISTA,	  to	  the	  VISTA	  group.	  These	  three	  all	  came	  from	  very	  different	  backgrounds	  and	  accepted	  the	  job	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.	  This	  group	  contains	  one	  white	  woman,	  one	  white	  man,	  and	  one	  white-­‐Hispanic	  man.	  The	  white	  woman	  was	  raised	  in	  New	  Orleans	  but	  had	  spent	  the	  last	  year,	  after	  graduating	  college,	  in	  her	  college	  town	  helping	  to	  investigate	  racist	  murders	  in	  the	  sixties.	  She	  returned	  to	  New	  Orleans	  to	  help	  in	  the	  recovery,	  specifically	  in	  working	  with	  her	  family	  and	  other	  whites	  around	  racism	  and	  white	  privilege.	  She	  found	  the	  AmeriCorps	  position	  on	  Craigslist.org,	  and	  explains:	  “I	  was	  so	  ready	  to	  get	  involved,	  I	  met	  with	  the	  boss	  and	  it	  seemed	  like	  we	  shared	  similar	  ideas…I	  thought	  this	  would	  be	  just	  perfect.”	  	  The	  white	  man	  came	  to	  New	  Orleans	  to	  work	  with	  this	  specific	  organization.	  He	  was	  a	  paid	  employee	  for	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  starting	  his	  AmeriCorps	  position	  with	  them.	  He	  described	  his	  AmeriCorps	  year	  as	  a	  career	  move—“paying	  your	  dues”—before	  becoming	  a	  salaried	  employee.	  He	  came	  with	  a	  bachelor’s	  degree	  in	  marketing	  and	  political	  science.	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The	  white-­‐Latino	  man	  moved	  to	  New	  Orleans	  with	  his	  wife	  in	  2006	  directly	  from	  a	  Peace	  Corps	  assignment	  in	  East	  Timor.	  They	  were	  evacuated	  ten	  months	  after	  their	  initial	  placement	  and	  decided	  to	  return	  to	  their	  home	  state.	  They	  are	  both	  from	  Louisiana,	  though	  not	  New	  Orleans.	  He	  had	  done	  AmeriCorps	  before	  his	  stint	  with	  the	  Peace	  Corps	  and	  was	  familiar	  with	  the	  program.	  He	  was	  struggling	  with	  a	  job	  search	  and	  found	  the	  position	  to	  work	  with	  the	  GNO	  Rebuilds’	  newsletter	  on	  Craigslist.org	  and	  was	  drawn	  to	  it	  because	  he	  had	  writing	  experience.	  	  
Political	  Activists	  The	  two	  interviewees	  (white,	  one	  male,	  one	  female)	  who	  worked	  through	  Words	  Not	  Guns	  were	  from	  outside	  Louisiana	  and	  came	  to	  New	  Orleans	  to	  work	  for	  TiES.	  They	  both	  spent	  at	  least	  six	  months	  working	  with	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  volunteers	  in	  TiES,	  specifically	  addressing	  issues	  of	  racism	  and	  classism	  within	  the	  organization.	  One	  was	  working	  at	  a	  site	  that	  focused	  on	  residential	  rebuilding	  and	  the	  other	  at	  the	  organization’s	  health	  clinic.	  The	  director	  of	  WNG	  personally	  recruited	  the	  two	  for	  AmeriCorps	  positions.	  They	  had	  previously	  known	  people	  who	  did	  AmeriCorps	  with	  the	  organization	  and	  as	  one	  put	  it:	  “really	  felt	  like	  the	  money	  they	  were	  getting	  was	  pretty	  string-­‐free.	  [Laughter.]	  They	  could	  use	  that	  money	  to	  support	  them	  to	  do	  the	  work	  they	  were	  already	  doing,	  that	  they	  were	  really	  interested	  in	  doing.”	  Though	  there	  were	  concerns:	  “I	  was	  a	  little	  hesitant	  I	  guess…	  I	  had	  this	  fear	  of	  the	  work	  being	  depoliticized	  and	  just	  being	  seen	  or	  promoted	  as	  service	  provision	  as	  opposed	  to	  community	  organizing	  and	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  solidarity	  framework.”	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VISTA	   The	  last	  four	  informants	  were	  all	  VISTAs.	  One	  participant,	  a	  non-­‐local	  black	  woman	  was	  raised	  in	  a	  military	  family	  and	  experienced	  homelessness	  as	  a	  child.	  She	  studied	  abroad	  in	  Kenya,	  returned	  and	  taught	  at	  an	  African	  centered	  school	  while	  attending	  college.	  A	  dynamic	  recruiter	  at	  a	  job	  fair	  encouraged	  her	  application	  and	  she	  applied	  to	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  St.	  Croix,	  Milwaukee	  and	  New	  Orleans.	  She	  settled	  on	  New	  Orleans:	  “I	  wanted	  to	  learn	  about	  community	  development	  and	  they	  said	  New	  Orleans	  is	  just	  like	  a	  third	  world	  country	  so	  if	  I	  go	  to	  New	  Orleans	  that’s	  gonna	  give	  me	  good	  experience	  and	  get	  ready	  for	  whatever	  I	  do	  after	  that.”	  A	  phone	  conversation	  with	  her	  future	  boss	  at	  Expanding	  Horizons	  sealed	  the	  deal.	  	  A	  white	  woman,	  self	  proclaimed	  seventh	  generation	  New	  Orleanian,	  was	  volunteering	  with	  Fun	  to	  Read	  New	  Orleans	  during	  the	  end	  of	  college	  at	  a	  local	  university.	  When	  graduation	  was	  approaching	  they	  offered	  her	  an	  AmeriCorps	  position.	  “It	  was	  just	  like,	  oh	  look	  at	  this,	  college	  is	  ending.	  [Laughter.]	  They’re	  going	  to	  give	  me	  some	  money,	  you	  know,	  not	  much	  but	  it	  kind	  of	  fell	  into	  my	  lap.”	  	  A	  non-­‐local	  white	  woman	  was	  a	  “hobo	  bum”	  while	  waiting	  on	  her	  Peace	  Corps	  appointment	  when	  Katrina	  hit.	  She	  traveled	  south	  to	  volunteer	  for	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  then	  decided	  to	  apply	  for	  VISTA,	  specifically	  to	  help	  with	  Katrina	  relief.	  She	  was	  placed	  with	  an	  organization	  in	  Alabama,	  which	  she	  did	  not	  like,	  so	  pushed	  for	  a	  transfer	  to	  the	  VISTA	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  She	  directed	  an	  English	  as	  a	  Second	  Language	  (ESL)	  program	  through	  CCGA.	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The	  black	  man	  who	  worked	  for	  this	  university	  VISTA	  program	  actually	  began	  after	  the	  above	  three—in	  February	  200724.	  He	  was	  sourced	  through	  the	  university	  VISTA	  program	  to	  work	  with	  GNO	  Rebuilds.	  He	  was	  raised	  in	  New	  Orleans	  and	  returned	  from	  evacuation	  to	  be	  close	  to	  his	  girlfriend	  who	  had	  found	  an	  AmeriCorps	  position	  with	  a	  housing	  construction	  non-­‐profit.	  “I	  wanted	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  rebuilding	  process	  in	  some	  way;	  I	  was	  kind	  of	  open	  into	  whichever	  way,	  for-­‐profit,	  non-­‐profit,	  university,	  higher-­‐education…”	  He	  started	  looking	  for	  State/National	  positions	  and	  found	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  first	  but	  took	  a	  position	  with	  the	  VISTA	  program	  because	  it	  provided	  housing.	  	  
Theme	  2.	  Experience	  and	  Training:	  “You	  don’t	  know	  the	  organization,	  you	  don’t	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  He	  was	  my	  only	  informant	  to	  start	  their	  AmeriCorps	  service	  after	  2006.	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Gutters	  Four	  of	  the	  five	  people	  who	  spent	  their	  time	  doing	  physical	  labor	  had	  bachelor’s	  degrees	  and	  one	  had	  a	  master’s	  in	  public	  administration.	  One	  woman	  started	  her	  AmeriCorps	  year	  immediately	  after	  high	  school—she	  was	  eighteen.	  One	  person	  went	  to	  a	  training	  nine	  months	  into	  her	  service,	  while	  another	  reported	  two	  orientations,	  one	  “pre-­‐service”	  and	  one	  about	  five	  months	  into	  it.	  She	  mentioned	  these	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  level	  of	  burnout—over	  half	  of	  the	  original	  group	  had	  dropped	  out	  of	  the	  program	  by	  the	  second	  orientation.	  No	  one	  in	  this	  group	  had	  ever	  gutted	  a	  house	  before	  or	  reported	  any	  construction	  experience,	  but	  they	  claimed	  they	  learned	  quickly—through	  mentorship	  from	  more	  experienced	  volunteers	  or	  “you	  just	  figured	  it	  out”	  as	  two	  volunteers	  reported.	  Eventually	  they	  ended	  up	  being	  the	  trainers,	  supervising	  temporary	  volunteer	  groups	  on-­‐site.	  None	  of	  them	  had	  experience	  or	  training	  about	  supervising	  volunteers	  but	  they	  generally	  reported	  this	  coming	  naturally	  or	  not	  being	  exceptionally	  hard	  to	  learn.	  For	  some	  technical	  and	  demanding	  tasks	  (such	  as	  mold	  removal	  or	  scouting	  flooded	  homes	  to	  determine	  their	  suitability	  as	  work	  sites)	  they	  detail	  sufficient	  training	  and	  supervision	  from	  their	  organizations.	  This	  group	  did	  emphasize	  their	  role	  as	  mental	  health	  caregivers	  and	  their	  inexperience	  handling	  traumatic	  situations.	  “When	  I	  was	  inspecting	  homes	  essentially	  when	  I	  was	  doing	  that	  I	  would	  go	  out	  and	  talk	  with	  homeowners	  and	  I	  was	  essentially	  a	  counselor	  for	  eight	  to	  ten	  hours	  a	  day	  and	  I	  would	  talk	  to	  about	  a	  dozen	  homeowners	  a	  day	  and	  hearing	  their	  stories.	  So	  it	  was	  something	  I	  was	  completely	  unprepared	  for	  as	  far	  as	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  that	  and	  those	  situations.”	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The	  NCCC	  team,	  of	  which	  I	  interviewed	  two	  members,	  spent	  a	  week	  observing	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  non-­‐profit	  in	  Mississippi	  and	  then	  was	  tasked	  to	  develop	  a	  similar	  volunteer	  organization	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  	  They	  were	  dropped	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  flooded,	  low-­‐income	  black	  neighborhood	  and	  had	  twelve	  weeks	  to	  get	  the	  organization	  (Collaborating	  Volunteers)	  up	  and	  running.	  They	  reported	  one	  paid	  staff	  person	  from	  the	  organization	  that	  worked	  with	  them.	  Both	  of	  these	  women	  reveled	  in	  the	  leadership	  they	  were	  granted.	  One	  explained,	  “While	  at	  [Collaborating	  Volunteers]	  in	  New	  Orleans	  we	  might	  have	  been	  cheap	  labor	  but	  we	  were	  running	  an	  organization	  and	  it	  was	  really	  spectacular.”	  Every	  member	  of	  this	  group	  was	  critical	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  relevant	  training.	  One	  mentioned	  safety	  and	  not	  being	  sure	  how	  to	  work	  in	  contaminated	  houses,	  two	  others	  emphasized	  their	  role	  as	  makeshift	  counselors	  and	  how	  lack	  of	  preparation	  lead	  to	  depression	  or	  mental	  health	  problems,	  and	  another	  explained	  generally:	  “I	  don’t	  feel	  like	  I	  was	  prepared	  mentally	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  training…That	  was	  one	  of	  my	  criticisms	  of	  the	  whole	  thing	  was	  maybe	  some	  kind	  of	  training	  beforehand	  would	  have	  been	  helpful.”	  
	  
Agenda	  Setters	  Everyone	  in	  this	  group	  had	  a	  bachelor’s	  degree	  and	  one	  had	  a	  master’s	  degree	  in	  urban	  planning.	  Of	  the	  four	  people	  in	  this	  group,	  the	  two	  working	  with	  United	  Residents	  reported	  not	  attending	  any	  training	  or	  orientation	  and	  the	  two	  with	  SVCOA,	  both	  of	  whom	  were	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  community	  outreach	  and	  neighborhood	  support,	  were	  given	  an	  unhelpful	  training	  video	  to	  watch.	  “We	  had	  a	  safety	  training	  but	  we	  couldn’t	  make	  it	  to	  one	  so	  it	  was	  a	  PowerPoint	  on	  a	  laptop	  with	  us	  in	  the	  room	  and	  it	  was	  like,	  wear	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goggles	  and	  don’t	  step	  on	  rafters	  and	  it	  was	  like,	  we	  don’t	  do	  that…We	  got	  our	  t-­‐shirts	  and	  boots	  and	  that	  was	  it.”	  One	  woman	  who	  worked	  with	  United	  Residents	  made	  the	  distinction	  between	  being	  inexperienced,	  and	  being	  an	  inexperienced	  leader:	  “There’s	  something	  maybe	  wrong	  with	  throwing	  inexperienced	  people	  in	  and	  then	  they’re	  sort	  of	  looked	  at	  as	  an	  experienced	  person.	  I	  know	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  I’m	  doing	  but	  these	  volunteers	  don’t	  know	  that.	  So	  in	  a	  way	  it’s	  not	  really	  fair—if	  it	  were	  like	  me	  and	  my	  neighbors	  and	  we	  were	  just	  like	  hey	  lets	  figure	  this	  out	  and	  do	  it,	  you	  know,	  I	  can	  see	  that.”	  She	  then	  opined	  that	  those	  who	  knew	  the	  neighborhood	  or	  who	  had	  experience	  in	  similar	  situations,	  such	  as	  post-­‐disaster	  rebuilding,	  might	  have	  been	  better	  suited	  to	  leadership	  roles.	  A	  particularly	  noteworthy	  example	  is	  of	  the	  young	  white	  woman	  who	  was	  working	  for	  United	  Residents,	  which	  was	  the	  recipient	  of	  a	  grant	  to	  host	  a	  summer	  camp	  at	  a	  community	  center.	  This	  AmeriCorps	  volunteer,	  having	  previously	  been	  only	  a	  camp	  counselor,	  was	  informed	  by	  her	  supervisors	  that	  she	  was	  the	  director	  of	  a	  two-­‐week	  summer	  camp	  for	  neighborhood	  kids.	  She	  explained:	  Now	  I	  obviously	  have	  never	  managed	  anything,	  I’ve	  been	  a	  summer	  camp	  counselor	  and	  that’s	  about	  all	  I’ve	  done…and	  a	  lot	  of	  babysitting.	  I	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  hiring	  people	  to	  do	  art	  with	  kids…and	  I	  actually	  ended	  up	  hiring	  other	  AmeriCorps	  members	  to	  be	  our	  counselors	  and	  I	  had	  to	  find	  kids...These	  were	  all	  big	  things	  that	  I	  was	  not	  trained	  for,	  so	  lack	  of	  training	  was	  a	  big	  challenge	  and	  being	  put	  in	  these	  positions	  of	  power	  without	  any	  real	  reality	  check.	  That	  was	  really	  hard,	  they	  sort	  of	  convinced	  me	  saying,	  ‘Oh	  it’s	  nothing,	  you	  can	  do	  it,	  we’ll	  get	  you	  through	  it,’	  but	  I	  didn’t	  really	  get	  any	  feedback	  until	  my	  first	  day	  of	  camp.	  So	  I’d	  done	  all	  this	  planning	  and	  marketing	  and	  recruiting	  and	  hiring,	  having	  no	  idea	  how	  to	  hire	  people,	  so	  it	  was	  really	  rough	  at	  first.	  It	  was	  really	  hard.	  To	  not	  have	  been	  vetted…you	  know	  trial	  by	  fire,	  they	  waited	  until	  I	  actually	  started	  the	  camp	  to	  tell	  me	  what	  I	  was	  doing	  wrong,	  instead	  of	  beforehand	  telling	  me,	  you	  need	  to	  do	  this	  you	  need	  to	  do	  that.	  There	  was	  not	  very	  realistic	  support	  and	  not	  realistic	  expectations.	  Sure,	  I	  can	  do	  it.	  I	  can	  do	  a	  lot	  of	  things,	  but	  to	  expect	  me	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  do	  it	  on	  my	  own—not	  realistic	  in	  my	  opinion.	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GNO	  Rebuilds	  All	  of	  the	  members	  of	  this	  group	  had	  bachelor’s	  degrees.	  One	  person	  reported	  not	  having	  attended	  training	  (though	  he	  had	  done	  AmeriCorps	  a	  few	  years	  prior).	  He	  had	  experience	  in	  journalism	  and	  free-­‐lance	  writing	  and	  was	  hired	  to	  be	  the	  editor	  of	  a	  newspaper	  about	  recovery,	  though	  he	  explained	  that	  he	  did	  not	  know	  how	  to	  start	  a	  newspaper	  from	  scratch.	  	  One	  white	  man	  explains	  rampant	  inexperience	  as	  problematic	  in	  his	  organization:	  “There	  wasn’t	  a	  lot	  of	  experience	  throughout	  the	  organization.	  Everyone	  was	  new	  pretty	  much—everyone	  was	  new	  to	  that	  world	  [non-­‐profit	  start	  up].	  That	  was	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  things,	  no	  one	  had	  done	  that	  type	  of	  work	  before	  or	  if	  they	  had	  done	  that	  type	  of	  work	  no	  one	  had	  had	  that	  type	  of	  responsibility.”	  One	  white	  woman	  explains	  what	  she	  thought	  was	  lacking	  in	  the	  training	  she	  received,	  which	  was	  exclusively	  technical:	  “So	  we	  had	  a	  Microsoft	  Office	  training	  that	  I	  went	  to	  because	  somebody	  had	  to	  go.	  I	  don’t	  think	  that’s—for	  instance,	  I	  think	  an	  undoing	  racism	  training	  would	  be	  really	  valuable	  for	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  I	  think	  having	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  community	  that	  you’re	  working	  in—just	  sort	  of	  going	  in	  completely	  naive	  without	  any	  sense	  or	  feeling	  of	  support	  from	  somebody	  who	  knows,	  I	  don’t	  think	  it’s	  good	  for	  the	  people	  they’re	  supposed	  to	  be	  helping	  and	  I	  don’t	  think	  it’s	  good	  for	  the	  volunteers	  and	  I	  don’t	  think	  it’s	  good	  for	  anyone.”	  
	  
Political	  Activists	  Both	  members	  of	  this	  group,	  and	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  woman	  who	  suggested	  an	  anti-­‐racism	  workshop,	  defined	  training	  and	  experience	  in	  different	  terms	  than	  other	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interviewees.	  Rather	  than	  technical	  or	  educational	  training,	  they	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  power	  dynamics	  and	  the	  role	  of	  volunteers.	  In	  this	  politically	  critical	  group,	  the	  women	  had	  bachelors	  (in	  American	  Studies/Ethnic	  Studies)	  and	  the	  man	  had	  not	  completed	  college	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview.	  Neither	  reported	  attending	  any	  AmeriCorps	  trainings	  and	  one	  expressed	  surprise	  that	  she	  did	  not	  get	  training	  from	  WNG.	  These	  two	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  political	  and	  racial	  understanding	  over	  concrete	  skills.	  One	  explained	  why	  he	  thought	  he	  was	  unprepared	  for	  his	  AmeriCorps	  year:	  “I	  was	  not,	  you	  know	  just	  didn’t	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  intentionality	  and	  at	  that	  point	  just	  did	  not	  have…I	  feel	  like	  I	  had	  some	  really	  rudimentary	  politics	  around	  anti-­‐racism	  and	  like	  barely	  any	  understanding	  of	  accountability	  in	  that	  context	  and	  what	  that	  means	  and	  what	  that	  would	  look	  like.	  It’s	  a	  really,	  you	  know	  just	  a	  very	  basic	  and	  not	  very	  well	  thought	  out	  or	  advanced	  idea	  of	  solidarity	  and	  what	  that	  means	  and	  what	  that	  looks	  like.”	  
	  
VISTA	   All	  four	  VISTA	  participants	  went	  to	  a	  VISTA	  pre-­‐service	  orientation	  and	  were	  provided	  with	  education	  along	  the	  way—weekly	  guest	  speakers	  and	  group	  discussions	  about	  service	  learning	  and	  volunteerism.	  While	  the	  black	  woman	  placed	  with	  Expanding	  Horizons	  reported	  a	  steep	  learning	  curve,	  required	  to	  learn	  things	  like	  how	  to	  price	  art	  with	  which	  she	  had	  no	  experience,	  she	  did	  bring	  with	  her	  previous	  expertise.	  Specifically	  she	  was	  accomplished	  at	  grassroots	  fund-­‐raising—resulting	  from	  having	  to	  pay	  her	  own	  way	  to	  study	  abroad—which	  was	  helpful	  for	  an	  organization	  in	  great	  need	  of	  funds.	  	  	  AmeriCorps	  initially	  placed	  the	  non-­‐local	  white	  woman	  with	  a	  national	  volunteer	  organization	  in	  Alabama.	  She	  spent	  three	  months	  there	  before	  transferring	  to	  a	  VISTA	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position	  with	  a	  university	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  At	  her	  first	  appointment	  she	  was	  tasked	  with	  finding	  projects	  for	  the	  organization	  to	  do	  in	  the	  lower	  three	  counties	  of	  Mississippi—the	  area	  in	  the	  state	  most	  affected	  by	  Katrina	  and	  Rita’s	  storm	  surges.	  She	  explained	  her	  project:	  “So	  I	  ended	  up	  running	  a	  health	  clinic	  for	  two	  months—managed	  and	  ran	  a	  health	  clinic,	  recruited	  doctors,	  ordered	  free	  supplies	  from	  drug	  companies	  for	  pills.	  We	  saw	  about	  400	  patients	  a	  day	  and	  then	  that	  kind	  of…I	  realized	  they	  needed	  a	  professional	  doing	  that.	  So	  I	  went	  back	  to	  my	  organization	  and	  fought	  with	  them.”	  She	  then	  transferred	  to	  New	  Orleans	  and	  was	  placed	  in	  charge	  of	  an	  ESL	  program	  that	  they	  expected	  150	  people	  to	  register	  for	  and	  got	  400	  the	  first	  day.	  She	  emphasized	  that	  she	  didn’t	  know	  how	  to	  run	  a	  program	  like	  this,	  didn’t	  know	  anything	  about	  teaching	  English	  and	  ultimately	  didn’t	  know	  how	  rudimentary	  her	  Spanish	  was	  until	  she	  was	  in	  this	  position.	  Most	  ESL	  teachers	  were	  volunteer	  undergraduate	  service-­‐learning	  students.	  She	  explained	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  university	  and	  her	  host	  organization:	  	  [The	  university]	  had	  basically	  come	  in	  and	  said,	  we	  will	  be	  the	  great	  white	  knight	  who	  will	  save	  all	  of	  this!	  We	  have	  all	  these	  students	  who	  teach	  English	  and	  they	  sent	  18	  and	  19	  year	  old	  kids	  in	  to	  teach	  these	  30	  year	  old	  adults,	  half	  of	  whom	  have	  reading	  issues	  in	  their	  own	  language	  or	  are	  functionally	  illiterate	  in	  their	  own	  language.	  Kids	  who	  had	  no	  clue	  what	  they	  were	  doing,	  no	  training	  whatsoever,	  big	  hearts,	  strong	  kids,	  I	  really	  appreciated	  what	  they	  did	  but	  I	  was	  like,	  these	  guys	  have	  no	  clue	  what	  they’re	  doing.	  	  Later	  she	  explained	  that	  because	  of	  a	  grant	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  they	  were	  required	  to	  administer	  placement	  tests	  to	  incoming	  students.	  They	  did	  so	  for	  months	  before	  finding	  out	  they	  were	  breaking	  the	  law	  by	  not	  being	  federally	  trained	  as	  test	  administrators.	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Theme	  3.	  Living	  with	  AmeriCorps:	  “A	  pitcher	  of	  beer	  for	  lunch.”	  	   This	  section	  presents	  the	  benefits	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  and	  host	  organizations	  provided	  volunteers,	  such	  as	  stipends,	  housing,	  health	  care	  and	  education,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  impacts	  their	  work	  had	  on	  their	  need	  for	  these	  benefits.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  stipend	  in	  2006	  was	  $10,900	  annually	  before	  taxes,	  provided	  on	  a	  bi-­‐weekly	  basis.	  Following	  successful	  contract	  completion	  each	  volunteer	  received	  a	  $5350	  education	  award.	  Thirteen	  out	  of	  eighteen	  interviewees	  were	  provided	  or	  offered	  free	  housing,	  and	  five	  of	  the	  thirteen	  were	  offered	  free	  board.	  Three	  of	  these	  thirteen	  volunteers	  were	  offered	  free	  room	  and	  board	  but	  choose	  to	  live	  independently	  despite	  the	  increased	  financial	  burden.	  There	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  stipend	  amount	  for	  those	  who	  had	  to	  provide	  for	  themselves	  completely	  independently	  and	  those	  who	  had	  much	  of	  their	  living	  expenses	  covered.	  	  AmeriCorps	  in	  2006	  provided	  a	  form	  of	  health	  insurance	  that	  covered	  emergency-­‐only	  care.	  
Interviewees	  emphasized	  housing	  provision,	  financial	  compensation,	  and	  health	  insurance	  as	  critical	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  volunteer.	  They	  also	  discussed	  the	  significant	  need	  for	  physical	  and	  mental	  health	  care	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  work.25	  Interviewees	  often	  mentioned	  money	  as	  a	  constraining	  factor	  and	  recommended	  that	  the	  pay	  be	  increased.	  Most	  volunteers	  who	  received	  housing	  recognized	  the	  negative	  impact	  it	  would	  have	  been	  on	  their	  finances	  if	  this	  benefit	  was	  not	  provided.	  Interviewees	  were	  critical	  of	  AmeriCorps’s	  health	  benefits	  and	  those	  who	  used	  them	  expressed	  disapproval	  of	  the	  limited	  coverage.	  	  Those	  who	  discussed	  needing	  health	  care	  while	  working	  for	  AmeriCorps	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The	  need	  for	  mental	  and	  physical	  health	  care	  for	  volunteers	  who	  fit	  within	  my	  research	  boundaries	  was	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  involved	  in	  Katrina	  relief	  work	  had	  the	  highest	  dropout	  rate	  of	  any	  group	  of	  federal	  volunteers,	  and	  cited	  mental	  health	  as	  a	  significant	  contributor	  to	  this	  level	  of	  burn	  out.	  This	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  environmental	  conditions	  resulting	  from	  the	  flooding,	  the	  uniquely	  physically	  demanding	  labor,	  and	  the	  secondary	  trauma	  non-­‐locals	  absorbed	  and	  the	  primary	  trauma	  local	  volunteers	  experienced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Katrina	  and	  the	  levee	  failure.	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emphasized	  the	  financial	  burden—they	  were	  rendered	  unable	  to	  live	  on	  the	  stipend	  without	  assistance	  due	  to	  medical	  bills.	  Two	  people	  reported	  asking	  their	  parents	  for	  money	  and	  one	  explained,	  “I	  just	  lived	  on	  a	  credit	  card.”	  While	  seven	  people	  mentioned	  physical	  health	  problems	  during	  their	  service	  year,	  fourteen	  mentioned	  mental	  health	  concerns.	  Chapter	  5	  presents	  this	  information	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  struggling	  post-­‐disaster	  city	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  housing	  and	  health-­‐care	  crisis.	  	  	  	  
Gutters	  Everyone	  in	  this	  group	  was	  provided	  room	  and	  board	  through	  their	  host	  organizations	  (CCGA	  or	  Collaborating	  Volunteers).	  Living	  situations	  were	  communal	  and	  often	  less	  than	  ideal—informants	  complained	  of	  lack	  of	  privacy	  and	  limited	  numbers	  of	  showers.	  One	  volunteer	  was	  originally	  placed	  with	  SVCOA	  and	  transferred	  to	  CCGA	  because	  he	  was	  struggling	  to	  house	  himself.	  He	  stayed	  for	  three	  months	  in	  CCGA	  volunteer	  housing	  and	  then	  reported	  moving	  out	  for	  mental	  health	  reasons.	  After	  moving	  out,	  he	  slept	  on	  couches,	  stayed	  with	  friends	  and	  rented	  a	  room	  for	  a	  few	  months.	  Everyone	  in	  this	  group	  lived	  in	  a	  building	  that	  was	  a	  former	  shelter.	  CCGA	  volunteers	  were	  in	  a	  former	  shelter	  for	  at-­‐risk	  youth	  and	  one	  worker	  with	  Collaborating	  Volunteers	  reported	  meeting	  a	  local	  teenager	  who	  was	  homeless	  and	  used	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  church	  before	  Katrina	  hit.	  All	  volunteers	  who	  were	  gutting	  were	  able	  to	  make	  ends	  meet	  on	  the	  stipend	  AmeriCorps	  provided—most	  credited	  free	  room	  and	  board	  for	  keeping	  costs	  low.	  One	  volunteer	  even	  reported	  being	  able	  to	  save	  money	  through	  her	  AmeriCorps	  year.	  While	  NCCC	  stipends	  are	  a	  bit	  lower	  than	  State/National	  and	  VISTA	  there	  were	  other	  forms	  of	  financial	  compensation.	  One	  NCCC	  member	  reported	  that	  their	  first	  work	  assignment	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was	  with	  the	  Red	  Cross	  in	  Baton	  Rouge	  for	  three	  weeks.	  The	  Red	  Cross	  paid	  them	  $900	  on	  top	  of	  their	  stipend	  for	  that	  time.	  Many	  volunteers,	  including	  her,	  decided	  not	  to	  accept	  this	  money,	  but	  some	  kept	  it.	  She	  explained,	  “For	  me	  $900	  was	  ridiculous	  and	  other	  people	  on	  my	  team	  and	  myself	  gave	  a	  lot	  of	  it	  back	  when	  we	  checked	  out.	  There	  were	  definitely	  volunteers	  who	  would	  come	  back	  with	  no	  money	  on	  their	  debit	  cards—they	  got	  debit	  cards—but	  you	  saw	  they	  had	  new	  watches	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  So	  you	  saw	  that	  they	  would	  go	  use	  it	  on	  all	  personal	  items.	  My	  biggest	  issue	  is	  making	  sure	  the	  money	  is	  going	  to	  the	  right	  places.”	  	   Two	  volunteers	  in	  this	  group	  reported	  health	  concerns.	  One	  got	  sick	  and	  couldn’t	  breathe	  without	  an	  inhaler	  because	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  houses	  she	  was	  working	  in.	  “Safety	  is	  something	  that	  really	  scares	  me.	  When	  I	  look	  back	  on	  what	  we	  were	  doing…[laughter].	  I	  mean	  we	  were	  working	  in	  homes	  that	  officially	  had	  asbestos	  in	  them!	  I	  was	  gutting	  houses	  and	  de-­‐molding	  in	  a	  paper	  mask!	  It	  was	  absolutely	  absurd	  the	  lack	  of	  precautions	  we	  took	  on	  safety.”	  She	  ended	  up	  being	  transferred	  to	  an	  office	  position	  due	  to	  her	  health	  problems.	  One	  volunteer,	  who	  was	  employed	  by	  her	  organization	  after	  her	  term	  of	  service,	  linked	  the	  health	  concerns	  of	  such	  physical	  work	  with	  emotional	  distress.	  “It	  was	  definitely	  the	  most	  physical	  and	  emotional	  job	  I’ve	  ever	  had.	  I	  was	  definitely	  burnt	  out,	  I	  essentially	  worked	  down	  there	  for	  two	  and	  a	  half	  years	  and	  after	  two	  and	  a	  half	  years	  I	  was	  so	  physically	  and	  emotionally	  exhausted	  that	  I…I	  don’t	  know…it’s	  a	  very	  emotional	  time	  looking	  back	  on	  it	  because	  I	  put	  so	  much	  energy	  and	  heart	  into	  the	  work	  that	  I	  was	  doing	  and	  definitely	  felt	  like	  I	  pretty	  much	  was	  beaten	  [by	  the	  work].”	  All	  of	  the	  volunteers	  who	  were	  doing	  physical	  labor—mostly	  gutting	  houses—reported	  emotional	  and	  mental	  health	  concerns.	  Three	  people	  mentioned	  high	  turnover	  of	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AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  their	  organization	  due	  to	  the	  heavy	  emotional	  toll.	  A	  volunteer	  with	  CCGA	  arrived	  for	  her	  term	  of	  service	  and	  was	  surprised	  to	  see	  how	  “burnt	  out”	  some	  volunteers	  were	  after	  only	  three	  months	  of	  work.	  Another	  volunteer	  described	  co-­‐workers	  deciding	  overnight	  that	  they	  could	  not	  work	  another	  day	  and	  breaking	  their	  contract	  on	  the	  spot.	  “It	  was	  really	  challenging	  work	  and	  it	  was	  really	  tough	  to	  go	  through	  peoples’	  personal	  belonging,	  photographs,	  wedding	  dresses,	  you	  know…all	  these	  remnants	  of	  people	  who	  had	  maybe	  lived	  in	  that	  house	  since	  birth	  and	  whose	  parents	  or	  grandparents	  built	  the	  house.	  It	  was	  really	  emotional	  work,	  combined	  with	  really	  physical	  work	  meant	  that	  you	  would	  get	  home	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  and	  just	  want	  to	  sleep.”	  Another	  volunteer	  explained	  self-­‐medicating	  during	  such	  a	  stressful	  time.	  “My	  boss	  was	  and	  is	  one	  of	  my	  good	  friends,	  we	  would	  for	  lunch	  run	  out,	  I	  would	  flip	  my	  [AmeriCorps]	  t-­‐shirt	  inside	  out26	  and	  we	  would	  go	  to	  a	  bar	  and	  have	  a	  pitcher	  of	  beer	  for	  lunch	  because	  it	  was	  such	  a	  stressful	  morning	  and	  she	  was	  already	  crying	  or	  something	  dramatic	  happened.”	  Two	  volunteers	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  support	  from	  supervisors	  and	  co-­‐workers.	  Another	  explained	  a	  mental	  health	  intervention:	  “At	  one	  point	  my	  supervisor	  said,	  ‘You	  can’t	  go	  out	  and	  inspect	  houses	  anymore’	  because	  I	  would	  come	  back	  completely	  emotionally	  distraught	  after	  hearing	  another	  sad	  story.”	  Another	  CCGA	  volunteer	  explained	  that	  after	  living	  in	  volunteer	  housing	  for	  three	  months	  he	  had	  to	  move	  out	  for	  mental	  health	  reasons.	  “It	  was	  really	  depressing,	  it	  was	  kind	  of	  cut	  off.	  I	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  friends	  in	  the	  city	  and	  I	  couldn’t	  see	  them	  cause	  I	  didn’t	  have	  a	  car	  and	  it’s	  quite	  a	  commute	  from	  there	  to	  here.	  I	  had	  to	  get	  away.	  I	  also	  was	  working	  seven	  days	  a	  week	  and	  to	  be	  working	  all	  day	  and	  then	  go	  back	  there	  and	  be	  kind	  of	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  society,	  it	  felt	  like	  too	  much.”	  While	  he	  reported	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  restrictions	  on	  activities	  (such	  as	  consuming	  alcohol)	  while	  sporting	  AmeriCorps	  paraphernalia.	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feeling	  better	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  move,	  the	  work	  continued	  to	  impact	  him:	  “After	  a	  while	  I	  just	  stopped	  taking	  lunch	  breaks	  because	  I	  felt	  kind	  of…I	  didn’t	  really	  feel	  like	  eating	  or	  whatever	  so	  I	  just	  worked	  through	  lunch.”	  	  	  
Agenda	  Setters	  Volunteers	  with	  SVCOA	  were	  staying	  on	  the	  second	  floor	  of	  a	  flooded	  church.	  While	  this	  was	  free	  for	  the	  four	  of	  them	  they	  reported	  some	  difficulties:	  	  There	  was	  electricity	  in	  three	  of	  the	  rooms	  and	  there	  was	  no	  hot	  water	  so	  we	  would	  take	  showers	  at	  the	  pastor’s	  house...	  It	  was	  just	  really	  creepy	  place	  to	  live.	  There	  would	  be	  people	  in	  the	  church	  at	  night.	  The	  church	  was	  this	  tremendous	  building	  that	  was	  just	  open,	  like	  all	  the	  buildings,	  just	  open	  to	  outside.	  So	  people	  who	  were	  on	  the	  streets	  were	  sleeping	  in	  the	  church	  and	  stuff.	  Once	  there	  was	  someone	  who	  tried	  to	  open	  my	  door	  at	  night	  and	  I	  was	  just	  like	  this	  cannot	  happen	  again.	  So	  we	  created	  a	  secure	  perimeter	  in	  the	  church	  for	  us	  at	  night27	  so	  that	  was	  creepy	  because	  the	  city	  was	  so	  dark…	  We	  had	  one	  neighbor.	  We	  had	  one	  neighbor	  who	  lived	  right	  behind	  the	  church.	  He	  was	  our	  pal,	  he	  was	  looking	  out	  for	  us	  but	  really	  no	  one	  else	  knew	  we	  lived	  there—it	  was	  just	  an	  abandoned	  looking	  church.	  It	  looked	  no	  more	  or	  less	  abandoned	  [than	  other	  buildings	  in	  the	  area]…they’d	  taken	  the	  water	  line	  off	  so	  it	  didn’t	  have	  that	  bathtub	  line.	  So	  we	  lived	  in	  the	  church	  and	  eventually	  the	  power	  and	  hot	  water	  fell	  into	  place.	  	  There	  were	  some	  benefits	  for	  volunteers	  who	  had	  free	  rein	  in	  the	  church:	  “I	  built	  a	  darkroom	  in	  the	  church.	  There	  were	  a	  lot	  of	  empty	  rooms	  in	  the	  church	  so	  you	  could	  sort	  of	  do	  whatever	  you	  wanted.	  So	  I	  built	  a	  darkroom	  and	  would	  photograph	  old	  houses	  which	  was	  fun	  but	  painstaking.”	  	  Volunteers	  working	  with	  United	  Residents	  had	  a	  harder	  time.	  One	  woman	  reported	  simply	  “living	  off	  my	  husband”	  in	  response	  to	  a	  question	  about	  making	  ends	  meet.	  Her	  co-­‐worker,	  however,	  reported	  paying	  for	  housing	  as	  the	  biggest	  stressor	  in	  her	  life	  that	  year—her	  rent	  was	  $450/month.	  This	  volunteer	  worked	  a	  second	  job	  in	  a	  kitchen,	  had	  to	  borrow	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  included	  a	  series	  of	  locked	  doors	  and	  secured/solid	  walls.	  
75	  
money	  from	  her	  parents	  and	  lived	  on	  a	  credit	  card.	  She	  explained:	  “I	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  stress	  over	  money;	  I	  couldn’t	  sleep	  some	  nights…”	  Another	  explained:	  “It’s	  hard	  to	  make	  ends	  meet	  if	  you	  have	  a	  cell	  phone,	  if	  you	  have	  a	  car—if	  you’re	  lucky	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  car…350	  or	  375	  dollars	  every	  two	  weeks	  is	  not	  very	  much	  money.”	  This	  volunteer	  relied	  on	  her	  family	  to	  help	  pay	  her	  bills.	  
	   Generally,	  Agenda	  Setters	  had	  fewer	  health	  complaints	  than	  the	  Gutters	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  job,	  which	  was	  generally	  less	  physically	  demanding	  than	  gutting.	  One	  volunteer	  with	  United	  Residents	  reported	  struggling	  with	  health	  care,	  which	  was	  emergency-­‐only.	  	  You	  don’t	  have…you	  can’t	  have	  a	  doctor	  or	  anything.	  That	  was	  another	  big	  stressor…	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  insurance.	  At	  the	  time	  I	  had	  enough	  health	  problems	  that	  it	  was	  an	  ordeal	  for	  me,	  you	  know,	  I	  had	  to	  pay	  $100.	  I	  had	  an	  ear	  infection,	  I	  think,	  and	  I	  had	  to	  pay	  two	  or	  three	  hundred	  dollars	  to	  get	  after-­‐care	  service	  and	  drops…And	  then	  I	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  back	  problems	  from	  working	  in	  the	  kitchen	  at	  night	  because	  I	  was	  wearing	  kitchen	  clogs	  and	  they	  were	  bad	  for	  my	  knees	  and	  so	  I	  had	  these	  really	  bad	  knee	  problems.	  I	  ended	  up	  going	  to	  chiropractor	  and	  there	  was	  no	  way	  I	  could	  get	  that	  reimbursed	  and	  that	  was	  a	  hundred	  dollars	  each	  time…	  	  	  Another	  volunteer	  in	  this	  group	  is	  currently	  in	  his	  third	  year	  of	  AmeriCorps	  and	  described	  how	  the	  health	  benefits	  have	  gotten	  worse.	  He	  describes	  the	  situation	  his	  third	  service	  term—in	  2009:	  	  It	  was	  a	  complete	  joke—a	  farce—it	  was	  infuriating.	  It	  wasn’t	  even	  health	  insurance;	  it	  was	  a	  health	  package,	  that’s	  how	  the	  lady	  on	  the	  phone	  described	  it	  to	  me.	  I	  was	  like,	  am	  I	  insured?	  And	  she	  was	  like,	  no;	  you	  have	  a	  health	  package	  though.	  I	  was	  like,	  are	  you	  kidding	  me?	  The	  only	  way,	  like	  if	  I	  got	  a	  nail	  driven	  through	  my	  foot	  at	  eight	  o’clock	  at	  night	  and	  I	  wasn’t	  on	  the	  clock	  then	  I	  wouldn’t	  be	  covered	  at	  all.	  So	  I	  had	  to	  go	  to	  the	  charity	  system…	  which	  is	  fine,	  that’s	  its	  own	  system.	  You	  were	  only	  covered	  if	  you	  were	  injured	  on	  the	  clock,	  which	  is	  ridiculous,	  completely	  ridiculous.	  The	  first	  year	  was	  not	  like	  that,	  it	  was	  better	  insurance.	  	  	  Both	  volunteers	  with	  United	  Residents	  reported	  work-­‐induced	  stress.	  The	  woman	  with	  the	  second	  job	  explained:	  “You	  don’t	  have	  any	  time	  to	  yourself	  so	  you	  don’t	  really	  stop	  and	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reflect	  as	  much	  as	  you	  should,	  at	  least	  in	  my	  situation.	  It	  was	  also	  chaotic	  time,	  post-­‐Katrina,	  for	  me.”	  She,	  like	  others,	  mentioned	  drinking	  as	  a	  way	  to	  relax.	  There	  was	  limited	  support	  from	  supervisors	  or	  other	  networks.	  A	  self-­‐described	  “emotionally	  exhausted”	  volunteer	  with	  SVCOA	  also	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  support	  and	  mentioned	  that	  there	  was	  a	  woman,	  who	  had	  a	  degree	  in	  social	  work	  in	  the	  organization	  offering	  free	  counseling.	  “That	  was	  good	  to	  have	  that	  accessible	  to	  the	  volunteers	  at	  the	  time—I	  valued	  that.	  She	  wasn’t	  the	  best	  but	  it	  was	  still	  valuable	  to	  know	  there	  was	  some	  support	  there	  that	  I	  couldn’t	  get	  otherwise.”	  SVCOA,	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  and	  the	  VISTA	  group	  were	  the	  only	  volunteers	  who	  mentioned	  having	  access	  to	  affordable	  mental	  health	  care.	  
	  
GNO	  Rebuilds	  All	  participants	  in	  this	  group	  had	  to	  find	  their	  own	  housing.	  A	  white	  woman	  explained	  she	  was	  living	  with	  her	  boyfriend	  and	  her	  sister	  and	  her	  sister’s	  girlfriend,	  which	  helped	  keep	  housing	  costs	  low.	  She	  explained	  that	  when	  things	  were	  especially	  tight	  her	  boyfriend	  would	  assist	  her	  financially.	  One	  white	  man	  reported	  simply	  that	  he	  had	  free	  rent	  and	  was	  employed	  by	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  for	  2	  or	  3	  months	  before	  starting	  AmeriCorps,	  which	  allowed	  him	  to	  save	  a	  little	  money.	  Another	  volunteer	  was	  married	  and	  his	  wife	  had	  student	  loans	  and	  a	  job	  to	  support	  them.	  He	  also	  took	  a	  part	  time	  job	  coaching	  soccer	  and	  did	  other	  side	  jobs	  such	  as	  being	  an	  extra	  in	  films.	  Two	  people	  in	  this	  group	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  mentioned	  having	  used	  their	  education	  award	  to	  fund	  school.	  There	  were	  very	  few	  complaints	  of	  health	  concerns	  in	  this	  group,	  which	  focused	  primarily	  on	  office	  work,	  though	  one	  did	  mention	  that	  the	  health	  care	  was	  “bad.”	  Three	  of	  the	  four	  mentioned	  stress	  and	  anxiety	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  work,	  and	  the	  white	  man	  noted	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that	  his	  co-­‐workers	  were	  struggling	  but	  did	  not	  address	  his	  own	  situation.	  One	  volunteer	  explained	  that	  there	  was	  temporarily	  a	  free	  counselor	  available:	  	  You	  just	  basically	  made	  an	  appointment	  and	  the	  reason	  they	  had	  it	  in	  place	  was	  because	  you’re	  dealing	  with	  post-­‐Katrina	  stuff—you’re	  seeing	  a	  lot	  of	  stuff.	  While	  I	  might	  not	  have	  seen	  things	  other	  people	  saw	  I	  guess,	  more	  in	  with	  the	  people,	  I	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  in	  the	  office	  I	  guess.	  When	  I	  talked	  to	  them	  about…I	  utilized	  this…I	  didn’t	  talk	  to	  them	  only	  about	  AmeriCorps	  of	  course	  it	  was	  job	  related	  stuff,	  but	  it	  was	  real	  good.	  I’m	  really	  glad	  they	  had	  that.	  That	  was	  only	  a	  short-­‐term	  thing;	  they	  ended	  it	  while	  I	  was	  there.	  	  
Political	  Activists	  The	  two	  members	  of	  this	  group	  mentioned	  AmeriCorps	  benefits	  and	  work	  concerns	  the	  least.	  They	  both	  temporarily	  stayed	  in	  free	  volunteer	  housing	  provided	  by	  TiES.	  Neither	  had	  a	  car	  and	  one	  was	  on	  food	  stamps.	  After	  moving	  out	  of	  free	  housing	  they	  were	  able	  to	  find	  relatively	  cheap	  places	  to	  live.	  As	  one	  explained	  simply,	  “I	  didn’t	  need	  any	  more	  than	  I	  was	  getting	  paid.”	  They	  did	  not	  mention	  any	  health	  concerns,	  though	  there	  was	  some	  mental	  anxiety	  from	  working	  closely	  with	  storm	  survivors	  and	  facing	  organizational	  resistance	  to	  their	  work.	  	  People	  were	  walking	  around	  with	  an	  incredible	  amount	  of	  stress;	  some	  people	  were	  walking	  around	  with	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  trauma.	  Things	  were	  pretty	  painful	  a	  lot	  of	  time…you	  know	  definite	  struggle	  with	  that	  and	  I	  think	  that	  exacerbates	  personality	  conflicts	  as	  well.	  So	  that	  was	  always	  an	  issue…	  I	  certainly	  found	  I	  was	  definitely	  not	  immune	  to	  any	  of	  that.	  I	  was	  very	  quick,	  I	  was	  not	  taking	  care	  of	  myself,	  and	  I	  was	  abusing	  alcohol	  pretty	  often.	  I	  think	  that	  that	  was	  also	  like,	  I	  think	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  weren’t	  sure	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  what	  was	  going	  on	  around	  them.	  There	  was	  conflict	  stuff	  going	  on	  all	  the	  time—it	  was	  a	  pretty	  intense	  environment.	  	  
	  
VISTA	   All	  VISTA	  informants	  reported	  receiving	  free	  housing	  in	  the	  hospital	  affiliated	  with	  their	  host	  university.	  As	  one	  volunteer	  explained:	  	  “They	  have	  these	  little	  apartments	  for	  public	  health	  students,	  people	  who	  have	  families	  who	  have	  patients	  in	  the	  hospital,	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whatever,	  so	  we	  were	  staying	  there.	  There	  were	  12	  of	  us	  and	  we	  basically	  all	  lived	  on	  the	  same	  floor	  right	  next	  to	  each	  other	  and	  we	  were	  roommates	  and	  everything.	  All	  [smushes	  hands	  together]	  like	  that.”	  One	  man	  explained	  that	  he	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  work	  through	  the	  VISTA	  program,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  organization	  directly,	  because	  the	  former	  offered	  free	  housing—which	  left	  him	  having	  to	  cover	  food	  and	  car	  insurance.	  He	  recognized	  housing	  as	  the	  biggest	  financial	  obstacle	  to	  those	  wanting	  to	  volunteer	  and	  suggested	  “keeping	  a	  small	  stash	  of	  Section	  8	  vouchers	  for	  those	  kids	  if	  you	  know	  you	  have	  a	  large	  program	  that’s	  coming	  in	  just	  leaving	  something	  like	  that	  open.”	  A	  local	  white	  woman	  explained	  that	  the	  stipend	  was	  enough	  because	  she	  didn’t	  have	  any	  student	  loans.	  Even	  with	  housing	  provided,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  position	  was	  a	  financial	  struggle	  for	  one	  woman:	  “Also,	  because	  of	  issues	  with	  my	  parents	  and	  their	  financial	  background,	  just	  the	  way	  they	  handle	  money	  and	  everything	  else	  I	  was	  very	  deathly	  afraid	  of	  being…I	  was	  homeless	  at	  one	  point	  growing	  up…so	  I	  never	  got	  into	  credit,	  ever.	  You	  could	  defer	  your	  loans	  so	  I	  really	  didn’t	  have…I	  had	  a	  cell	  phone	  bill	  and	  that	  was	  it,	  and	  I	  couldn’t	  even	  pay	  that	  all…just	  to	  try	  and	  eat.”	  Two	  members	  of	  this	  group	  brought	  up	  health	  care,	  though	  one	  did	  say	  that	  they	  had	  access	  to	  the	  university’s	  clinic.	  One	  member	  went	  to	  the	  doctor	  and	  ended	  up	  having	  to	  pay	  large	  medical	  bills,	  which	  was	  another	  reason	  why	  she	  could	  not	  live	  off	  the	  stipend.	  One	  volunteer	  mentioned	  that	  she	  did	  not	  think	  it	  was	  acceptable	  to	  be	  technically	  working	  24	  hours	  per	  day,	  seven	  days	  per	  week,	  with	  only	  ten	  days	  off	  a	  year,	  especially	  in	  a	  disaster	  area.	  	   I	  think	  it	  should	  be	  built	  in	  that	  at	  least	  20	  to	  25	  days	  off	  a	  year,	  which	  is,	  I	  think	  what	  Peace	  Corps	  volunteers	  get.	  I	  think	  there	  should	  be	  special	  consideration	  given	  for…I	  don’t	  want	  to	  say	  counseling…I	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  put	  this,	  but	  there	  should	  be	  some	  system	  in	  place	  of	  debriefing	  and/or	  counseling	  if	  necessary	  for	  volunteers.	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That	  was	  something	  that	  drove	  me	  crazy—you	  have	  a	  bunch	  of	  people	  down	  here,	  probably	  the	  largest	  disaster	  in	  the	  past	  few	  hundred	  years	  in	  the	  country	  and	  you’re	  kind	  of	  just	  letting	  these	  kids	  just	  burn	  themselves	  out,	  burn	  themselves	  out.	  Then	  they’re	  getting	  chewed	  out	  for	  dropping	  out	  of	  the	  program!	  	  This	  volunteer	  was	  pulled	  aside	  by	  state	  AmeriCorps	  directors	  to	  help	  them	  troubleshoot	  reasons	  for	  the	  largest	  drop-­‐out	  rate	  the	  program	  has	  ever	  seen.	  Another	  volunteer	  explained	  how	  weekly	  meetings	  with	  check-­‐in	  time	  and	  a	  social	  worker	  to	  conduct	  group	  therapy	  sessions	  helped	  support	  her	  through	  difficult	  times.	  Another	  explained	  “It	  also	  became	  this	  great	  support	  group,	  where	  you	  could	  just	  totally	  vent	  and	  put	  it	  all	  on	  the	  table	  and	  just	  imagine	  this	  group	  of	  thirteen	  people	  helping	  you	  trouble	  shoot,	  people	  who	  have	  prior	  experience,	  people	  who	  don’t	  but	  work	  in	  a	  different	  environment	  or	  whatever	  the	  case.	  Or,	  just	  imagine	  that	  network,	  it	  was	  an	  already	  ready-­‐made	  group	  of	  friends	  and	  network	  to	  resources	  in	  the	  city.”	  	  






	  	   I	  interviewed	  five	  volunteers	  whose	  main	  assignment	  was	  doing	  physical	  labor	  in	  flooded	  neighborhoods,	  mostly	  for	  private	  homeowners.	  This	  included	  gutting	  homes	  and	  mold	  remediation.	  All	  of	  them	  led	  volunteer	  teams	  that	  traveled	  to	  NOLA	  to	  work.	  Before	  8am	  every	  morning	  they	  would	  meet	  the	  volunteer	  team,	  collect	  tools,	  give	  a	  safety	  talk,	  drive	  to	  the	  site	  for	  the	  day,	  demonstrate	  the	  work	  and	  assign	  tasks.	  They	  usually	  stayed	  on	  site	  until	  the	  volunteer	  team	  was	  ready	  to	  leave,	  sometime	  between	  3	  and	  6pm.	  They	  then	  drove	  back,	  unloaded	  the	  tools,	  and	  made	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  next	  day.	  While	  on	  the	  work	  site	  AmeriCorps	  workers	  were	  often	  the	  authority	  figures.	  One	  volunteer	  explains:	  “I	  didn’t	  really	  like	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  the	  decisions	  that	  I	  made…that	  I	  could	  make	  a	  mistake	  and	  it	  would	  end	  up	  costing	  somebody	  something	  in	  the	  future…like	  if	  I	  was	  working	  on	  a	  homeowner’s	  house	  for	  example	  and	  I	  make	  a	  bad	  decision	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  save	  the	  floorboards,	  I	  could	  end	  up	  costing	  them	  a	  couple	  hundred	  dollars	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  few	  thousand	  more	  dollars.”	  In	  addition	  to	  leading	  volunteer	  crews,	  two	  interviewees	  reported,	  “inspecting	  homes”	  to	  determine	  their	  eligibility	  as	  potential	  work	  sites.	  This	  was	  mostly	  based	  on	  structural	  soundness.	  One	  person	  emphasized	  this	  task	  of	  scouting	  homes	  because	  it	  was	  the	  project	  he	  had	  the	  most	  amount	  of	  guidance	  and	  supervision	  with,	  working	  closely	  with	  his	  supervisor28.	  	  The	  two	  NCCC	  volunteers	  were	  in	  New	  Orleans	  for	  twelve	  weeks	  and	  developed	  a	  New	  Orleans	  site	  for	  a	  national	  volunteer	  program.	  They	  led	  crews,	  assigned	  work	  projects	  and	  managed	  volunteers.	  Both	  NCCC	  and	  VISTA	  programs	  are	  24	  hour	  per	  day	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This	  volunteer	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  level	  of	  training	  his	  supervisor	  had	  in	  this	  area.	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commitments	  with	  very	  limited	  time	  off.	  One	  NCCC	  informant	  explained	  that	  her	  work	  with	  volunteers	  required	  workdays	  that	  lasted	  fourteen	  to	  twenty	  hours.	  During	  their	  time	  at	  Collaborating	  Volunteers	  their	  daily	  responsibilities	  paralleled	  those	  who	  were	  working	  under	  AmeriCorps	  State/National	  doing	  house	  gutting,	  mold	  remediation	  and	  other	  physically	  demanding	  work	  in	  flooded	  homes.	  	  	  	  
GNO	  Rebuilds	  	  I	  interviewed	  four	  people,	  one	  of	  whom	  was	  a	  VISTA,	  who	  worked	  for	  this	  neighborhood	  support	  organization.29	  They	  all	  reported	  difficult	  work	  situations.	  While	  the	  VISTA	  volunteer	  did	  have	  obligations	  to	  the	  university’s	  service	  learning	  program,	  he	  described	  his	  work	  as	  centered	  largely	  around	  organizational	  maintenance	  and	  supporting	  regular	  educational	  meetings	  hosted	  by	  the	  organization.	  This	  involved	  getting	  low-­‐cost	  food,	  recruiting	  speakers	  and	  publicizing.	  He	  was	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  handling	  the	  application	  process	  required	  for	  the	  organization	  to	  get	  501(c)3	  status.	  He	  took	  steps	  to	  hinder	  this	  process	  when	  a	  local	  resident	  expressed	  contempt	  for	  the	  work	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  ultimately	  its	  mission.	  This	  resident,	  herself	  a	  neighborhood	  leader,	  approached	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  to	  challenge	  the	  reality	  of	  some	  of	  their	  missions	  and	  statements.	  She	  insisted	  that	  they	  could	  be	  supporting	  different	  programming	  and	  be	  more	  accountable	  to	  pre-­‐Katrina	  residents.	  One	  Latino	  man	  was	  the	  editor	  in	  chief	  of	  the	  monthly	  newspaper	  and	  he	  worked	  with	  volunteers	  to	  produce	  articles	  and	  do	  layouts.	  He	  was	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  organization’s	  website	  and	  spent	  time	  helping	  coordinate	  weekly	  citywide	  meetings.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  For	  this	  theme	  only,	  Work,	  I	  am	  including	  this	  VISTA	  volunteer	  in	  the	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  group	  because	  his	  answers	  to	  questions	  relating	  to	  job	  responsibilities	  were	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  his	  co-­‐workers	  at	  this	  organization.	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Most	  of	  the	  comments	  about	  the	  work	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  expected	  to	  do	  for	  this	  organization	  centered	  around	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  director	  and	  the	  board	  of	  directors.	  The	  director	  had	  conceptualized	  the	  organization	  after	  the	  storm	  and	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  was	  comprised	  of	  community	  leaders.	  One	  volunteer	  described	  the	  organizational	  development	  process:	  “A	  lot	  of	  organizations	  just	  sort	  of	  came	  up	  and	  his	  was	  just	  something	  that	  just	  happened	  like	  he	  didn’t	  really	  plan	  it…	  He	  found	  funding	  and	  then	  he	  found	  AmeriCorps	  just	  cause	  he’s	  a	  social	  person	  and	  he	  knows	  who	  to	  talk	  to.”	  He	  described	  the	  boss	  in	  this	  way:	  “He	  would	  come	  in…we	  called	  him,	  behind	  his	  back	  of	  course,	  the	  Tornado.	  He	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  out	  doing	  whatever	  he	  did	  with	  people	  and	  he’d	  come	  into	  the	  office	  and	  when	  he	  left	  it	  was	  like	  a	  tornado	  had	  hit—he	  was	  throwing	  out	  ideas,	  you	  do	  this,	  you	  do	  this,	  you	  do	  this.	  That	  was	  why	  he	  was	  crazy	  I	  guess.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  to	  define	  crazy	  of	  course	  and	  I’m	  sure	  he	  wasn’t	  psychological	  or	  anything	  like	  an	  insane	  person.	  But	  it	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  lot	  harder	  with	  him	  around	  than	  when	  he	  wasn’t	  around.	  We	  were	  able	  to	  really	  get	  things	  done	  on	  our	  own.”	  	  	  The	  white	  man	  was	  the	  least	  critical	  of	  the	  organization.	  He	  did	  allow	  that	  his	  boss	  was	  “really	  bad	  at	  managing”	  but	  appreciated	  the	  freedom	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  skills	  fostered	  in	  him	  by	  the	  environment.	  He	  still	  works	  for	  the	  organization.	  His	  daily	  responsibilities	  usually	  revolved	  around	  coordinating	  weekly	  meetings—arranging	  guest	  speakers	  and	  food.	  He	  also	  managed	  a	  database	  and	  list	  serve.	  He	  reported	  working	  50-­‐60	  hour	  weeks—more	  than	  he	  did	  after	  he	  was	  put	  on	  salary.	  He	  described	  the	  work	  as	  “very	  much	  about	  self-­‐motivation	  and	  results-­‐driven.”	  The	  white	  woman	  placed	  with	  this	  organization	  had	  the	  most	  critical	  things	  to	  say	  about	  it.	  She	  explained	  her	  work	  this	  way:	  	  So	  really	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  work	  of	  getting	  our	  501(c)3	  status,	  working	  with	  funders,	  getting	  grants,	  this	  kind	  of	  very	  basic	  level	  formation	  stuff	  fell	  to	  us	  as	  AmeriCorps	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volunteers.	  We	  spent	  almost	  all	  of	  our	  time	  trying	  to	  keep	  this	  organization	  alive,	  which	  basically	  meant	  that	  we	  didn’t	  do	  anything	  that	  was	  our	  mission	  which	  was	  another	  wildly	  debated…I	  mean,	  I	  don’t	  even	  think	  we	  had	  a	  mission	  statement	  until	  my	  last	  month	  there	  or	  something	  that	  it	  was	  agreed	  upon.	  It	  was	  a	  constant	  battle—who	  are	  we,	  what	  are	  we	  doing,	  having	  these	  conversations	  over	  and	  over	  again.	  I	  felt	  like	  there	  weren’t	  very	  good	  boundaries	  between	  our	  boss	  and	  us	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  hours	  we	  were	  putting	  in	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  work	  that	  was	  expected	  of	  us	  that	  we	  didn’t	  necessarily	  feel	  capable	  of	  doing	  or	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  speak	  up	  to	  him.	  	  	  She	  went	  to	  a	  lot	  of	  meetings	  held	  by	  schools,	  the	  city	  council,	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  neighborhood	  associations,	  and	  others.	  She	  also	  helped	  coordinate	  weekly	  meetings	  hosted	  by	  GNO	  Rebuilds,	  and	  assisted	  with	  the	  organization’s	  newspaper.	  She	  was	  also	  responsible	  for	  recording	  and	  summarizing	  the	  work	  of	  all	  GNO	  Rebuilds’	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  She	  explained	  took	  two	  days	  a	  month	  just	  to	  do	  that.	  	  It	  felt	  like	  there	  was	  really	  no	  substance	  to	  anything	  that	  we	  did.	  It	  felt	  like	  a	  big	  joke	  to	  me,	  honestly.	  All	  the	  meetings	  that	  we	  were	  going	  to,	  I	  started	  realizing	  pretty	  quickly	  that	  it	  was	  all	  the	  same	  people	  who	  were	  representatives	  of	  other	  non-­‐profits	  and	  somehow	  having	  this	  meeting	  of	  all	  these	  other	  people	  from	  non-­‐profits	  could	  conceive	  of	  some	  citizen	  participation	  or	  whatever	  it	  was	  that	  they…It	  just	  felt	  like	  we	  were	  all	  there	  to	  pat	  each	  other	  on	  the	  back,	  to	  network	  with	  each	  other,	  it	  was	  a	  total	  vacuum	  of	  anything	  that	  was	  actually	  happening.	  It	  just	  felt	  like	  it	  was	  creating	  more	  and	  more	  layers	  between	  people	  who	  were	  the	  rebuilding,	  recovery	  work	  that	  was	  happening	  and	  these	  big	  foundations	  that	  were	  wanting	  to	  throw	  money	  at	  organizations	  like	  ours.	  	  She	  further	  described	  her	  impressions	  of	  the	  work	  and	  the	  organization:	  	  What	  I	  ultimately	  found,	  [GNO	  Rebuilds]	  was	  doing	  was	  sort	  of	  creating	  its	  own	  agenda	  for	  rebuilding	  stuff	  rather	  than	  listening	  to	  others,	  rather	  than	  working	  as	  a	  supporting	  organization	  that	  ostensibly	  would	  want	  to	  put	  itself	  out	  of	  business.	  It	  seemed	  that	  it	  was	  trying	  to	  just	  create	  itself	  and	  sustain	  itself	  and	  create	  it’s	  whole	  set	  of	  agenda,	  create	  it’s	  whole	  own	  thing.	  It	  felt	  very	  much	  that	  what	  I	  ended	  up	  doing	  in	  a	  very	  dysfunctional	  way,	  help	  create	  an	  organization	  that	  I	  ultimately	  didn’t	  believe	  in	  as	  an	  effective	  or	  useful	  thing.	  I	  felt	  like	  there	  was	  almost	  nothing	  we	  could	  point	  to	  that	  we’d	  done	  that	  was	  something	  I	  felt	  good	  about	  at	  the	  point	  when	  I	  left.	  	  While	  her	  negative	  opinions	  of	  the	  organization	  are	  stronger	  than	  those	  of	  her	  co-­‐workers,	  two	  of	  them	  expressed	  disbelief	  that	  this	  organization	  still	  exists.	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Agenda	  Setters	  This	  group	  reported	  the	  most	  free	  time,	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  they	  should	  be	  doing.	  The	  four	  volunteers	  in	  this	  group	  worked	  for	  two	  different	  organizations—United	  Residents	  and	  SVCOA—and	  had	  similar	  work	  descriptions.	  One	  informant	  as	  described	  the	  structure	  of	  United	  Residents:	  “[The	  director]	  has	  an	  idea	  and	  it	  sort	  of	  flows	  down,	  rather	  than	  the	  neighborhood	  has	  an	  idea	  and	  it	  goes	  up.”	  The	  most	  noteworthy	  sentiment	  expressed	  by	  these	  four	  volunteers	  is	  that	  their	  biggest	  challenge	  was	  figuring	  out	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  done	  in	  their	  neighborhood	  and	  that	  they	  struggled	  to	  find	  work	  to	  fill	  their	  full-­‐time	  commitment	  to	  AmeriCorps.	  One	  informant	  expressed:	  “I	  was	  surprised	  by	  how	  much	  down	  time	  there	  was…I	  could	  just,	  I	  could	  do	  whatever	  I	  wanted	  on	  the	  computer	  many	  hours	  a	  day	  because	  there	  was	  not	  a	  lot	  expected	  of	  me.	  It’s	  pretty	  obvious	  that	  they	  had	  no	  work	  plan	  for	  what	  they	  were	  going	  to	  do	  with	  us.”	  She	  and	  the	  other	  volunteer	  I	  interviewed	  who	  worked	  for	  this	  organization	  ended	  up	  going	  to	  city	  council,	  neighborhood	  association	  and	  city	  planning	  meetings.	  They	  also	  planned	  neighborhood	  “visioning	  sessions,”	  built	  a	  website,	  distributed	  fliers	  for	  events,	  and	  coordinated	  and	  managed	  volunteers	  to	  work	  on	  a	  community	  center.	  “You	  make	  your	  own	  work	  but	  you	  kind	  of	  feel	  like,	  what	  am	  I	  doing	  here?	  Why	  am	  I	  here?”	  	  A	  volunteer	  at	  SVCOA	  expressed	  this	  sentiment	  as	  well:	  “I	  had	  no	  idea	  there	  would	  be	  so	  little	  direction.	  I	  remember	  thinking…what	  are	  we	  doing?	  I	  kind	  of	  felt	  lost	  in	  a	  way…I	  remember	  that	  we	  were	  kind	  of	  searching	  for	  ways	  to	  spend	  our	  time.	  It	  got	  a	  lot	  better	  but	  we	  weren’t	  sure	  what	  we	  could	  count	  as	  hours	  and	  what	  we	  couldn’t	  count	  as	  hours	  because	  of	  our	  lack	  of	  a	  mission…our	  lack	  of	  a	  project	  is	  what	  it	  boiled	  down	  to…It	  might	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have	  been	  thirty	  hour	  weeks	  or	  twenty	  hour	  weeks	  at	  the	  beginning	  just	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  organization.”	  She	  describes	  a	  moment	  that	  sticks	  out	  to	  her:	  I	  have	  this	  very	  vivid	  memory	  of	  like	  us	  being	  in	  our	  common	  room	  at	  the	  church	  eating	  oatmeal,	  reading	  the	  paper,	  passing	  that	  around,	  reading	  stories	  from	  it,	  reading	  our	  horoscopes…It	  was	  like	  this	  suspension	  in	  time.	  I	  don’t	  know,	  we	  had	  nothing	  to	  do.	  We	  really	  didn’t.	  It	  was	  depressing,	  it	  was	  very	  sad.	  There	  was	  so	  much	  going	  on	  but	  so	  few	  access	  points	  to	  that.	  So	  I	  think	  that	  compounds	  some	  of	  those	  negative	  feelings	  about	  being	  disillusioned	  by	  the	  federal	  government,	  well,	  this	  is	  their	  disaster	  response.	  	  This	  group	  ended	  up	  starting	  a	  community	  garden,	  a	  tutoring	  program	  at	  a	  local	  elementary	  school	  and	  assisted	  the	  neighborhood	  association	  in	  some	  of	  their	  projects	  by	  flyering	  for	  events.	  Three	  of	  the	  four	  AmeriCorps	  who	  were	  working	  for	  this	  organization	  stayed	  on	  for	  their	  second	  AmeriCorps	  year	  and	  ended	  up	  opening	  a	  homeless	  shelter30.	  	  Even	  though	  this	  group	  was	  State/National,	  which	  unlike	  VISTA	  and	  NCCC	  does	  not	  require	  volunteer	  to	  be	  “on	  the	  clock”	  24-­‐7,	  one	  informant	  explained	  that	  the	  lines	  between	  working	  and	  not	  working	  blurred	  because	  they	  lived	  where	  they	  worked.	  He	  also	  mentioned	  that	  there	  was	  never	  a	  typical	  work	  day:	  “It’s	  just	  a	  really	  hard	  thing	  to	  get	  used	  to	  because	  you	  like	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  off	  but	  we	  were	  never	  really	  off—we	  were	  never	  really	  on	  either.”	  He	  explained	  that	  this	  was	  because	  volunteer	  management	  was	  24-­‐7	  and	  they	  were	  the	  authority	  figures	  because	  they	  lived	  in	  the	  church.	  Thus,	  volunteers	  relied	  on	  them	  for	  advice	  and	  guidance	  at	  all	  hours	  of	  the	  night.	  He	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  a	  short-­‐term	  volunteer’s	  wallet	  being	  stolen	  at	  two	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  the	  AmeriCorps	  workers	  having	  to	  get	  up	  and	  deal	  with	  it.	  Interviewees	  who	  worked	  for	  this	  organization	  emphasized	  the	  very	  hands-­‐off	  supervision	  they	  received.	  Their	  boss	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  rebuilding	  and	  supporting	  eight	  New	  Orleans	  churches—but	  he	  gave	  them	  one	  very	  clear	  direction:	  “When	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Discussed	  on	  page	  66.	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we	  would	  be	  kind	  of	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  really	  committing	  ourselves	  to	  something	  big	  and	  new,	  he	  would	  say	  you	  should	  not	  commit	  yourselves,	  you	  should	  hold	  back…You	  should	  wait	  until	  the	  right	  moment	  comes	  along	  before	  you	  completely	  commit	  yourselves.	  That	  really	  perplexed	  us	  because	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  all	  this	  destruction	  we’re	  holding	  back,	  you	  know?”	  He	  explained	  how	  this	  created	  tension	  because	  there	  was	  so	  much	  to	  be	  done	  but	  everything	  required	  a	  deep	  commitment.	  This	  group	  ended	  up	  “holding	  back”	  for	  the	  entire	  service	  year	  and	  part	  of	  their	  second.	  It	  was	  then	  that	  they	  were	  approached	  to	  open	  a	  homeless	  shelter.	  
	  
Political	  Activists	  The	  two	  in	  this	  group	  technically	  worked	  for	  Words	  Not	  Guns	  but	  they	  both	  reported	  having	  limited	  contact	  with	  this	  organization.	  Upon	  receiving	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  they	  continued	  doing	  what	  they	  had	  been	  doing—they	  had	  both	  been	  volunteering	  for	  TiES.	  One	  was	  organizing	  volunteers	  against	  racism	  and	  white	  privilege,	  the	  other	  was	  doing	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  this	  work	  in	  addition	  to	  supporting	  community	  control	  of	  a	  medical	  clinic.	  Each	  person’s	  work	  centered	  around	  anti-­‐oppression	  organizing	  with	  volunteer	  groups	  and	  community	  outreach	  via	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  or	  active	  participation	  in	  other	  organizations.	  One	  person	  described	  his	  work	  as	  visiting	  on	  porches,	  hanging	  out	  in	  community	  meeting	  spots	  and	  walking	  around,	  practices	  which	  have	  been	  established	  as	  excellent	  outreach	  activities.	  One	  participant	  reported	  regular	  volunteer	  commitments	  with	  organizations	  that	  work	  to	  support	  immigrants,	  challenge	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  and	  provide	  anti-­‐racism	  trainings.	  Another	  used	  a	  lot	  of	  his	  hours	  to	  protest	  the	  demolition	  of	  public	  housing	  during	  his	  second	  AmeriCorps	  year.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  further,	  they	  had	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little	  supervision	  or	  oversight.	  As	  one	  person	  stated:	  “I	  was	  free	  to	  do	  political	  organizing	  work	  full	  time.”	  
	  
VISTA	  	  All	  four	  VISTAs	  I	  interviewed	  were	  sourced	  through	  a	  historically	  white,	  wealthy	  New	  Orleans	  university.	  They	  explained	  that	  their	  job	  was	  to	  increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  their	  organizations	  to	  host	  service	  learning	  students	  and	  to	  provide	  guidance	  and	  programming	  for	  these	  students.	  These	  VISTAs	  all	  worked	  for	  different	  organizations:	  Expanding	  Horizons,	  Fun	  to	  Read	  New	  Orleans,	  an	  ESL	  program	  run	  through	  CCGA,	  and	  GNO	  Rebuilds.	  They	  worked	  at	  their	  organizations	  Monday	  through	  Thursday,	  and	  spent	  Fridays	  in	  staff	  meetings,	  and	  working	  as	  a	  group	  on	  volunteer	  projects.	  One	  volunteer	  was	  placed	  with	  GNO	  Rebuilds,	  and	  for	  this	  section	  only	  is	  included	  in	  the	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  group.	  Another	  VISTA’s	  responsibility	  was	  to	  bring	  undergraduate	  service	  learning	  students	  into	  public	  schools	  as	  “reading	  buddies”	  to	  “make	  reading	  fun.”	  She	  spent	  her	  time	  trying	  to	  match	  kids	  with	  tutors,	  convince	  teachers	  that	  the	  program	  was	  worthwhile,	  develop	  a	  more	  rigorous	  curriculum	  and	  transition	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  new	  site	  in	  a	  new	  school.	  The	  other	  two	  were	  placed	  in	  difficult	  situations	  and	  reported	  pressure	  from	  the	  university	  to	  accommodate	  more	  service	  learning	  students	  and	  pressure	  from	  organizations	  to	  further	  their	  specific	  missions.	  	  	   One	  member	  of	  this	  VISTA	  group	  was	  the	  woman	  who	  ran	  a	  health	  clinic	  in	  Mississippi	  and	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  Once	  in	  the	  city	  she	  was	  acting	  director	  of	  one	  of	  the	  few	  ESL	  programs	  in	  the	  city.	  She	  reported	  struggling	  to	  understand	  the	  federal	  grant	  under	  which	  the	  program	  operated,	  spending	  an	  entire	  month	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reading	  it	  over.	  She	  also	  pored	  over	  new	  reports	  and	  population	  estimated	  trying	  to	  estimate	  the	  number	  of	  students	  to	  expect.	  She	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  training	  service	  learning	  students	  to	  be	  ESL	  teachers—resulting	  in	  what	  she	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  world’s	  worst	  volunteer	  training,”	  and	  supporting	  them	  when	  there	  were	  classroom	  difficulties.	  She	  struggled	  with	  resources—the	  program	  lacked	  textbooks—and	  infrastructure.	  She	  described	  the	  process	  of	  biking	  to	  the	  CCGA’s	  executive	  offices,	  sneaking	  in	  with	  badges	  they	  forged,	  and	  “stealing”	  thousands	  of	  photocopies	  from	  their	  parent	  organization.	  She	  had	  to	  strong-­‐arm	  the	  university	  hosting	  VISTA	  volunteers	  into	  restricting	  the	  number	  of	  service	  learning	  students:	  	  I	  told	  this	  woman	  that	  and	  she	  fought	  back	  at	  me,	  you	  don’t	  know	  what	  you’re	  talking	  about,	  you’ve	  never	  been…you’re	  not	  from	  this	  city,	  you	  don’t	  know	  how	  this	  city	  works,	  and	  we’re	  going	  to	  do…we’re	  going	  to	  put	  students	  over	  there	  whether	  you	  like	  it	  or	  not.	  I	  was	  like,	  over	  my	  dead	  body.	  Even	  though	  I	  was	  working	  for	  them,	  I	  started	  a	  little	  fight	  with	  that	  organization,	  between	  her	  and	  my	  organization	  and	  had	  to	  keep	  going	  back	  and	  forth.	  Man,	  that	  was	  a	  weird	  dynamic.	  At	  that	  point	  we	  were	  sandwiched	  between	  [the	  university]	  who	  was	  trying	  to	  strong	  arm	  us	  into	  taking	  30	  or	  40	  service	  learning	  students	  a	  semester—no	  she	  wanted	  us	  to	  take	  200—and	  I	  was	  like,	  we	  don’t	  even	  have	  an	  office,	  we	  don’t	  even	  have	  a	  phone,	  we’re	  not	  taking	  200	  volunteers.	  	  	  Through	  this	  whole	  process	  she	  reported	  developing	  a	  curriculum	  and	  a	  solid	  program:	  “We	  expanded	  to	  six	  sites,	  we	  really	  created	  a	  solid,	  state-­‐wide	  recognized	  as	  a	  solid	  ESL	  program,	  it’s	  not	  perfect	  but	  I	  think	  we	  really	  laid	  the	  ground	  work	  for	  building	  a	  long	  term	  sustainable	  program	  that’s	  still	  going	  to	  be	  there	  in	  ten	  years.”	  The	  black	  woman	  in	  this	  VISTA	  group	  was	  placed	  with	  a	  small	  community	  arts	  organization	  that	  not	  only	  sold	  art	  but	  holistically	  supported	  the	  artists	  by	  providing	  them	  with	  housing	  and	  other	  needs.	  She	  described	  her	  work	  in	  this	  way:	  	  Then	  some	  of	  the	  artists	  got	  sick,	  we	  found	  them,	  we	  had	  to	  bring	  them	  back,	  so	  I	  was	  doing	  case	  management	  stuff,	  like	  finding	  places	  for	  people	  to	  live,	  furniture	  and	  helping	  them.	  One	  of	  my	  roles	  was	  actually	  helping	  and	  training	  them	  on	  how	  to	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put	  their	  portfolios	  together	  so	  a	  lot	  of	  me	  was	  learning	  as	  I	  went.	  So	  okay,	  what	  does	  a	  successful	  artist…how	  can	  an	  artist	  be	  successful	  in	  the	  business	  of	  art?	  So	  this	  organization	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  about	  the	  business	  of	  art.	  So	  I	  had	  to	  learn	  how	  do	  you	  price	  art.	  If	  we’re	  using	  this	  as	  a	  community	  space	  how	  do	  we	  support	  ourselves	  and	  still	  keep	  this	  open,	  you	  know	  what	  I	  mean?	  It	  was	  just	  all	  these	  things	  as	  I	  was	  learning	  that	  neighborhood,	  this	  was	  in	  Central	  City,	  as	  people	  were	  coming	  back,	  what	  was	  needed.	  We	  were	  doing	  a	  lot	  of	  event	  planning	  to	  bring	  some	  sense	  of	  normalcy,	  like	  you	  know	  something’s	  always	  going	  on…that’s	  what’s	  normal.	  	  	  She	  was	  basically	  an	  assistant	  to	  the	  organization’s	  director	  who	  invested	  in	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  city	  and	  the	  rebuilding	  processes:	  “She	  really	  wanted	  me	  to	  get	  dirty	  and	  really	  know	  the	  city.”	  	  
	  
Theme	  5.	  AmeriCorps	  Rules	  and	  Regulations:	  “You	  gotta	  do	  what	  you	  gotta	  do.”	  	   This	  section	  examines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  post-­‐Katrina	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  governed	  by	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  and	  regulations	  [Appendix	  E].	  These	  rules	  generally	  prohibit	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  from	  engaging	  in	  any	  political	  or	  religious	  activities	  during	  work	  hours.	  For	  NCCC	  and	  VISTA	  volunteers,	  who	  are	  never	  technically	  “off,”	  these	  rules	  applied	  to	  their	  entire	  service	  term.	  This	  includes	  voter	  registration	  drives,	  influencing	  union	  organizing,	  engaging	  in	  petitions	  or	  boycotts,	  “or	  providing	  a	  direct	  benefit	  to	  a	  for-­‐profit	  entity,	  a	  labor	  union,	  a	  partisan	  political	  organization.”	  One	  may	  not	  engage	  in	  religious	  instruction	  or	  conduct	  worship	  services.	  This	  section	  also	  provides	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  rules	  stated	  on	  paper	  and	  in	  contracts	  were	  enforced	  during	  the	  2006	  AmeriCorps	  year	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  	  
Gutters	  Generally	  the	  State/National	  volunteers	  in	  this	  group	  were	  connected	  to	  each	  other	  but	  not	  necessarily	  to	  the	  national	  program.	  One	  participant	  reported	  that	  he	  didn’t	  feel	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connected	  to	  the	  national	  structure	  at	  all.	  Another	  volunteer	  explained	  that	  some	  rules—like	  interpersonal	  relationships	  between	  leadership	  and	  volunteers—were	  thrown	  out	  the	  window	  in	  New	  Orleans:	  “I	  actually	  think	  that	  some	  of	  the	  stuff	  they	  [AmeriCorps	  leaders	  and	  supervisors]	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  most	  things…what	  we’re	  going	  to	  do	  is	  what	  we’re	  going	  to	  do.	  We’re	  down	  here	  for	  relief,	  it’s	  not	  a	  cookie-­‐cutter	  project…”	  NCCC	  had	  unique	  oversight	  as	  their	  supervisor	  was	  not	  affiliated	  with	  their	  host	  organization	  but	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  to	  lead	  the	  team.	  One	  NCCC	  volunteer	  actually	  reported	  meeting	  with	  then-­‐President	  Bush	  who	  came	  to	  visit	  their	  site,	  who	  was	  there	  for	  a	  public	  relations	  trip	  and	  photo	  shoot.	  	  	  
Agenda	  Setters	  Generally	  members	  of	  this	  group	  had	  very	  little	  affiliation	  with	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program.	  One	  volunteer	  explained:	  “I	  guess	  as	  far	  as	  AmeriCorps	  goes…I	  guess	  I	  was	  a	  little	  surprised	  about	  how	  it	  was…being	  part	  of	  AmeriCorps	  wasn’t	  really	  part	  of	  the	  job	  as	  I	  might	  have	  anticipated.	  We	  didn’t	  have	  any	  contact	  with	  AmeriCorps	  personnel	  or	  anything	  like	  that.	  It	  was	  us,	  our	  supervisor	  and	  the	  other	  company	  employees.	  AmeriCorps	  was	  just	  part	  of	  our	  job	  title…”	  Another	  told	  this	  story:	  “Like	  I	  said	  our	  relationship	  with	  our	  job	  as	  far	  as	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  AmeriCorps	  was	  very	  detached,	  so	  much	  so	  we	  were	  10	  months	  into	  the	  program	  before	  we	  were	  told,	  oh	  wait,	  you’re	  supposed	  to	  go	  to	  this	  website	  and	  pick	  out	  apparel.	  Cause	  you’re	  actually	  supposed	  to	  be	  wearing	  AmeriCorps	  apparel	  as	  you’re	  working,	  and	  we’re	  like,	  really?	  [Laughter].	  We	  got	  two	  more	  months	  to	  comply,	  all	  right.”	  Everyone	  in	  this	  group	  mentioned	  time-­‐sheets	  as	  their	  primarily	  responsibility	  to	  the	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AmeriCorps	  program.	  One	  volunteer	  reported	  keeping	  her	  own	  time	  sheets	  without	  supervision	  “which	  totally	  could	  have	  been	  fudged.”	  One	  volunteer	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  AmeriCorps	  contract	  without	  altering	  it:	  “I	  had	  a	  big	  problem	  with	  that	  contract.	  There	  is	  one	  part	  of	  the	  contract	  which	  I	  recall	  really	  infringes	  on	  your	  religious	  rights.	  I	  had	  an	  issue	  with	  that.	  Basically	  it	  stipulated	  what	  you	  could	  or	  could	  not	  do	  outside	  of	  your	  hours	  that	  you’re	  working	  for	  AmeriCorps.	  I	  would	  have	  to	  find	  a	  copy	  of	  it,	  but	  I	  defiantly	  scratched	  out	  and	  re-­‐wrote	  part	  of	  that	  saying,	  I	  will	  work	  under	  this	  condition	  and	  this	  condition	  only.”	  There	  were	  no	  repercussions	  or	  follow	  up	  regarding	  this	  edit.31	  
	  
GNO	  Rebuilds	  One	  member	  of	  this	  group	  had	  done	  AmeriCorps	  before	  and	  reported	  knowing	  how	  it	  worked.	  He	  was	  the	  only	  person	  I	  interviewed	  who	  didn’t	  complete	  his	  contract.	  This	  was	  because	  he	  was	  accepted	  into	  a	  graduate	  program	  and	  school	  started	  two	  months	  before	  the	  end	  of	  his	  AmeriCorps	  term.	  He	  made	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  his	  troubles	  with	  his	  organization	  and	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program.	  Another	  volunteer	  reported	  not	  feeling	  very	  connected	  to	  AmeriCorps,	  though	  one	  of	  her	  monthly	  assignments	  was	  to	  spend	  two	  days	  compiling	  the	  AmeriCorps	  report	  on	  their	  activities.	  Another	  volunteer	  also	  identified	  this	  report	  as	  one	  of	  his	  job	  responsibilities.	  He	  claims	  he	  had	  “little	  to	  no	  oversight”	  from	  AmeriCorps.	  He	  explained:	  “I	  actually	  always	  felt	  like	  I	  wasn’t	  really	  part	  of	  ‘the	  AmeriCorps.’	  I	  never	  carried	  myself	  like	  I	  was	  AmeriCorps,	  wearing	  the	  shirt	  was	  bullshit,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  AmeriCorps	  contract	  states:	  “At	  no	  time	  may	  the	  member…	  engage	  in	  religious	  instruction;	  conduct	  worship	  services;	  [or]	  engage	  in	  any	  form	  of	  religious	  proselytization.”	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absolute	  bullshit—that	  is	  retarded.”	  When	  asked	  about	  the	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  and	  regulations	  he	  explained:	  “I’ll	  put	  it	  this	  way—I	  did	  whatever	  the	  fuck	  I	  wanted…there	  was	  no	  federal	  oversight.	  There	  was	  no	  oversight	  and	  there	  was	  no	  federal	  oversight!”	  	  
Political	  Activists	  This	  small	  group	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  activities	  were	  explicitly	  forbidden	  in	  the	  AmeriCorps	  guidelines.	  Neither	  of	  them	  faced	  any	  repercussions	  and	  one	  actually	  completed	  a	  second	  service	  year	  doing	  similar	  work.	  He	  explains:	  “I	  was	  surprised	  because	  I	  thought	  I	  was	  getting	  more	  oversight.	  In	  my	  particular	  situation	  I	  thought	  there	  was	  going	  to	  be	  more	  bureaucracy	  and	  more	  oversight	  and	  more	  restrictions	  or	  even	  guidance	  or	  boundaries	  around	  what	  I	  was	  doing.	  I	  was	  actually…I	  pretty	  much	  was	  able	  to	  define	  and	  develop	  pretty	  much	  what	  I	  wanted	  to	  do.”	  He	  links	  this	  freedom	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina:	  At	  least	  through	  what	  I’ve	  seen	  and	  folks	  that	  I’ve	  talked	  to	  who	  have	  done	  AmeriCorps	  outside	  of	  New	  Orleans	  post-­‐Katrina,	  it’s	  much	  more	  bureaucratic	  and	  it’s	  much	  more	  dot	  the	  i’s	  and	  cross	  the	  t’s	  at	  the	  situation.	  I	  can	  say	  really	  ultimately	  the	  reason	  I	  did	  AmeriCorps	  and	  took	  this	  position	  was	  because	  I	  knew	  that	  from	  talking	  to	  other	  folks,	  I	  knew	  that	  this	  particular	  situation	  I	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  restrictions	  on	  what	  I	  was	  able	  to	  do,	  you	  know?	  So,	  yeah,	  I	  went	  to	  like	  protests,	  I	  didn’t	  wear	  AmeriCorps	  stuff,	  so	  I	  wasn’t	  like	  actively	  promoting	  AmeriCorps	  at	  these	  events,	  but…Yeah,	  technically	  as	  an	  AmeriCorps	  member	  I	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  struggle	  to	  save	  public	  housing	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  But	  I	  did	  anyway.	  And	  my	  supervisor	  didn’t	  care…	  I	  think	  some	  of	  that	  was	  because	  just	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  program	  that	  we	  were	  doing	  and	  the	  national	  [AmeriCorps]	  program	  I	  think	  were	  sort	  of	  sympathetic	  to	  our—to	  the	  politics	  of	  these	  groups	  and	  also	  sympathetic	  to	  what	  was	  going	  on	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  So	  I	  think	  that	  they	  maybe	  weren’t	  as	  strict	  with	  us—like	  it	  was	  a	  you	  gotta	  do	  what	  you	  gotta	  do	  sort	  of	  thing…I	  don’t	  know.	  I	  feel	  like	  people	  I’ve	  talked	  to	  elsewhere,	  it’s	  much	  more	  like	  you’re	  in	  the	  office	  from	  9-­‐5	  and	  your	  documenting	  all	  your	  hours	  and	  the	  supervisor	  is	  checking	  your	  thing	  every	  couple	  days…	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The	  second	  volunteer	  in	  this	  group	  also	  expressed	  surprise	  as	  how	  little	  oversight	  she	  received:	  In	  all	  honesty,	  I	  expected	  them	  to	  care	  a	  little	  bit	  more	  about	  what	  I	  was	  doing	  with	  their	  money.	  I	  had	  to	  do	  timesheets	  but	  they	  were	  really	  vague	  and	  it	  was	  hard	  for	  me	  because	  the	  work	  that	  I	  was	  doing	  was	  very	  different…I	  was	  doing	  organizing	  and	  this	  grant	  was	  like	  for	  community	  mediation.	  So	  sometimes	  I	  had	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  fit	  my	  work	  into	  the	  categories	  of	  what	  they	  wanted	  me	  to	  be	  doing.	  I	  think	  I	  defiantly…I’m	  saying	  all	  this	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  candor,	  but	  at	  the	  time—even	  now,	  it	  feels…weird.	  It	  feels	  like	  I’m	  kind	  of	  getting	  away	  with	  something.	  It	  felt	  like	  I	  was	  getting	  away	  with	  something.	  I	  could	  get	  them…I	  almost	  bragged	  about	  it…getting	  George	  Bush	  to	  give	  me	  money	  to	  do	  anti-­‐racist	  organizing	  in	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans.	  It	  was	  because	  there	  was	  so	  little	  surveillance	  and	  so	  little	  accountability	  for	  me	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  I	  was	  actually	  doing.	  A	  time	  sheet	  is	  really	  easy	  to	  fill	  out	  in	  whatever	  way	  to	  make	  it	  look	  like	  I’m	  doing	  what	  they	  want	  me	  to	  do.	  	  
VISTA	   Besides	  NCCC,	  VISTA	  volunteers	  were	  the	  most	  connected	  with	  AmeriCorps	  as	  a	  state	  and	  national	  program.	  They	  spent	  every	  Friday	  meeting	  with	  their	  VISTA	  leader	  as	  a	  group—in	  staff	  meetings	  and	  working	  on	  communal	  projects.	  The	  VISTA	  leader	  provided	  guest	  speakers	  and	  reported	  to	  the	  higher	  AmeriCorps	  structure.	  A	  non-­‐local	  white	  woman	  initially	  worked	  in	  Alabama,	  where	  she	  was	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  her	  state	  director	  because	  the	  work	  was	  going	  so	  badly.	  She	  reported	  being	  the	  first	  one	  to	  tell	  an	  AmeriCorps	  representative	  that	  she	  was	  running	  a	  medical	  clinic.	  She	  insisted	  that	  her	  leadership	  role	  was	  inappropriate	  given	  her	  training	  and	  experience	  and	  her	  state	  AmeriCorps	  supervisor	  agreed	  with	  her.	  She	  went	  to	  regional	  trainings	  with	  people	  from	  five	  states	  but	  had	  a	  hard	  time	  communicating	  to	  AmeriCorps	  staff	  “how	  our	  experiences	  did	  not	  fit	  within	  the	  federal	  guidelines	  of	  what	  we	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  doing.”	  She	  went	  on	  to	  explain:	  “Like	  you’re	  only	  supposed	  to	  have	  this	  many	  days	  off,	  you’re	  supposed	  to	  be	  working	  24-­‐7.”	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Unlike	  some	  of	  the	  other	  informants,	  one	  woman	  reported	  a	  complex	  reporting	  system	  and	  a	  simple	  time	  sheet.	  “The	  tools	  and	  structures	  of	  reporting	  [to	  AmeriCorps]	  felt	  very	  intrusive	  at	  times…So	  I	  felt	  like	  the	  bureaucracy	  of	  it	  sometimes	  when	  we	  had	  to	  do	  these	  random	  requests	  that	  came	  from	  high	  up	  or	  having	  legislators	  of	  whoever	  come	  down	  to	  do	  the	  charade	  of	  their	  showing	  us	  off	  and	  it	  was	  really	  weird	  and	  awkward	  and	  uncomfortable.”	  When	  asked	  about	  her	  relationship	  to	  the	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  and	  regulations	  she	  explained:	  	  I	  remember	  talking	  about	  why	  we	  weren’t	  allowed	  to	  protest	  or	  whatever.	  So	  I	  remember	  it	  was,	  all	  kind	  of	  things,	  like	  we	  weren’t	  allowed	  to	  do	  it	  as	  VISTAs,	  but	  I	  didn’t	  make	  the	  connection	  as	  AmeriCorps	  overall	  understanding	  the	  history	  outside	  of	  being	  told	  by	  the	  AmeriCorps	  people…	  Nobody	  ever	  said	  do	  you	  know	  what	  AmeriCorps	  did?	  So	  I	  never	  even	  thought	  to	  look	  at	  the	  history	  outside	  of	  what	  they	  told	  us.	  So	  I	  was	  like	  yeah,	  I	  never	  thought,	  when	  we	  would	  protest	  when	  we	  were	  gutting	  houses	  and	  we	  were	  doing	  all	  those	  things,	  it	  was	  like	  we	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  do	  that	  but	  it	  was	  like	  okay,	  we’re	  just	  kind	  of…I	  don’t	  know	  breaking	  the	  rules.	  You	  think	  it	  was	  maybe	  liability	  but	  not	  that	  fundamental	  right...	  I	  was	  like	  goddamn,	  they	  got	  me.	  [Laughter.]	  Because	  I	  was	  doing	  it	  anyway,	  not	  because	  of	  that,	  but	  if	  I	  had	  known,	  if	  I	  had	  thought	  about	  that	  I	  think	  we	  could	  have	  done	  it	  anyway	  and	  really	  like	  attacked	  that	  too,	  you	  know	  what	  I	  mean?	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Chapter	  5.	  DATA	  ANALYSIS	  
Introduction	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  above	  data	  in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  context	  of	  New	  Orleans	  and	  the	  city’s	  recovery	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  My	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  three	  criteria	  for	  effective	  disaster	  response	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  which	  I	  have	  developed.	  In	  this	  case	  I	  use	  effective	  disaster	  response	  to	  mean	  a	  program	  that	  centers	  the	  needs	  of	  affected	  citizens	  that	  social	  scientists	  label	  “socially	  vulnerable.”	  These	  criteria	  are	  based	  on	  social	  scientific	  literature	  regarding	  effective	  disaster	  response,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  racial	  justice	  movement	  politics,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  I	  have	  emphasized	  these	  sources	  because	  of	  my	  own	  ethical	  and	  political	  beliefs	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  government	  relief.	  These	  criteria	  were	  neither	  developed	  by	  nor	  presented	  to	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program.	  AmeriCorps	  has	  made	  no	  claims	  that	  it	  was	  attempting	  to	  fulfill	  these	  criteria;	  however,	  I	  believe	  this	  does	  not	  absolve	  them	  from	  scrutiny	  on	  these	  grounds.	  	   The	  first	  criterion	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Guiding	  Principles	  on	  Internal	  Displacement	  which	  states	  that	  authorities	  should	  ensure	  that	  evacuated	  residents	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  return	  to	  their	  home	  city.32	  I	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  AmeriCorps	  policies	  for	  the	  return	  of	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  The	  second	  criterion	  is	  based	  on	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  resources	  available	  in	  the	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina33.	  I	  frame	  the	  benefits	  and	  resources	  provided	  to	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  local	  housing	  and	  health	  care	  situations.	  This	  second	  criterion	  is	  framed	  by	  FEMA’s	  statement	  that	  “Volunteers	  should	  plan	  to	  be	  as	  self-­‐sufficient	  as	  possible	  so	  that	  they	  are	  of	  little,	  if	  any,	  burden	  on	  the	  disaster-­‐affected	  community”	  (FEMA	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  See	  pages	  38	  to	  39	  for	  sections	  from	  this	  document.	  33	  See	  page	  36	  for	  details	  on	  storm	  damage	  to	  infrastructure	  and	  public	  services.	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2007).	  This	  analysis	  is	  framed	  by	  my	  discussion	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  state.	  The	  last	  of	  the	  three	  criteria	  is	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  accountability.	  This	  principle	  is	  rooted	  in	  accountability	  literature	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  personal	  experience	  and	  understanding	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  234.	  There	  are	  many	  groups	  and	  communities	  affected	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina;	  however,	  this	  research	  centers	  the	  needs	  and	  self-­‐determination	  of	  those	  deemed	  “socially	  vulnerable”	  by	  social	  scientists.	  	  	   The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  was	  not	  designed	  or	  run	  specifically	  as	  disaster	  response	  but	  does	  recruit	  and	  send	  volunteers	  to	  do	  this	  work.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  did	  not	  promise	  to	  fulfill	  the	  criteria	  I	  use	  to	  evaluate	  their	  disaster	  response.	  These	  criteria	  are	  based	  on	  the	  publications	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  FEMA,	  social	  justice	  activists	  and	  scholars	  and	  racial	  justice	  movement	  principles	  of	  accountability.	  In	  my	  analysis	  I	  center	  the	  needs	  and	  autonomy	  of	  New	  Orleanians	  affected	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  assess	  the	  implications	  of	  AmeriCorps	  in	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006	  according	  to	  these	  three	  criteria.	  	  
AmeriCorps’	  role	  in	  supporting	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  residents	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  did	  not	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  support	  the	  return	  of	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  displaced	  by	  Katrina.	  All	  local	  residents	  who	  were	  hired	  by	  the	  program	  had	  already	  all	  returned	  of	  their	  own	  accord,	  prior	  to	  receiving	  an	  AmeriCorps	  position.	  Only	  one	  interviewee	  out	  of	  eighteen	  reported	  locating	  displaced	  residents	  and	  supporting	  their	  return	  home	  as	  part	  of	  her	  job	  responsibilities.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  could	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  See	  page	  14	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  accountability	  in	  SNCC’s	  Freedom	  Summer	  program	  and	  page	  15	  for	  Paul	  Kivel’s	  statement	  relating	  it	  to	  modern	  work.	  Also,	  see	  pages	  24	  to	  27	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  political	  activism	  in	  holding	  government	  anti-­‐poverty	  programs	  accountable	  to	  low-­‐income	  citizens.	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ensured	  compliance	  with	  a	  section	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  statement	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  Internally	  Displaced	  People	  (IDP)	  to	  return	  home	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  by	  hiring	  them	  directly	  to	  rebuild	  their	  own	  communities,	  or	  second,	  by	  ensuring	  that	  supporting	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  people	  was	  a	  top	  priority	  for	  volunteers.	  I	  discuss	  each	  alternative	  in	  turn.	  	  My	  first	  criterion	  regards	  the	  process	  of	  recruiting	  and	  hiring	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  There	  was	  organizational	  capacity	  to	  provide	  housing	  for	  volunteers,	  the	  lack	  of	  which	  was	  a	  barrier	  to	  people	  returning	  home.	  The	  small	  stipend	  and	  limited	  health	  care,	  while	  not	  sufficient	  to	  live	  on,	  could	  have	  provided	  a	  base-­‐line	  income.	  The	  health	  benefits	  excluded	  a	  significant	  population	  as	  it	  was	  limited	  to	  emergency-­‐only—dire	  situations	  were	  covered	  to	  an	  extent	  but	  preventative	  and	  primary	  care	  was	  not.	  This	  eliminates	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  population	  who	  might	  want	  to	  work	  with	  AmeriCorps	  but	  had	  some	  sort	  of	  medical	  problem	  or	  needed	  regular	  check-­‐ups	  (such	  as	  diabetics).	  Also,	  there	  were	  very	  few	  senior	  participants	  who	  came	  to	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Katrina,	  unlike	  the	  volunteer	  population	  at	  regional	  trainings,	  which,	  according	  to	  two	  interviewees,	  spanned	  multiple	  generations.	  One	  volunteer	  mentioned	  having	  a	  physical	  disability	  but	  did	  not	  discuss	  requiring	  any	  related	  medical	  care.	  	  Generalizing	  across	  the	  hiring	  process	  of	  national	  volunteers	  is	  difficult	  because	  of	  the	  initiative	  taken	  by	  host	  organizations.	  Only	  four	  interviewees,	  none	  of	  whom	  lived	  in	  New	  Orleans	  prior	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  applied	  to	  AmeriCorps	  independent	  of	  an	  organizational	  placement.	  Two	  were	  NCCC	  members,	  who	  are	  assigned	  to	  an	  AmeriCorps	  campus	  and	  traveled	  to	  multiple	  states	  to	  work	  with	  numerous	  organizations.	  One	  was	  the	  VISTA	  that	  applied	  specifically	  to	  do	  Katrina	  relief	  work	  in	  September	  2005	  and	  was	  placed	  in	  Alabama	  (she	  later	  transferred	  to	  New	  Orleans).	  The	  fourth	  was	  also	  a	  VISTA	  who	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applied	  for	  AmeriCorps	  in	  three	  states	  following	  a	  presentation	  by	  a	  recruiter	  at	  her	  college—a	  historically	  black	  university.	  Everyone	  else	  was	  recruited	  directly	  by	  their	  organization.	  	  Four	  interviewees	  mentioned	  finding	  their	  specific	  AmeriCorps	  position	  online.	  While	  many	  people	  displaced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Hurricanes	  Katrina	  and	  Rita	  turned,	  sometimes	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  to	  the	  internet	  for	  information,	  those	  most	  adept	  at	  searching	  had	  the	  advantage	  in	  finding	  employment	  through	  this	  avenue—generally	  not	  low-­‐income	  people	  who	  don’t	  have	  access	  to	  personal	  computers.	  Additionally,	  the	  websites	  used	  by	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  to	  find	  their	  positions,	  Craigslist.org,	  Idealist.org	  and	  AmeriCorps.gov,	  may	  not	  be	  familiar	  to	  novice	  internet	  users.	  They	  are	  distinct	  from	  other	  websites	  frequents	  by	  displaced	  residents	  such	  as	  Nola.com,	  a	  newspaper-­‐affiliated	  site	  with	  comprehensive	  information	  on	  New	  Orleans,	  or	  FEMA.gov	  (a	  necessity	  for	  everyone	  who	  requested	  disaster	  assistance).	  Those	  who	  had	  personal	  computers	  or	  regular	  free	  or	  low-­‐cost	  internet	  access	  also	  had	  the	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  the	  first	  to	  see	  and	  apply	  for	  AmeriCorps	  positions.	  One	  volunteer	  mentioned	  finding	  his	  position	  on	  a	  flier	  posted	  on	  a	  private,	  white-­‐majority,	  residential	  college	  campus	  upon	  returning	  to	  New	  Orleans	  in	  January	  2006.	  While	  I	  have	  no	  information	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  flyering	  at	  institutions	  of	  higher	  education,	  this	  process	  recruits	  a	  very	  different	  applicant	  pool	  than,	  for	  example,	  flyering	  FEMA	  offices	  in	  Baton	  Rouge,	  or	  Red	  Cross	  centers	  in	  Atlanta	  or	  Baptist	  churches	  in	  New	  Orleans.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  aside	  from	  maintaining	  AmeriCorps.gov,	  all	  other	  publicizing	  of	  job	  opportunities	  was	  handled	  by	  the	  organizations,	  not	  the	  national	  AmeriCorps	  structure.	  These	  tactics	  specifically	  recruit	  those	  with	  some	  amount	  of	  privilege	  indicated	  by	  Internet	  savviness	  or	  attendance	  at	  an	  elite	  college.	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Organizational	  leaders	  granted	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  recruited	  seven	  respondents	  personally.	  This	  process	  varied	  widely	  based	  on	  who	  did	  the	  hiring,	  but	  it	  effectively	  eliminated	  competition	  for	  positions.	  A	  process	  like	  this	  one	  can	  support	  the	  hiring	  of	  qualified	  people	  who	  otherwise	  might	  not	  have	  heard	  of	  the	  positions	  or	  who	  may	  not	  have	  the	  educational	  credentials	  to	  compete	  in	  an	  open	  application	  process.	  My	  sample	  included	  an	  organization	  that	  directly	  recruited	  local	  citizens:	  United	  Residents	  hired	  two	  of	  their	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  partially	  based	  on	  their	  history	  of	  residence	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  where	  they	  would	  be	  working.	  Thus,	  the	  organization	  directly	  ensured	  employment	  and	  leadership	  roles	  for	  two	  residents	  who	  had	  returned	  from	  evacuation.	  This	  is	  an	  excellent	  model,	  employing	  pre-­‐disaster	  residents	  to	  take	  leadership	  in	  the	  recovery	  of	  their	  own	  neighborhood.	  However,	  in	  this	  case	  both	  of	  these	  women	  had	  been	  able	  to	  return	  following	  evacuation	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  were	  employed	  full	  time	  in	  jobs	  they	  left	  for	  AmeriCorps.	  Thus	  their	  AmeriCorps	  positions	  did	  not	  facilitate	  their	  return	  home,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  their	  organization	  did	  not	  provide	  them	  with	  housing,	  unlike	  significant	  numbers	  of	  non-­‐local	  volunteers.	  	  The	  Political	  Activists	  were	  both	  recruited	  by	  the	  local	  director	  of	  WNG.	  One	  political	  activist	  explained	  that	  there	  was	  “no	  accountability”	  in	  this	  hiring	  process.	  According	  to	  him	  the	  director	  of	  WGN	  gave	  these	  positions	  to	  young,	  non-­‐local	  whites	  who	  were	  doing	  what	  she	  determined	  to	  be	  “good	  work.”	  This	  could	  be	  problematic	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  open	  access	  to	  job	  position	  announcements.	  	  Alternatively,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  could	  have	  indirectly	  supported	  the	  return	  of	  IDPs	  by	  ensuring	  that	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  its	  volunteers	  was	  to	  support	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  residents,	  which	  was	  mentioned	  by	  only	  one	  study	  participant.	  This	  could	  have	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occurred	  by	  placing	  volunteers	  with	  organizations	  who	  identified	  this	  effort	  as	  their	  primary	  mission.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  could	  have	  also	  placed	  volunteers	  with	  various	  organizations	  and	  included	  supporting	  displaced	  residents	  in	  their	  job	  description.	  This	  structure	  would	  parallel	  that	  imposed	  by	  the	  university	  that	  hosted	  VISTAs—they	  were	  all	  with	  different	  organizations	  but	  their	  work	  was	  focused	  on	  supporting	  service-­‐learning	  students.	  AmeriCorps	  neither	  directly	  nor	  indirectly	  supported	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  residents	  to	  their	  hometown.	  	   Only	  one	  volunteer,	  a	  VISTA	  who	  worked	  for	  Expanding	  Horizons,	  reported	  finding	  displaced	  residents	  and	  supporting	  their	  return	  home	  in	  her	  job	  description.	  No	  one	  else	  mentioned	  this	  as	  a	  work	  assignment.	  Instead	  they	  supported	  residents	  who	  were	  already	  returned	  (typically	  those	  with	  the	  greatest	  access	  to	  resources,35	  members	  of	  neighborhood	  organizations,	  and	  homeowners)	  or	  non-­‐locals	  (such	  as	  undergraduate	  service	  learning	  students	  or	  short-­‐term	  volunteers).	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  could	  have	  made	  great	  strides	  in	  ensuring	  the	  return	  of	  residents	  using	  the	  support	  of	  organizations	  and	  volunteers	  with	  connections	  to	  displaced	  residents.	  Rather	  it	  perpetuated	  the	  powerful	  Katrina	  response	  attitude	  that	  following	  the	  federal	  mass-­‐evacuation:	  individuals	  were	  responsible	  for	  finding	  their	  own	  way	  home.	  	  
Relationship	  to	  Local	  Resources	  
	   This	  section	  examines	  the	  systematic	  use	  of	  the	  city’s	  resources	  to	  support	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  I	  draw	  on	  FEMA’s	  statement	  that	  disaster	  relief	  volunteers	  must	  be	  “self-­‐sufficient”	  so	  as	  not	  to	  burden	  disaster	  affected	  areas	  (FEMA	  2007).	  This	  section	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Resources	  in	  this	  case	  include	  un-­‐flooded	  homes.	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places	  the	  housing	  benefits	  received	  by	  thirteen	  of	  my	  eighteen	  subject	  participants	  in	  the	  context	  of	  New	  Orleans’	  post-­‐Katrina	  housing	  shortage.	  I	  also	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  limited	  physical	  and	  mental	  health	  benefits	  for	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  These	  limited	  benefits	  increased	  volunteers’	  reliance	  on	  the	  city’s	  already	  taxed	  public	  health	  services.	  Due	  to	  the	  low	  living	  stipend	  and	  insufficient	  health	  care,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  relied	  on	  the	  crippled	  housing	  and	  medical	  infrastructure	  of	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  to	  care	  for	  their	  volunteers.	  They	  occupied	  un-­‐flooded	  housing	  units	  and	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  families	  or	  the	  charity	  medical	  system	  for	  medical	  care.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  VISTA	  group	  they	  suffered	  from	  un-­‐treated	  mental	  health	  needs.	  	  	  	  
Housing	  Thirteen	  of	  the	  eighteen	  people	  I	  interviewed	  were	  offered	  housing	  as	  a	  benefit	  of	  their	  work	  with	  AmeriCorps	  and	  their	  host	  organization.	  Except	  for	  the	  case	  of	  NCCC,	  housing	  and	  food,	  when	  provided,	  were	  supplied	  by	  the	  organizations	  themselves,	  not	  by	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program.	  Affordable	  housing	  was	  a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  evacuated	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  returning	  home.	  With	  homes	  flooded	  and	  rents	  skyrocketing,	  people	  struggled	  to	  find	  places	  to	  stay.	  Returning	  residents	  packed	  into	  FEMA	  trailers,	  slept	  in	  their	  cars,	  stayed	  with	  friends	  and	  often	  commuted	  hundreds	  of	  miles	  to	  see	  their	  families.	  Volunteers	  who	  were	  housed	  by	  CCGA	  and	  Collaborating	  Volunteers	  were	  housed	  in	  former	  homeless	  shelters	  that	  did	  not	  flood.	  The	  VISTA	  volunteers	  were	  housed	  in	  apartments	  attached	  to	  the	  university-­‐affiliated	  hospital	  that	  formerly	  housed	  public	  health	  students	  and	  families	  with	  loved	  ones	  in	  the	  hospital.	  SVCOA	  volunteers	  lived	  in	  a	  church	  that	  was	  so	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large	  (and	  they	  had	  so	  much	  freedom)	  that	  a	  volunteer	  built	  an	  entire	  darkroom	  in	  the	  church	  for	  his	  personal	  use.	  	  By	  choosing	  to	  use	  these	  spaces	  as	  volunteer	  housing	  rather	  than	  living	  spaces	  for	  returning	  residents,	  these	  organizations	  prioritized	  the	  volunteers	  over	  the	  needs	  of	  displaced	  residents	  returning	  after	  Katrina.	  	  Recall	  the	  non-­‐local	  volunteer	  who	  met	  a	  homeless	  teenager	  who	  had	  grown	  up	  in	  the	  church	  were	  the	  volunteer	  was	  staying.	  She	  offered	  him	  her	  couch,	  an	  individual	  act	  of	  kindness	  not	  bolstered	  by	  systematic	  attempts	  to	  house	  people	  sleeping	  on	  the	  street.	  The	  city	  was	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  medical	  professionals	  who	  could	  have	  utilized	  the	  apartments	  VISTA	  volunteers	  were	  living	  in.	  There	  were	  systematic	  processes	  that	  converted	  much	  needed	  housing	  for	  vulnerable	  members	  of	  the	  New	  Orleans	  community	  to	  free	  housing	  for	  volunteers,	  and	  these	  processes	  were	  perpetuated	  and	  encouraged	  by	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program.	  If	  there	  was	  ever	  a	  time	  to	  open	  the	  doors	  of	  all	  possible	  shelters	  to	  returning	  residents	  who	  were	  trying	  to	  rebuild,	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006	  was	  it.	  Instead,	  these	  vital	  spaces	  were	  opened	  to	  volunteers.	  	  	  
Health	  Care	  	   AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  provided	  emergency-­‐only	  health	  care	  and	  many	  volunteers	  were	  living	  and	  working	  in	  hazardous	  environments	  with	  very	  limited	  safety	  precautions	  and	  equipment.	  Members	  of	  The	  Gutters	  group	  especially	  reported	  many	  safety	  and	  health	  concerns.	  One	  interviewee	  reported	  serious	  respiratory	  damage	  after	  only	  three	  months	  of	  gutting	  houses.	  The	  federal	  government	  suspended	  Occupational	  Safety	  and	  Health	  Administration	  (OSHA)	  regulations	  after	  Katrina	  (Gorman	  2010,	  5)	  and	  there	  was	  limited	  safety	  equipment	  and	  training	  for	  volunteers.	  This	  caused	  Katrina	  relief	  
103	  
volunteers	  to	  be	  more	  reliant	  on	  health	  care	  than	  those	  working	  in	  non-­‐disaster	  situations.	  Low-­‐level	  insurance	  forced	  volunteers	  to	  pay	  large	  health	  care	  bills—four	  people	  mentioned	  these	  costs	  as	  contributing	  factors	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  live	  on	  the	  stipend	  alone.	  Two	  mentioned	  borrowing	  money	  from	  their	  parents,	  one	  had	  to	  “live	  on	  a	  credit	  card,”	  and	  the	  fourth	  who	  was	  raised	  with	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  class	  privilege	  claimed	  that	  her	  finances	  were	  so	  tight	  she	  “just	  had	  to	  try	  and	  eat.”	  This	  level	  of	  insurance	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  volunteers’	  well	  being	  and	  added	  another	  layer	  of	  stress	  to	  an	  already	  difficult	  livelihood.	  Another	  volunteer	  mentioned	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  charity	  medical	  system,	  which	  placed	  an	  undue	  burden	  on	  the	  crippled	  medical	  system	  in	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans.	  With	  Charity	  Hospital	  closed,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  medical	  facilities	  still	  recovering	  from	  severe	  flooding,	  the	  care	  available	  for	  returning	  residents	  was	  sub	  par36.	  The	  influx	  of	  under-­‐insured	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  may	  not	  have	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  health	  care	  system	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  but	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  expected	  the	  city	  of	  New	  Orleans	  and	  local	  hospitals	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  slack	  and	  care	  for	  federal	  volunteers	  is	  irresponsible	  disaster	  relief	  practice37.	  Assuming	  that	  volunteers	  to	  come	  from	  privilege	  and	  rely	  on	  family	  members	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  a	  credit	  card	  further	  discourages	  disaster	  survivors,	  who	  are	  financially	  struggling	  having	  suffered	  storm	  and	  flood	  damages,	  from	  becoming	  involved	  with	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  page	  36	  in	  Chapter	  2	  for	  more	  detail	  about	  the	  availability	  of	  medical	  facilities.	  37	  This	  process	  of	  the	  federal	  AmeriCorps	  program	  expecting	  individual	  volunteers	  or	  health	  care	  facilities	  to	  compensate	  for	  insufficient	  health	  care	  parallels	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  evolution	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  as	  discussed	  on	  pages	  22	  to	  23	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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Stress	  and	  mental	  health	  	   In	  examining	  volunteer	  stress	  levels,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  reiterate	  that	  my	  case	  study	  is	  an	  exceptional	  snapshot	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program,	  which	  generally	  is	  not	  disaster	  focused.	  The	  2006	  New	  Orleans	  AmeriCorps	  team	  saw	  the	  highest	  dropout	  rate	  in	  the	  program’s	  history,	  according	  to	  one	  interviewee,	  who	  was	  approached	  by	  state	  supervisors	  about	  this	  phenomenon.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  recognized	  this	  level	  of	  stress	  and	  provided	  a	  temporary,	  free	  counselor	  which	  three	  interviewees	  mentioned,	  two	  of	  whom	  used	  this	  service.	  This	  was	  short	  term,	  ending	  early	  2007,	  and	  was	  not	  widely	  publicized	  as	  three	  volunteers	  recommended	  that	  AmeriCorps	  provide	  some	  sort	  of	  mental	  health	  care,	  implying	  that	  there	  was	  none	  available	  during	  their	  service	  year.	  All	  VISTA	  volunteers	  were	  involved	  in	  what	  one	  described	  as	  “a	  kind	  of	  group	  therapy”	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  social	  worker	  provided	  by	  the	  university	  that	  hosted	  them.	  These	  services	  are	  rarely	  available	  to	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  non-­‐disaster	  situations	  and	  AmeriCorps	  was	  correct	  in	  recognizing	  the	  unique	  nature	  of	  this	  work	  environment38.	  	  Generally,	  all	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  interviewed	  experienced	  an	  amount	  of	  stress	  ranging	  from	  “extreme”	  to	  “manageable”	  with	  the	  majority	  falling	  on	  the	  “extreme”	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  This	  stress	  contributed	  to	  the	  uniquely	  high	  dropout	  rate,	  and	  low	  numbers	  of	  people	  who	  continued	  the	  work	  they	  were	  doing	  after	  their	  service	  completion.	  This	  caused	  fast	  turnover	  in	  organizations,	  which	  can	  inhibit	  organizational	  capacity	  as	  the	  most	  experienced	  workers	  leave	  and	  take	  their	  knowledge	  with	  them39.	  Thus,	  the	  experience	  that	  is	  gained	  by	  volunteers	  is	  often	  lost	  to	  other	  states	  or	  countries	  as	  mobile	  volunteers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  page	  27	  in	  Chapter	  2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  mental	  health,	  specifically	  secondary	  trauma	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  volunteers.	  39	  See	  page	  33	  in	  Chapter	  2	  for	  an	  expanded	  discussion	  of	  organizational	  dependence	  on	  short-­‐term	  volunteers.	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escape	  from	  high	  stress	  situations.	  Indeed,	  of	  those	  I	  interviewed	  over	  the	  phone,	  over	  half	  of	  them	  reported	  stress	  and	  trauma	  as	  primary	  factors	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  move	  away	  from	  New	  Orleans.	  	  Even	  those	  who	  did	  not	  drop	  out	  of	  the	  program	  brought	  their	  increasing	  levels	  of	  trauma	  and	  stress	  into	  their	  work,	  thereby	  inhibiting	  their	  effectiveness.	  	   While	  those	  in	  The	  Gutters	  group	  reported	  learning	  the	  process	  of	  gutting	  a	  house	  relatively	  quickly,	  volunteers	  were	  completely	  unprepared	  for	  the	  emotional	  part.	  Three	  people	  reported	  an	  emotional	  toll	  due	  to	  their	  role	  as	  “counselors.”	  This	  included	  “listening	  to	  peoples’	  stories,”	  doing	  intake	  interviews,	  and	  some	  form	  of	  case	  management.	  Of	  those	  who	  reported	  these	  activities,	  no	  one	  had	  any	  background	  in	  social	  work	  or	  counseling,	  nor	  were	  they	  trained	  in	  how	  to	  handle	  such	  situations.	  The	  emotional	  needs	  of	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  were	  very	  high,	  with	  skyrocketing	  rates	  of	  trauma	  (Galea,	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Coker,	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Kesser,	  et	  al.	  2006)	  and	  increasing	  rates	  of	  suicide	  (Kesser,	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Caring	  for	  people	  in	  these	  situations	  is	  something	  that	  interviewees	  reported	  not	  being	  able	  to	  learn—unlike	  gutting	  which	  become	  easier	  with	  experience.	  Rather,	  this	  emotional	  work	  became	  harder	  and	  harder	  as	  volunteers	  experienced	  more	  and	  more	  secondary	  trauma.	  This	  aspect	  of	  their	  job	  was	  devastating	  for	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  and	  it	  also	  affected	  residents	  who,	  in	  their	  very	  vulnerable	  state,	  had	  only	  untrained,	  young	  volunteers	  to	  turn	  to	  for	  emotional	  support.	  This	  is	  a	  situation	  where	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers,	  trying	  their	  best,	  inappropriately	  filled	  a	  gap	  left	  by	  the	  federal	  disaster	  response.	  The	  mental	  health	  needs	  of	  displaced	  people	  were	  not	  met	  and	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  were	  placed	  in	  situations	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  handle.	  Residents	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  turn	  to	  already	  traumatized,	  young,	  untrained	  volunteers.	  None	  of	  the	  volunteers	  in	  The	  Gutters	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group	  reported	  any	  mental	  health	  care	  provided	  for	  themselves	  or	  for	  the	  residents	  they	  were	  serving.	  	  
AmeriCorps’	  accountability	  to	  “socially	  vulnerable”	  citizens	  
	   This	  section	  examines	  the	  third	  criterion:	  accountability	  structures	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  as	  they	  were	  enacted	  in	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis,	  I	  define	  accountability	  as	  the	  prioritization	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  specific	  group	  or	  community.	  The	  specific	  groups	  I	  focus	  on	  are	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  who	  are	  labeled	  “socially	  vulnerable:”	  low-­‐income	  residents,	  people	  of	  color,	  women,	  youth,	  elderly	  and	  people	  with	  disabilities;	  and	  the	  second	  group,	  non-­‐local	  volunteers	  who	  were	  only	  marginally	  affected	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina40.	  My	  examination	  of	  accountability	  develops	  in	  two	  parts.	  First	  I	  analyze	  the	  leadership	  structures	  governing	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  group	  leadership	  and	  direction	  are	  clues	  about	  whose	  interests	  are	  being	  served41.	  Second,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  work	  projects	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  focused	  on	  to	  better	  gauge	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  and	  of	  individual	  organizations.	  This	  criterion	  I	  developed	  in	  light	  of	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  work	  represented	  by	  project	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  See	  page	  37	  to	  38	  in	  Chapter	  2	  for	  a	  complete	  definition	  of	  social	  vulnerability.	  41	  See	  pages	  14	  to	  15	  for	  and	  explanation	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  examining	  leadership	  structure	  in	  organizations.	  See	  pages	  39	  to	  40	  for	  historical	  examples	  of	  ineffective	  disaster	  recovery	  leadership.	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Leadership	  structures	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  leadership	  and	  work	  supervision	  is	  a	  strong	  measure	  of	  accountability42.	  Thus,	  I	  examine	  the	  leadership	  structures	  in	  AmeriCorps	  host	  organizations	  as	  reported	  by	  project	  participants.	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  worked	  to	  the	  best	  of	  their	  ability	  despite	  being	  placed	  in	  extremely	  difficult	  situations.	  Their	  jobs	  often	  included	  large	  amounts	  of	  leadership	  and	  control.	  Every	  person	  I	  interviewed	  reported	  their	  own	  or	  fellow	  volunteers’	  lack	  of	  preparation	  for	  the	  positions	  they	  were	  placed	  in.	  Formal	  education	  and	  training	  can	  be	  very	  useful,	  even	  vital,	  but	  life	  experience	  can	  also	  make	  someone	  exceptionally	  qualified	  for	  a	  job.	  Generally,	  AmeriCorps	  participants	  were	  inexperienced,	  which	  would	  have	  rendered	  them	  unqualified	  for	  the	  positions	  they	  found	  themselves	  in	  if	  they	  had	  been	  employees	  rather	  than	  stipended	  volunteers43.	  AmeriCorps	  generally	  hired	  non-­‐local	  volunteers,	  which	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  is	  not	  un-­‐accountable	  to	  local	  residents,	  but	  these	  volunteers	  were	  placed	  in	  strong	  leadership	  positions	  with	  very	  little	  guidance	  regarding	  the	  work	  residents	  had	  requested.	  Their	  lack	  of	  experience	  and	  training	  in	  the	  fields	  in	  which	  they	  worked	  did	  not	  ensure	  quality	  services	  for	  disaster-­‐affected	  New	  Orleanians.	  The	  two	  local	  volunteers,	  who	  worked	  with	  United	  Residents,	  worked	  in	  their	  own	  neighborhoods	  where	  they	  had	  lived	  prior	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  This	  represents	  strong	  accountability—supporting	  local	  residents	  to	  help	  their	  own	  communities.	  The	  biggest	  issue	  is	  the	  preparation	  and	  direction	  provided	  to	  them,	  as	  both	  reported	  training	  and	  supervision	  to	  be	  lacking.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  even	  if	  one	  hires	  neighborhood	  residents,	  unless	  they	  come	  in	  with	  strong	  backgrounds	  related	  to	  their	  work	  assignments,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  See	  footnote	  on	  page	  27	  in	  Chapter	  2	  for	  scholarship	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  experienced	  leadership.	  43	  See	  pages	  26	  and	  27	  in	  Chapter	  2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  amateur	  volunteers.	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it	  is	  poor	  practice	  to	  simply	  throw	  them	  into	  the	  fire	  without	  appropriate	  training	  and	  clear	  job	  descriptions.	  United	  Residents	  would	  have	  increased	  their	  local	  accountability	  by	  hiring	  local	  people	  who	  had	  experience	  in	  community	  work,	  or	  provided	  these	  volunteers	  with	  strong	  skills.	  
	   Directing	  a	  summer	  camp	  for	  the	  first	  time	  ever	  with	  no	  preparation	  or	  experience	  not	  only	  threw	  one	  volunteer	  into	  a	  confusing	  and	  stressful	  situation,	  it	  ultimately	  impacted	  low-­‐income	  youth,	  all	  of	  whom	  experienced	  increased	  vulnerability	  resulting	  from	  disaster-­‐induced	  trauma.	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  tried	  to	  do	  their	  best	  but	  were	  not	  provided	  with	  the	  proper	  training	  to	  support	  some	  of	  our	  nation’s	  most	  vulnerable	  children.	  I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  this	  particular	  summer	  camp	  went	  badly	  or	  was	  not	  a	  great	  experience	  for	  those	  involved,	  I	  am	  saying	  that	  the	  AmeriCorps	  structure	  did	  not	  ensure	  that	  it	  would	  be.	  	  While	  the	  director	  of	  the	  summer	  camp	  was	  perhaps	  more	  qualified	  to	  do	  so	  having	  finished	  doing	  it	  once,	  she	  gained	  this	  experience	  through	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  with	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  youth,	  who	  should	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  training	  ground.	  This	  experience	  may	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  next	  summer	  camp	  she	  runs;	  however,	  the	  nature	  of	  AmeriCorps	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  mechanism	  designed	  to	  keep	  volunteers	  in	  their	  positions.	  The	  one-­‐year	  or	  ten-­‐month	  contracts	  allow	  volunteers	  to	  take	  this	  newly	  minted	  experience	  and	  use	  it	  to	  their	  advantage	  wherever	  they	  wish	  to	  travel,	  whether	  across	  the	  country	  or	  across	  the	  world.	  Thus,	  the	  community	  that	  supported	  this	  training	  and	  leadership	  development	  for	  the	  individual	  volunteer	  does	  not	  necessarily	  see	  the	  benefit	  of	  it	  through	  increased	  competence	  or	  understanding	  used	  to	  put	  on	  the	  next	  summer’s	  camp.	  To	  be	  clear,	  in	  this	  case	  this	  particular	  volunteer	  did	  stay	  on	  to	  direct	  three	  more	  summer	  camps	  in	  the	  same	  neighborhood,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  no	  AmeriCorps	  structure	  designed	  to	  keep	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her	  there.	  Rather,	  she	  was	  offered	  a	  job	  through	  United	  Residents	  following	  her	  term	  of	  service.	  	  The	  NCCC	  team	  was	  sent	  to	  New	  Orleans	  to	  develop,	  from	  the	  ground	  up,	  a	  branch	  of	  a	  national	  non-­‐profit,	  Collaborating	  Volunteers.	  They,	  ages	  18	  to	  24,	  were	  sent	  to	  one	  of	  the	  non-­‐profit’s	  sites	  in	  Biloxi	  for	  a	  week	  to	  “see	  how	  it	  works.”	  They	  then	  traveled	  to	  New	  Orleans	  where	  they,	  in	  addition	  to	  one	  staff	  person,	  were	  tasked	  with	  developing	  a	  non-­‐profit	  volunteer	  program	  in	  Central	  City.	  While	  both	  NCCC	  volunteers	  reported	  liking	  “the	  challenge”	  and	  the	  leadership	  they	  were	  awarded,	  the	  level	  of	  control	  they	  had	  over	  how	  the	  organization	  was	  going	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  city	  and	  returning	  New	  Orleanians	  is	  problematic.	  This	  team	  was	  only	  supposed	  to	  be	  on	  this	  project	  for	  8	  weeks,	  though	  it	  was	  extended	  to	  12	  before	  they	  traveled	  to	  their	  next	  site.	  Their	  level	  of	  accountability	  was	  limited	  because	  they	  did	  not	  see	  the	  long-­‐term	  impacts	  of	  their	  work,	  and	  they	  were	  not	  held	  accountable	  for	  structures	  they	  put	  in	  place.	  Not	  only	  is	  a	  week	  in	  Biloxi	  not	  long	  enough	  to	  “understand	  how	  a	  non-­‐profit	  works”	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  able	  to	  build	  one	  from	  the	  ground	  up,	  but	  it	  is	  irresponsible	  for	  a	  group	  with	  limited	  understanding	  of	  Katrina	  and	  New	  Orleans	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  developing	  a	  full-­‐fledged.	  	  According	  to	  Paul	  Kivel,	  effective	  work	  in	  a	  community	  requires	  connections	  that	  “break	  down	  isolation”	  (2007,	  146).	  One	  interviewee	  in	  my	  study	  reported	  that	  the	  organization’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  neighborhood	  was	  “distant”—exactly	  the	  opposite	  type	  of	  relationship	  one	  should	  have	  with	  people	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  help44.	  Strong	  relationships	  with	  those	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  and	  those	  affected	  by	  the	  storm	  will	  breed	  innovative	  and	  accountable	  relief	  practices.	  Thus,	  the	  short-­‐term,	  in-­‐and-­‐out	  type	  process	  embodied	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  For	  example,	  SNCC’s	  leaders	  were	  working	  in	  Mississippi	  for	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  Freedom	  Summer.	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NCCC’s	  engagement	  with	  local	  communities	  can	  only	  brush	  the	  surface—acceptable	  if	  they	  are	  taking	  leadership	  from	  those	  who	  are	  from	  the	  area	  and	  have	  strong	  relationships	  already	  built,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  they	  were	  the	  leaders	  and	  guiding	  short	  term	  volunteers45.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  extremely	  temporary	  nature	  of	  the	  NCCC	  program	  and	  the	  high	  level	  of	  leadership	  this	  group	  was	  awarded	  seriously	  restricts	  the	  level	  of	  accountability	  they	  had	  to	  residents	  affected	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  SVCOA	  volunteers	  in	  their	  second	  service	  year.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  severe	  housing	  crisis	  they	  were	  tasked	  with	  building	  a	  homeless	  shelter	  in	  the	  church	  where	  they	  were	  staying	  and	  working.	  Despite	  lack	  of	  training	  and	  expertise,	  they	  jumped	  at	  the	  chance	  to	  do	  something	  about	  this	  social	  problem.	  In	  three	  weeks	  they	  built	  bunk	  beds	  in	  the	  church,	  and	  started	  doing	  intake	  interviews.	  They	  had	  no	  guidance	  or	  training	  regarding	  shelter	  management.	  This	  situation	  deserves	  highlighting	  as	  an	  exceptional	  show	  of	  inexperienced	  leadership	  being	  tasked	  with	  serving	  disaster	  affected	  residents	  in	  very	  vulnerable	  positions.	  Their	  host	  organization	  and	  AmeriCorps	  allowed	  them	  to	  operate	  at	  a	  level	  beyond	  their	  qualifications46.	  It	  is	  not	  accountable	  to	  a	  very	  vulnerable	  population—post-­‐Katrina	  homeless	  residents—to	  provide	  them	  with	  young,	  inexperienced	  volunteers	  who	  have	  never	  experienced	  homelessness	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  something	  as	  necessary	  as	  a	  shelter.	  Indeed,	  one	  informant	  explained	  that	  after	  five	  months	  they	  spent	  a	  summer	  “regrouping	  and	  processing”	  and	  realized	  that	  a	  safe,	  overnight	  space	  was	  just	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  needs	  expressed	  by	  people	  experiencing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  While	  the	  NCCC	  volunteers	  were	  in	  New	  Orleans	  for	  a	  short	  amount	  of	  time,	  “short	  term	  volunteers”	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  sentence	  were	  groups	  of	  volunteers	  who	  came	  from	  other	  areas	  to	  volunteer	  for	  a	  week	  or	  two.	  46	  Again,	  qualifications	  in	  this	  study	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  formal	  education	  and	  training	  but	  also	  personal	  experience	  that	  increases	  a	  person’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  task	  at	  hand.	  In	  this	  case,	  experiencing	  homelessness	  or	  having	  worked	  in	  shelters	  previously	  is	  considered	  valuable.	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homelessness.	  Presumably	  both	  people	  who	  have	  experienced	  homelessness	  and	  those	  who	  have	  worked	  in	  this	  capacity	  before	  would	  know	  this	  coming	  into	  the	  situation.	  Again,	  the	  experience	  these	  volunteers	  gained	  could	  be	  very	  helpful	  as	  they	  continue	  this	  work,	  provided	  they	  had	  stayed	  in	  New	  Orleans	  working	  with	  a	  shelter.	  The	  system	  is	  set-­‐up,	  however,	  so	  that	  there	  is	  a	  very	  high	  turnover	  in	  organizations.	  As	  individuals	  struggle	  with	  the	  financial	  reality	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  stipend,	  they	  cannot	  remain	  in	  their	  positions	  for	  extended	  amounts	  of	  time.	  Additionally,	  AmeriCorps	  explicitly	  discourages	  people	  from	  doing	  more	  than	  two	  or	  three	  terms	  of	  service.	  	  Thus,	  incoming	  lack	  of	  experience	  and	  training	  coupled	  with	  a	  high	  turnover	  rate	  can	  lead	  to	  ineffective,	  sub-­‐par	  and	  sometimes	  dangerous	  situations	  for	  residents	  who	  have	  just	  experienced	  disasters.	  	  
Work	  priorities	  The	  actual	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  that	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  did	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  as	  it	  exemplified	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  and	  the	  host	  organizations.	  The	  Gutters	  generally	  gutted	  private	  residences,	  benefiting	  homeowners.	  They	  also	  reported	  doing	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  that	  directly	  benefited	  short-­‐term	  volunteers,	  such	  as	  packing	  coolers	  with	  cold	  drinks	  for	  the	  work	  crews,	  building	  showers	  in	  volunteer	  housing,	  and	  cooking	  meals	  for	  volunteer	  teams.	  The	  Agenda	  Setters	  also	  reported	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  centered	  on	  short-­‐term	  volunteer	  teams.	  SVCOA	  volunteers	  started	  a	  tutoring	  program	  at	  a	  local	  public	  school	  that	  potentially	  benefited	  students	  and	  teachers.	  They	  also	  worked	  with	  the	  Mid-­‐City	  Neighborhood	  Association,	  comprised	  almost	  exclusively	  of	  homeowners,	  specifically	  those	  who	  had	  been	  able	  to	  return	  to	  the	  city.	  They	  started	  a	  homeless	  shelter	  to	  help	  house	  some	  of	  the	  many	  homeless	  residents.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  with	  GNO	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Rebuilds	  reported	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  activities,	  the	  majority	  of	  which	  focused	  on	  organizational	  maintenance	  like	  submitting	  a	  501(c)	  3	  application,	  grant	  writing,	  and	  website	  and	  newsletter	  publishing.	  The	  VISTAs’	  main	  priority	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  university	  was	  to	  increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  their	  host	  organizations	  to	  host	  service	  learning	  students.	  They	  all	  assisted	  the	  organizations	  in	  various	  ways,	  but	  ultimately	  they	  were	  there	  to	  build	  the	  service-­‐learning	  program	  that	  provided	  volunteer	  opportunities	  for	  mostly	  non-­‐local,	  mostly	  white,	  college	  students.	  The	  Political	  Activists	  tailored	  their	  work	  around	  the	  leadership	  of	  local	  activists	  and	  community	  organizers.	  They	  often	  worked	  with	  short-­‐term,	  non-­‐local	  volunteers,	  and	  challenged	  them	  in	  anti-­‐racist,	  anti-­‐classist	  workshops	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  local	  organizations	  and	  leaders	  with	  experience	  and	  understanding	  of	  this	  work.	  	   What	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  no	  one	  in	  my	  sample	  reported	  being	  accountable	  or	  working	  for	  the	  direct	  benefit	  of	  people	  still	  evacuated,	  especially	  low-­‐income	  people	  and	  renters.	  Homeowners,	  even	  those	  evacuated,	  benefited	  from	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  The	  Gutters.	  There	  was	  no	  structure	  in	  place	  to	  use	  this	  labor	  on	  rental	  properties	  or	  public	  housing,	  both	  of	  which	  were	  sorely	  needed	  for	  the	  return	  of	  low-­‐income	  residents.	  Homeowners	  also	  benefited	  from	  the	  alliance	  between	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  and	  neighborhood	  associations.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  homeowners	  do	  not	  “deserve”	  this	  benefit—indeed,	  in	  New	  Orleans	  especially,	  there	  are	  many	  low-­‐income	  homeowners	  who	  could	  use	  this	  support.	  The	  majority	  of	  their	  equity	  was	  in	  their	  homes	  that	  the	  flood	  destroyed,	  and	  AmeriCorps	  and	  other	  volunteer	  labor	  helped	  to	  restore	  this	  property.	  Renters	  and	  public	  housing	  residents	  did	  not	  receive	  this	  assistance.	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   SVCOA	  volunteers	  did	  start	  a	  homeless	  shelter	  in	  2007,	  which	  was	  important	  considering	  the	  housing	  crisis	  plaguing	  the	  city	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  issue	  with	  this	  project	  is	  not	  the	  intentions	  but	  the	  execution.	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  with	  no	  experience	  in	  shelter	  programming,	  design	  or	  management	  were	  in	  charge.	  While	  it	  is	  important	  to	  prioritize	  services	  for	  homeless	  returning	  residents,	  the	  volunteers	  in	  this	  case	  were	  under	  qualified.	  Leadership	  of	  local	  community	  members	  and	  organizers	  would	  have	  been	  a	  more	  accountable	  practice.	  The	  priorities	  in	  place	  for	  those	  in	  the	  VISTA	  group	  and	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  were	  some	  of	  the	  least	  accountable	  to	  displaced	  residents.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  individual	  volunteers	  were	  unaccountable;	  in	  fact,	  a	  few	  of	  them	  mentioned	  resisting	  the	  structures	  set	  up	  to	  try	  and	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  people	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  disaster47.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  a	  VISTA	  volunteer	  “getting	  in	  a	  fight”	  with	  the	  university,	  which	  was	  trying	  to	  make	  her	  take	  two	  hundred	  service-­‐learning	  students	  while	  she	  knew	  it	  would	  be	  harmful	  to	  her	  organization.	  Another	  VISTA	  spent	  some	  of	  her	  time	  assisting	  local	  artists	  in	  their	  return	  to	  the	  city,	  which	  was	  not	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  university.	  New	  organizational	  maintenance	  and	  supporting	  service-­‐learning	  students	  is	  not	  in	  alliance	  with	  the	  priorities	  of	  residents	  who	  experienced	  the	  most	  serious	  devastation	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  This	  is	  a	  case	  where	  the	  use	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  as	  a	  disaster	  response	  program	  is	  exceptionally	  inappropriate—these	  efforts	  to	  support	  service	  learning	  students	  or	  the	  survival	  of	  a	  new	  organization	  might	  be	  more	  understandable	  in	  a	  city	  that	  was	  not	  recovering	  from	  a	  devastating	  disaster,	  but	  in	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  they	  were	  an	  inappropriate	  emphasis	  for	  a	  federal	  program	  to	  focus	  on,	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  I	  have	  identified.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  This	  resistance	  is	  not	  historically	  unique	  as	  significant	  numbers	  of	  early	  VISTA	  volunteers	  defied	  organizational	  and	  program	  regulations.	  See	  pages	  9	  to	  11	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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   In	  discussing	  this	  work	  I	  want	  to	  emphasize	  that	  post-­‐Katrina	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  put	  in	  strong	  effort	  considering	  the	  conditions	  they	  were	  working	  under.	  My	  point	  is	  that	  there	  were	  no	  structures	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  work	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  directly	  benefited	  those	  who	  were	  disproportionally	  affected	  by	  the	  disaster.	  In	  fact,	  the	  two	  Political	  Activists	  who	  were	  most	  accountable	  to	  local	  leadership	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  low-­‐income	  people	  of	  color	  did	  so	  by	  breaking	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  that	  prohibit	  political	  action.	  The	  Political	  Activists	  and	  one	  member	  of	  GNO	  Rebuilds	  emphasized	  cultural	  understanding	  over	  technical	  training.	  They	  explained	  that	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  that	  a	  volunteer	  can	  come	  in	  with	  is	  anti-­‐racism	  training,	  “a	  clear	  sense	  of	  solidarity”	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  culture	  they	  are	  working	  in.	  The	  political	  activists	  began	  their	  AmeriCorps	  service	  with	  some	  experience	  because	  they	  had	  been	  working	  with	  TiES	  for	  months	  before	  they	  received	  AmeriCorps	  stipends;	  still	  they	  both	  claimed	  they	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  learn	  from	  local	  grassroots	  organizations.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  AmeriCorps	  in	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006	  there	  was	  no	  structure	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  volunteers	  worked	  in	  responsible	  and	  accountable	  ways;	  rather	  it	  was	  left	  up	  to	  the	  organization	  and,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  individual.	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Chapter	  6.	  CONCLUSION	  This	  study	  is	  not	  a	  snapshot	  of	  a	  typical	  AmeriCorps	  program,	  but	  rather	  a	  study	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program’s	  response	  to	  an	  exceptionally	  devastating	  disaster.	  While	  some	  of	  my	  findings	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  the	  program	  as	  a	  whole,	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  AmeriCorps	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  federal	  disaster	  response	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  Thus,	  I	  have	  examined	  the	  role	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  following	  Katrina	  and	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  the	  mass	  evacuation	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  The	  volunteers	  represented	  in	  this	  research	  did	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  work	  and	  rose	  to	  the	  task	  of	  assisting	  recovery	  in	  whatever	  way	  possible.	  They	  were	  sometimes	  placed	  in	  nearly	  impossible	  situations	  and	  worked	  to	  the	  best	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  useful,	  sustainable	  programs.	  Ultimately	  I	  want	  to	  lift	  up	  the	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  who	  gave	  of	  their	  blood,	  sweat	  and	  tears	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions	  and	  full	  efforts.	  They	  were	  placed,	  as	  one	  put	  it,	  “in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  firestorm”	  with	  little	  preparation,	  training	  or	  guidance.	  In	  a	  city	  with	  a	  massive	  housing	  crisis	  they	  opened	  homeless	  shelters.	  In	  areas	  with	  little	  to	  no	  available	  heath	  care	  they	  supervised	  and	  assisted	  clinics.	  They	  flyered	  neighborhoods,	  taught	  classes,	  organized	  fundraisers,	  worked	  against	  societal	  oppression	  and	  gutted	  thousands	  of	  flooded	  homes.	  These	  efforts	  and	  the	  people	  who	  sustained	  them	  are	  to	  be	  commended.	  My	  ultimate	  criticism	  lies	  with	  the	  structural	  components	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  which	  served	  to	  support	  volunteers	  and	  inhibit	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  residents.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  an	  effective	  disaster	  program.	  As	  shown	  by	  my	  research,	  it	  did	  not	  support	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  residents,	  nor	  did	  it	  ensure	  that	  volunteers	  worked	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  accountable	  to	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  disaster.	  AmeriCorps	  generally	  placed	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inexperienced,	  under-­‐qualified	  volunteers	  in	  leadership	  positions	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  Their	  work,	  be	  it	  good	  or	  bad,	  affects	  our	  most	  vulnerable	  people—those	  who	  directly	  experienced	  the	  disaster,	  often	  people	  of	  color,	  people	  with	  low	  incomes,	  youth,	  the	  elderly,	  homeless	  people—and	  there	  is	  no	  systemic	  assurance	  that	  it	  will	  be	  good.	  Even	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  seemingly	  exclusively	  physical	  labor	  as	  a	  work	  assignment,	  informants	  reported	  being	  make-­‐shift	  counselors	  for	  people	  suffering	  from	  trauma,	  which	  could	  have	  devastating	  effects	  on	  both	  the	  volunteer	  and	  resident.	  Additionally,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program’s	  benefits	  placed	  a	  significant	  burden	  on	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  to	  support	  volunteers.	  Additionally,	  the	  housing	  requirements,	  limited	  stipends	  and	  poor	  health	  insurance	  burdened	  the	  wounded	  city’s	  services	  even	  more.	  Many	  volunteers	  were	  housed	  in	  former	  shelters,	  making	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  people	  in	  need	  of	  social	  services	  to	  return.	  Should	  injury	  or	  illness	  occur,	  which	  it	  did	  often	  due	  to	  the	  hazardous	  working	  conditions,	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  disproportionately	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  charity	  health	  care	  system,	  which	  was	  struggling	  to	  provide	  reasonable	  care	  for	  the	  returning	  population.	  AmeriCorps	  does	  give	  young	  people	  a	  chance	  to	  gain	  real-­‐life	  experience	  by	  working	  in	  capacities	  which	  challenge	  them	  to	  think	  and	  problem	  solve.	  This	  experience	  is	  built	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  ten	  to	  twelve	  month	  term	  on	  a	  steep	  learning	  curve.	  Following	  this	  term	  there	  is	  no	  programmatic	  encouragement	  for	  volunteers	  to	  continue	  the	  same	  work	  in	  the	  same	  area.	  Organizations	  that	  host	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  often	  do	  so	  because	  of	  the	  low-­‐cost	  of	  such	  labor.	  Thus,	  they	  often	  do	  not	  have	  the	  budget	  to	  hire	  volunteers	  once	  their	  service	  is	  up,	  but	  rather	  end	  up	  taking	  on	  another,	  new	  AmeriCorps	  worker	  to	  start	  the	  learning	  process	  all	  over	  again.	  The	  experience	  that	  the	  organization,	  city	  and	  the	  people	  a	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volunteer	  was	  working	  with	  imparted	  on	  them	  moves	  with	  the	  volunteer	  and	  is	  not	  returned	  or	  built	  upon	  as	  it	  would	  be	  with	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment.	  After	  an	  acute	  disaster	  this	  impact	  on	  the	  city	  and	  those	  utilizing	  the	  services	  of	  these	  organizations	  is	  that	  much	  more	  significant	  because	  of	  the	  increased	  level	  of	  trauma	  and	  need	  for	  services	  among	  the	  general	  population.	  	  I	  have	  determined	  that	  AmeriCorps	  is	  not	  an	  appropriate	  disaster	  response	  program,	  according	  to	  the	  specific	  criteria	  I	  have	  established	  for	  a	  just	  and	  effective	  disaster	  response	  program	  and	  my	  case-­‐study	  examination	  of	  volunteers	  in	  New	  Orleans	  in	  2006.	  AmeriCorps	  did	  not	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  support	  the	  return	  of	  evacuated	  residents,	  a	  priority	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  local	  grassroots	  organizations	  emphasize.	  The	  program	  in	  New	  Orleans	  did	  not	  appropriately	  interact	  with	  post-­‐disaster	  resources	  such	  as	  housing	  and	  health	  care—it	  	  expected	  local	  organizations	  to	  house	  volunteers	  and	  hospitals	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  tab	  for	  caring	  for	  minimally	  insured	  volunteers.	  AmeriCorps	  structures	  did	  not	  encourage	  accountability	  to	  “socially	  vulnerable”	  people	  affected	  by	  Hurricane	  Katrina.	  Inexperienced	  volunteers	  were	  placed	  in	  leadership	  positions	  above	  their	  qualification	  levels	  and	  their	  work	  priorities	  often	  focused	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  non-­‐local	  volunteers	  or	  New	  Orleans	  residents	  with	  greater	  access	  to	  resources.	  	  
Policy	  Recommendations	  Following	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  exemplified	  irresponsible	  and	  un-­‐accountable	  federal	  disaster	  response.	  In	  its	  current	  state	  I	  do	  not	  encourage	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  to	  be	  used	  as	  disaster	  response;	  however,	  I	  realistically	  believe	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  used	  in	  such	  capacity.	  Thus,	  I	  have	  three	  main	  policy	  recommendations	  that	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would	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  as	  a	  just	  component	  of	  government	  disaster	  response.	  These	  recommendations	  parallel	  Chapter	  5,	  focusing	  on	  the	  return	  of	  IDPs,	  appropriate	  interaction	  with	  local	  post-­‐disaster	  resources	  and	  ensuring	  accountability	  in	  volunteer	  work.	  	  The	  first	  policy	  recommendation	  addresses	  the	  needs	  of	  New	  Orleans	  evacuees,	  or	  IDPs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  disasters	  that	  require	  mass	  evacuation,	  displaced	  residents	  should	  be	  given	  priority	  in	  the	  AmeriCorps	  hiring	  process	  and	  they	  should	  be	  specifically	  recruited.	  	  IDPs	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  use	  an	  AmeriCorps	  position	  to	  help	  them	  return	  home.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  should	  also	  ensure	  that	  supporting	  the	  return	  of	  residents	  is	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  priorities	  for	  volunteers	  and	  place	  them	  with	  organizations	  that	  are	  doing	  this	  work.	  	  The	  second	  policy	  recommendation	  involves	  appropriate	  support	  of	  incoming	  volunteers.	  Following	  an	  acute	  disaster,	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  should	  gather	  information	  about	  the	  local	  situation	  and	  available	  resources	  and	  commit	  to	  placing	  a	  small	  to	  nonexistent	  burden	  on	  the	  disaster	  zone	  to	  support	  incoming	  volunteers.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans,	  this	  would	  have	  included	  a	  housing	  stipend	  which	  would	  allow	  volunteers	  to	  pay	  market-­‐rate	  rent,	  full	  health	  coverage	  and	  counseling	  for	  all	  volunteers.	  This	  would	  have	  eliminated	  the	  need	  to	  use	  former	  shelter	  space	  and	  decreased	  the	  burden	  on	  local	  hospitals	  and	  clinics.	  The	  third	  policy	  recommendation	  encourages	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  to	  adopt	  systems	  that	  ensure	  volunteer	  accountability	  to	  “socially	  vulnerable”	  residents.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  “social	  vulnerability”	  is	  a	  product	  of	  social	  inequality,	  and	  renders	  some	  populations	  more	  susceptible	  to	  disasters.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  should	  ensure	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organizational	  leadership	  comes	  from	  local	  people	  who	  have	  experience	  working	  to	  reduce	  social	  inequality	  in	  their	  communities.	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  should	  be	  placed	  in	  positions	  that	  match	  their	  qualification	  levels.	  In	  no	  case	  should	  a	  twenty-­‐two	  year	  old	  language	  major	  be	  running	  a	  health	  clinic	  or	  an	  untrained	  person	  be	  conducting	  intake	  interviews	  at	  a	  homeless	  shelter	  due	  to	  the	  harm	  that	  can	  come	  to	  them	  and	  the	  people	  utilizing	  these	  services.	  The	  AmeriCorps	  program	  should	  train	  volunteers	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  supporting	  local	  leadership.	  This	  includes	  some	  of	  the	  recommendations	  interviewees	  made	  for	  orientation	  and	  training	  workshops	  such	  as	  anti-­‐racism,	  community	  organizing,	  and	  accountability.	  When	  supportive	  roles	  are	  placed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  larger	  social	  change	  they	  become	  more	  palatable	  to	  volunteers	  with	  class	  and	  educational	  privilege	  who	  might	  expect	  a	  stronger	  leadership	  role.	  	  	  
Further	  Research	  One	  component	  that	  is	  missing	  from	  my	  study	  is	  data	  from	  organizations	  and	  supervisors,	  both	  those	  that	  hosted	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  and	  those	  that	  did	  not.	  An	  organizational	  study	  of	  the	  decisions	  leaders	  made	  around	  hosting	  volunteers	  would	  lend	  insight	  into	  the	  process	  of	  matching	  volunteers	  with	  organizations	  and	  the	  process	  of	  federal	  site	  selection.	  Though	  I	  attempted	  statistical	  searches,	  they	  ultimately	  dead-­‐ended.	  	  A	  compilation	  of	  statistics	  about	  post-­‐disaster	  volunteers,	  both	  those	  who	  were	  government	  sponsored	  and	  those	  who	  were	  not,	  would	  assist	  researchers	  in	  placing	  sample	  sets	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  context.	  The	  boundaries	  of	  my	  research	  isolate	  a	  very	  unique	  AmeriCorps	  locale	  and	  volunteer	  responsibilities.	  I	  can	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  identify	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  post-­‐
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Katrina	  situation	  compared	  to	  the	  general	  AmeriCorps	  volunteer	  situation,	  but	  it	  will	  not	  be	  comprehensive	  without	  further	  studies	  of	  other	  AmeriCorps	  locations,	  or	  even	  an	  updated	  study	  of	  AmeriCorps	  in	  New	  Orleans	  five	  years	  after	  Katrina.	  In	  order	  to	  compile	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  and	  volunteers	  in	  general,	  more	  independent	  studies	  need	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  volunteers	  on	  low-­‐income	  areas	  across	  the	  country.	  I	  intentionally	  focused	  on	  the	  organizational	  and	  systemic	  components	  of	  volunteerism	  in	  this	  study	  despite	  a	  wealth	  of	  data	  about	  the	  individual	  feelings	  and	  concerns	  of	  volunteers.	  It	  could	  be	  interesting	  and	  useful	  to	  analyze	  how	  volunteers	  talked	  about	  the	  city	  and	  their	  experiences—as	  a	  sort	  of	  alternative	  source	  of	  information	  about	  the	  situation	  for	  their	  geographically	  diverse	  friends	  and	  family.	  Researchers	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  volunteer	  retention	  rates	  might	  want	  to	  focus	  further	  research	  on	  stress	  levels	  and	  financial	  resources—two	  of	  the	  most	  cited	  reasons	  for	  not	  completing	  a	  second	  year.	  Ultimately	  I	  urge	  all	  researchers	  to	  approach	  volunteerism	  with	  a	  critical	  lens,	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  it	  is	  a	  privilege	  to	  be	  able	  to	  volunteer	  for	  a	  year.	  Volunteers	  are	  channeled	  into	  systems:	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  that	  are	  all	  influenced	  by	  political	  and	  economic	  motives	  and	  must	  be	  placed	  in	  a	  historical	  context.	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APPENDIX	  B	  
Email	  to	  recruit	  potential	  study	  participants	  	   Hello,	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers!	  I	  am	  a	  graduate	  student	  working	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Dr.	  Rachel	  Luft	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Sociology	  at	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  	  I	  am	  conducting	  a	  research	  study	  that	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  Katrina	  relief.	  For	  this	  study,	  I	  am	  looking	  to	  enlist	  the	  help	  of	  individuals	  who	  volunteered	  through	  AmeriCorps	  State/National	  or	  AmeriCorps	  VISTA	  in	  the	  Greater	  New	  Orleans	  area	  between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  study,	  each	  of	  the	  participants	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  participate	  in	  one	  interview	  that	  will	  last	  approximately	  one	  hour.	  This	  study	  is	  completely	  voluntary,	  and	  participants	  can	  opt	  out	  of	  answering	  any	  questions	  or	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study	  at	  any	  time.	  Confidentiality	  of	  your	  identity	  and	  that	  of	  any	  organizations	  will	  be	  maintained	  at	  all	  time.	  We	  hope	  to	  create	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  volunteerism	  as	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  and	  investigate	  federal	  support	  of	  non-­‐profit	  and	  faith	  based	  organizations.	  	  We	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  participants,	  representing	  a	  spectrum	  of	  opinions	  about	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program,	  and	  diverse	  organizational	  placements.	  	  We	  are	  placing	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  in	  post-­‐Katrina	  New	  Orleans	  within	  the	  context	  of	  national	  disaster	  relief	  and	  are	  documenting	  the	  ways	  federal	  influences	  affect	  local	  recovery	  and	  social	  justice	  organizing.	  	  Would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed?	  If	  so,	  please	  contact	  me,	  Emily	  Danielson	  at	  504-­‐259-­‐9116	  or	  emily.danielson@gmail.com.	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  C	  
Participant	  Consent	  Form	  
	   	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   [Date],	  2010	  
	  Dear	  Volunteer:	  I	  am	  a	  graduate	  student	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Dr.	  Rachel	  Luft	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Urban	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  	  We	  are	  conducting	  a	  research	  study	  that	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  Katrina	  relief.	  We	  hope	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  volunteers	  as	  well	  as	  federal	  support	  of	  specific	  organizations.	  We	  are	  focusing	  specifically	  on	  the	  service	  year	  2006-­‐2007,	  as	  it	  was	  a	  crucial	  time	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Katrina	  recovery.	  I	  am	  requesting	  your	  participation,	  which	  will	  involve	  one	  interview,	  lasting	  approximately	  one	  hour.	  Your	  participation	  in	  this	  study	  is	  voluntary.	  	  If	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  participate	  or	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study	  at	  any	  time,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  penalty.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  research	  study	  may	  be	  published,	  but	  your	  name	  will	  not	  be	  used.	  	  We	  have	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  ensure	  that	  you	  face	  minimal	  risks	  as	  a	  result	  of	  your	  participation.	  There	  may	  be	  slight	  risk	  should	  you	  choose	  to	  disclose	  unauthorized	  use	  of	  funded	  hours;	  however,	  AmeriCorps	  has	  no	  history	  of	  retroactively	  reviewing	  participants’	  volunteer	  hours.	  Again,	  your	  name	  and	  any	  individually	  identifying	  characteristics	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential.	  	  In	  this	  study	  we	  frame	  government-­‐sponsored	  volunteers	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  federal	  disaster	  response.	  Although	  there	  may	  be	  no	  direct	  benefit	  to	  you,	  the	  possible	  benefit	  of	  your	  participation	  is	  a	  greater	  collective	  understanding	  of	  volunteerism	  as	  disaster	  relief.	  We	  believe	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  scrutinize	  all	  aspects	  of	  Katrina	  relief	  to	  strengthen	  criticism	  of	  the	  federal	  response.	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  concerning	  the	  research	  study,	  please	  call	  me	  at	  (504)	  259-­‐9116.	  Sincerely,	  Emily	  Danielson	  By	  signing	  below	  you	  are	  giving	  consent	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  above	  study.	  	  	  ______________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________________________	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ______________	  Signature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Printed	  Name	   	   	   	   Date	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  your	  rights	  as	  a	  subject/participant	  in	  this	  research,	  or	  if	  you	  feel	  you	  have	  been	  placed	  at	  risk,	  please	  contact	  Dr.	  Ann	  O’Hanlon	  at	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Orleans	  (504)	  280-­‐3990.	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Participant	  Introduction	  to	  the	  study	  Hello,	  thank	  you	  for	  agreeing	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  project.	  I	  am	  conducting	  research	  on	  the	  role	  of	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  New	  Orleans	  following	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  framing	  AmeriCorps	  within	  federal	  disaster	  response.	  We	  hope	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  volunteers	  as	  well	  as	  federal	  support	  of	  specific	  organizations.	  	  
I	  have	  a	  few	  questions	  I	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you.	  Feel	  free	  to	  pass	  on	  any	  of	  them,	  or	  to	  stop	  the	  interview	  process	  at	  any	  time.	  Your	  participation	  is	  completely	  voluntary,	  and	  there	  will	  be	  no	  negative	  repercussions	  if	  you	  decide	  not	  to	  participate	  or	  wish	  to	  stop.	  
We	  will	  maintain	  confidentiality	  of	  your	  identity	  and	  that	  of	  any	  organizations	  you	  mention	  through	  code	  names.	  My	  adviser	  and	  I	  will	  be	  the	  only	  ones	  who	  knows	  identities	  and	  will	  not	  disclose	  it	  for	  any	  reason.	  If	  you	  consent	  to	  tape	  recording,	  I	  will	  transcribe	  the	  interview,	  save	  it	  in	  a	  password-­‐protected	  folder,	  and	  destroy	  the	  audio	  copy.	  You	  may	  have	  a	  copy	  of	  this	  transcript	  if	  you	  like,	  and	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  review	  it.	  May	  I	  tape	  record	  this	  interview?	  
Do	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  for	  me	  now,	  before	  we	  begin?	  
Here	  is	  a	  form	  for	  you	  with	  contact	  information	  for	  my	  adviser	  and	  me.	  Please	  feel	  free	  to	  contact	  us	  with	  any	  questions	  or	  concerns	  that	  may	  come	  up	  in	  the	  future.	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  E	  
Section	  of	  the	  AmeriCorps	  Contract	  Agreement	  	  The	  complete	  document	  of	  AmeriCorps	  rules	  and	  regulations	  can	  be	  accessed	  through	  links	  at	  http://www.americorps.gov/about/ac/rulemaking_faq.asp.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  I	  am	  including	  here	  the	  full	  text	  of	  an	  email	  sent	  by	  an	  AmeriCorps	  supervisor	  to	  current	  AmeriCorps	  volunteers	  in	  the	  New	  Orleans	  area.	  This	  was	  sent	  two	  weeks	  prior	  to	  the	  2010	  mayoral	  elections.	  §	  2520.65	  	  	  What	  activities	  are	  prohibited	  in	  AmeriCorps	  subtitle	  C	  programs?	  (a)	  While	  charging	  time	  to	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program,	  accumulating	  service	  or	  training	  hours,	  or	  otherwise	  performing	  activities	  supported	  by	  the	  AmeriCorps	  program	  or	  the	  Corporation,	  staff	  and	  members	  may	  not	  engage	  in	  the	  following	  activities:	  	  (1)	  Attempting	  to	  influence	  legislation;	  	  (2)	  Organizing	  or	  engaging	  in	  protests,	  petitions,	  boycotts,	  or	  strikes;	  	  (3)	  Assisting,	  promoting,	  or	  deterring	  union	  organizing;	  	  (4)	  Impairing	  existing	  contracts	  for	  services	  or	  collective	  bargaining	  agreements;	  	  (5)	  Engaging	  in	  partisan	  political	  activities,	  or	  other	  activities	  designed	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  election	  to	  any	  public	  office;	  	  (6)	  Participating	  in,	  or	  endorsing,	  events	  or	  activities	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  include	  advocacy	  for	  or	  against	  political	  parties,	  political	  platforms,	  political	  candidates,	  proposed	  legislation,	  or	  elected	  officials;	  	  (7)	  Engaging	  in	  religious	  instruction,	  conducting	  worship	  services,	  providing	  instruction	  as	  part	  of	  a	  program	  that	  includes	  mandatory	  religious	  instruction	  or	  worship,	  constructing	  or	  operating	  facilities	  devoted	  to	  religious	  instruction	  or	  worship,	  maintaining	  facilities	  primarily	  or	  inherently	  devoted	  to	  religious	  instruction	  or	  worship,	  or	  engaging	  in	  any	  form	  of	  religious	  proselytization;	  	  (8)	  Providing	  a	  direct	  benefit	  to—	  	  (i)	  A	  business	  organized	  for	  profit;	  	  (ii)	  A	  labor	  union;	  	  (iii)	  A	  partisan	  political	  organization;	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